

July, 1930

The Psychoanalytic Review

*A Journal Devoted to an
Understanding of Human Conduct*

EDITED AND PUBLISHED BY

ERNEST R. RUSSELL, M.D., and WITH ELY SELLIFF

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Journal of Medical Psychology.

EDITORIAL BOARD
Psychoanalytic Association.

Subscription Price: Quarterly, \$4.00 per Volume,
Single Numbers, \$1.75
Foreign, \$5.00

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BY THE

PSYCHOANALYTIC PUBLISHING COMPANY
370 BROADWAY, NEW YORK, N. Y.

WASHINGTON, D. C.
Entered as Second-Class Matter, July 1, 1910, at the Post Office at Albany, N. Y., under

Psychological Disease Monograph Series

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THE PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW

A JOURNAL DEVOTED TO AN
UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN CONDUCT

VOLUME XVII

JULY, 1930

NUMBER 3

ORIGINAL ARTICLES

AN ETHNOLOGIST'S FOOTNOTE TO "TOTEM AND TABOO"

BY MARGARET MEAD

AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY

"Thus we find again that taboo has grown out of the soil of an ambivalent emotional attitude. The taboo of the dead also originates from the opposition between the conscious grief and the unconscious satisfaction at death. If this is the origin of the resentment of spirits it is self-evident that just the nearest and formerly most beloved survivors have to fear it most."—Sigmund Freud, p. 103 of "Totem and Taboo."

"It is a necessary defect of studies which seek to apply the point of view of psychoanalysis to the mental sciences that they cannot do justice to either subject. They therefore confine themselves to the rôle of incentives and make suggestions to the expert which he should take into account in his work."—Ibid., p. 124.

In accordance with Dr. Freud's recommendation that the ethnologist seek to give more specialized applications to the general point of view expressed in "Totem and Taboo," I wish to discuss two hypotheses, on the basis of ethnographical material.

I. That granting the presence of an ambivalent attitude towards the dead, especially towards those individuals with whom we have been in intimate contact, which aspect of this ambivalent attitude will be the dominant and conscious one, and which aspect will be forced to keep out of sight and only express itself indirectly, is a function of the civilization in which an individual lives.

II. That it is possible to find a cultural solution of these conflicting attitudes which may obviate the need of suppressing either one.

I

In our civilization, joy, relief, even indifference toward the death of a relative or friend, are socially unacceptable attitudes. The

memory of the beloved dead must be kept green at all costs. Photographs are exhibited; bedrooms and studies left untouched; lockets and funeral wreaths made of the hair of the deceased. A lively expression of a belief in a greatly desired future reunion is considered to be the most "beautiful expression" of true grief. This picture of the perfect mourner leaves no room for another set of attitudes—a genuine relief or joy over the death of someone hated either for himself or because he stood in the way of some other relationship. It is not necessary to mull over inexpertly here the great number of psychoanalytic records illustrating the neuroses which arise through the violent efforts made to attain the socially approved attitudes. The obsessions of guilt for the death of someone towards whom a death wish has been entertained—the rituals of atonement—are familiar enough.

But granting that the existence of conflicting attitudes may result in serious conflicts, and even in real neuroses in particularly susceptible individuals, it is hardly in accord with the ethnographic evidence to assume that the *same* attitude will be uppermost and approved, and the same attitude be deprecated and outlawed, in all human societies. And as the conscious mind of the individual is molded and shaped by the traditions of his own society, so the attitudes which are permitted free uncensored play in any individual personality will vary from one civilization to another.

Attempts to clarify and explain the mourning behaviors of individuals in very different cultures in terms of the particular ambivalence of attitude which is institutionalized in our own culture, are likely to be misleading.

Among the Chukchee and Koryak of aboriginal Siberia the whole emphasis is laid upon the complete removal of the dead, the equipment of the spirit so that it will never return, the bewildering and baffling of the spirit so that it cannot find its way back to the abode of its relatives. In discussing the Siberian practices I shall reproduce Dr. Bogoras'¹ and Dr. Jochelson's² own words so as not to mar their accounts by the introduction of less vivid paraphrases. After death, among the Chukchee, "one man must stay all the time with the body, because should it be left alone it might revive and do

¹ W. Bogoras. "The Chukchee," Part II: Religion. *Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History*, Vol. XI, 1907.

² Jochelson. "The Koryak," Religion and Myths. *Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History*, Vol. VI, Part I.

harm."³ "Among other taboos connected with the funeral must be mentioned the interdictions against beating the drum for three nights during the time of the ceremony. The beating of the drum might call the deceased back to the house."⁴

Bogoras⁵ quotes a farewell speech of a wife to the corpse of her dead husband. "Well, well, what can I do, we have lived together for so many years and now you are going away. Do not keep an evil mind against me. My head was never very strong. If I acted unfairly toward you, have no bad feeling towards me." "At every hitch in this task (that of dressing the corpse in its burial clothes) the followers admonish the dead one, saying 'Leave off! Make haste! You have to go away, do not be so obstinate.'"⁶ "In most cases the body is carried out of the tent not through the entrance, but through the roof . . . or under the folds of the tent cover, somewhere on the back side of the tent. Every trace of this improvised exit is immediately obliterated; and thus the deceased one, if he should come back, would not be able to recognize the way."⁷ After reaching the grave and going through a number of ceremonies "the fortifier" (officiant) "cuts the throat of the corpse and leaves the body. This last stroke is to prevent the spirit of the deceased from following the people of the cortege and is considered quite indispensable."⁸ On the way home, the order of march is reversed, and many ceremonies and incantations are performed—the fortifier throwing behind him several small stones which become a "mountain," a bunch of grass which becomes a "forest," and a cup which becomes a "sea"; magical defenses against the return of the dead. On the return home "all the members of the procession, holding one another by the hand, form a large ring, which is encircled by that part of the thong that was taken home from the funeral. Each of the members takes hold of it, and each one cuts off the part nearest to himself. This severs all connection between them; and the spirit of the deceased, if it should ever come back, would have to find them out one by one."⁹ "The 'fortifying' person enchants a piece of

³ Bogoras, p. 519.

⁴ Op. cit., p. 521.

⁵ Op. cit., p. 519.

⁶ Op. cit., p. 520.

⁷ Op. cit., p. 525.

⁸ Op. cit., p. 528.

⁹ Op. cit., p. 529.

sheet iron having many holes pierced in it. This iron is placed under one of the skins of the bedding in the sleeping room. If the deceased should try to enter the sleeping room from under ground, he would be caught in the holes of the sheet iron which would act like an iron net."¹⁰ Two days later the relatives visit the grave. If beasts of prey have mutilated the dead body "the relatives feel secure."¹¹

"Fear of the dead and the idea of taking precautionary measures against their return are so deeply implanted in the Chukchee mind that they appear even in the children's plays. In the Maritime villages I saw young boys amusing themselves among the ruins of underground houses with a peculiar kind of play of this kind."¹²

The other side of the shield appears in native statements that some of the dead are protectors and in the custom of wearing pieces of the garments of the dead as amulets. So also in our civilization fear of the ghosts and superstitious avoidance of clothing belonging to a deceased person, and similar attitudes, are permitted to creep into the acceptable attitude of a yearning love which cherishes every memento of the dead and attempts to reconstruct a semblance of their very presence in our midst.

A notable feature of the mourning ceremonies of the Koryak, whose culture has many traits in common with the Chukchee, is the taboo against the manifestation of grief until after burial. The elaborate grave clothes cannot be finished until after death, and this sometimes entails two or three days' sewing. "While the dead person is in the house, he is considered as a member of the family and the people try to make it appear as though nothing had happened. It is supposed that he is participating in the meals of the family and in card playing. It is therefore forbidden to wait for the deceased before he has been taken out."¹³ "The Reindeer Koryak play (cards) on the body of the deceased, entertaining him in this manner."¹⁴

Jochelson describes in detail the burning of a baby girl. "When the clothes were burned, and the child's head appeared, her grandfather took a pole and thrusting it into the body, said, ' . . . This is the magpie of the underworld which pricked.' He imitated the

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 528.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 530.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 518.

¹³ Jochelson, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

¹⁴ *Loc. cit.*

actions of the magpie of the world of the dead, in order to inform the deceased that she was passing to another world, and must not return to the house. . . . Before leaving, the grandfather went around the pyre, first from right to left, and then from left to right, in order so to obscure his tracks that the deceased might not be able to follow him."¹⁵

This is, of course, only objective description of customary behaviors. We have no data upon the existence or nonexistence of conflicts leading to neuroses. But it would seem reasonable to postulate that in such a civilization, where the whole life of the community from childhood up is permeated with an attitude of fear and hostility toward the dead, the conflicts, if such did arise, would be different from those which distress the susceptible in our own culture. The stress is so very different. It would be in the individuals who valued their loved ones too intensely, who wished to cherish and fondle the dead, who clung to each last vestige of contact with the departed, that conflict would arise. In our culture it is the boy who banged all the doors in the house when told his father was dying, to make him die faster, or the man who waited with breathless anxiety as the coffin lid was nailed on tightly, who has an obsession of guilt. But it would be the Koryak wife who wailed loudly and uncontrollably while the men of the household played cards on the corpse; the Chukchee father who could not bear to have the throat of his son cut, who neglected to throw behind him the stone which would become a protective wall between him and the dead; the woman who secretly removed the iron screen in which the returning ghost should have been entangled, who might be expected to develop conflicts. Such attitudes as these would be socially unacceptable. The conscious personality, carefully shaped by a vigorous cultural tradition, would thrust such dangerous, anti-social, wicked attitudes away from it; and it would be excessive sorrow, not excessive relief at a death, which would produce conflict.

Such a hypothesis does not bring into question the probability of the origin in an original ambivalence of feeling, of funeral customs in which contradicting attitudes toward the dead are found mingled together. But it would claim that a civilization may seize upon one or the other of these attitudes, elaborate it, ramify it, institutionalize it, until the reverse attitude, outlawed by society, is made an outlaw in each individual personality which is shaped by that society.

¹⁵ Op. cit., p. 112.

II

Only where this emphasis is extreme and the deprecation of a contrary attitude is very severe, would a serious conflict arise. Where the society preserves institutional expressions of both attitudes, it may be that the possibilities of conflict are practically obviated. Such a case might be the curious twist which the Bagobo of the Philippines give to the very widespread idea of multiple souls.

The theory of multiple souls is a bit of primitive theology not necessarily endowed with any strong emotional tone. It may be a numerical concept bound up with an elaborate system of sacred number, as in the Malay Peninsula,¹⁶ where a man was said to have seven souls, but the nature of the seven was undifferentiated. Or it may take the form found among the Yakut of Siberia,¹⁷ who believe that man is composed of (i) *tyn*, "life," "breath"; (ii) *kut*, the physical soul, and (iii) *sur*, the psychic soul. *Kut* is common to men, animals, and plants, and is composed of three parts, (a) *buoi-kut*, literally earth soul, *i.e.*, soul composed of earthly elements; (b) *salgyn-kut*, literally air soul, *i.e.*, composed of air; (c) *giy'd-kut*, "mother soul," the maternal element. Souls may be ascribed to different parts of the body and a man with a frozen foot be described as "short of souls." Distinctions between "dream souls," "shadow souls"—a soul which perishes at death in contradistinction to one which does not, are also widely distributed ideas. The mere attribution of several souls to each individual need not exert any influence upon the affective attitudes in the face of death.

But the Bagobo¹⁸ have given this widely spread notion of multiple souls a special emphasis by distinguishing a right-hand soul, which is beneficent, and a left-hand soul, which is malevolent. The ambivalence inherent in emotional attitudes is transferred categorically to the *object* of the attitude, and so a resolution of the conflict is made possible. The *takarwanan* (good soul) is associated, in native thinking, with those factors of existence which stand for life, health, activity, joy; while the *tebang* (bad soul) is associated with factors that tend toward death, sickness, sluggishness, pain. The left-hand soul often departs from the human body and does unlooked-for things that have an unhappy influence on the body: it undertakes alarming exploits; it wanders about as a dream spirit, thus produc-

¹⁶ W. Skeat. "Malay Magic," p. 50.

¹⁷ M. A. Czaplicka. "Aboriginal Siberia," p. 279.

¹⁸ Laura Benedict. "Bagobo Ceremonial, Magic and Myth." *Annals Science*, Vol. XXV, pp. 1-308, May, 1916.

ing nightmare, or at least horrible mental images during sleep. The right-hand soul, on the contrary, is associated with the normal continuity of existence, for it never leaves the body from birth until death, except to lie, at times, as the right-hand shadow still attached clingingly to the physical frame.¹⁹ After death the *Takawanan* goes to the city of the dead. Very different is the fate of the *Tebang*.²⁰ "Up to the time that the body is buried the left-hand soul still bears his old name of *tebang*, but after the funeral he is called *burkan* or *kamatoyan*. We may speak of him as a *buso* (demon) ghost, for convenience in designation, but there is now very little distinction between him and the rest of the demons. Like other *buso*, he digs up dead bodies, tears the flesh from the skeletons and devours the flesh; like other *buso*, he stands under the house of the dying, or hovers over it to drink the watery blood of the corpse. . . . In short, it is those mental images most abhorrent to Bagobo fancy that are pressed into service for picturing the future of that spirit that throws the shadow on the left side and looks at one strangely from the water."²¹ "An intelligent adult differentiates perfectly the tripartite nature which tradition has assigned to man,—there is a physical body that the *buso* will dig up and eat after it has been put under the soil, there is a good *takawanan* that goes to the One Country to continue its existence in a less substantial and more highly idealized manner than upon earth, although moved by like interests and like emotions to those that motivate him here, and, finally, there is an evil *tebang* that turns into a horrible man-eating *burkan*, perpetually roaming over the earth like a prey animal and preserving not a single tie or a single interest to bind him to the friends and activities of his mortal life."

A more ingenious device for permitting the free play of ambivalent attitudes towards a single individual or towards oneself could hardly be imagined. All that is evil, all that is detestable in one's living thoughts, in one's dream experiences, all the socially non-acceptable, thoroughly disreputable attitudes can be fastened upon this left-hand soul, who is even open to the accusation of having actually left the owner's body to carry out its evil purposes. Similarly, after death, all the relief, the hostility to the dead, the fear of an invasion of the reorganized lives of the survivors by the troublesome memory and presence of the dead—all these can be projected upon the *tebang*,

¹⁹ Op. cit., pp. 49-50.

²⁰ Op. cit., p. 60.

²¹ Op. cit., p. 63.

which is even robbed of all sense of personality or memory of its former associates. That the conflict is not quite resolved is shown by the fear that the good soul may try to take others with it on its long journey. But the grief over the loss of a loved one, the wish to cherish one who is dead and to care for him, are taken care of in the disposal of the right-hand soul which journeys to the One Country and is so loath to leave its dear ones behind that it must bathe in the dark waters of a river of forgetfulness before it is contented to remain in a country where "the rice . . . is of immaculate whiteness, and each grain as big as a kernel of corn; the camotes are the size of a great round pot, and every stick of sugar cane is as large as the trunk of a cocoanut palm."²²

Here again we do not have the data comparable to the numerous case histories which throw so much light upon the responses of individuals to our own culture. But it is again reasonable to urge that where a historical development has provided such a neat device for draining off the discrepant aspects of emotion into two socially approved channels, the cause for conflict, the need of suppressing one attitude and emphasizing the other at whatever cost, is at least partially removed.

SUMMARY

The concept of ambivalence which Dr. Freud has used to illuminate the origins of funeral ceremonies and contradictory attitudes towards the dead might also include the possibilities:

- I. That some cultures, rather than retaining a great number of contradictory elements, will tend to emphasize one aspect of the emotion, either grief and love as in our own culture, or fear, distrust, and hostility as in the Siberian cultures described; and that when one aspect is so heavily stressed, it is the other which, excessively developed, leads to conflict. Which aspect of the ambivalent attitude is culturally stressed will depend upon historical causes.
- II. Other cultures, like that of the Bagobo, may develop an institutionalized attitude towards personality which, objectifying the conflict between contradictory emotions, presents a cultural solution of the conflict and necessitates no such suppression on the part of the individual.

²² Op. cit., p. 55.

VIGILANCE, THE MOTOR PATTERN AND INNER MEANING IN SOME SCHIZOPHRENICS' BEHAVIOR *

BY SMITH ELY JELLIFFE, M.D., PH.D.

OF NEW YORK

At a previous meeting of this Association (1925) an effort was made to throw some light upon certain resemblances and differences in the behavior of individuals suffering from a type of disorder roughly envisaged as "schizophrenic" and others equally dimly grouped as "encephalitic."

In that contribution¹ the chief accent was laid upon what was termed the "Mental Picture," after preliminary remarks had outlined a point of view regarding the working fictions of nosology in general.

No contrasting situations such as epidemic encephalitis and schizophrenia are implied in the topic chosen to be presented at this session. Yet in that aspect of the former discussion which might be viewed in the light of a psychobiological reaction known as "schizophrenia" as resulting directly or indirectly from an infectious disease process known as lethargic encephalitis (v. Economo) certain issues emerge which are of paramount significance. It is to these in part that this study will devote its attention.

It is not to be assumed that an attempt will be made to discuss the thesis that even certain types of schizophrenia might be conceived of as due to an infectious process, such as encephalitis, or other related or nonrelated infection. While this might prove to be an interesting as well as a profitable adventure, it is not here contemplated. Nor, on the other hand, will it be a part of this enterprise to again attempt to show what for centuries has been proven to be true, that "ideas," "thoughts," "feelings," are just as capable of producing, under favorable situations, lesions of structure, capable of altering function in much the same, though often with differences, as toxins, bacteria, or traumata.

* Paper presented in synopsis at the Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease, Dec. 28, 1929.

¹ Jelliffe. The Mental Pictures in Schizophrenia and in Epidemic Encephalitis. *Am. Jour. of Psych.*, 6, 413, 1927.

In a previous effort, however, to outline the "Mental Pictures" certain "cross road" vistas appeared which open up wider if not new horizons for contemplation, and one can leave for the moment the problem whether schizophrenia is what is called an infectious, toxic, or a psychogenic disorder. Since this statement of it is held to be an academic pseudo-problem, it is left aside in this place.

Just where to enter into the "Mental Pictures" it is difficult to state, especially as it is claimed that "mental" has a fundamental motor behavioristic patterning. In simple words there is a long and subtly connected chain, or gradually accumulating combination of engraphic patterns or "gestalten," which, beginning with physico-chemical reactions, through reflex actions to biological motor responses of plants as well as animals, finally, in animals, through the freedom of the hands, advances to the facial musculature by displacement of productive energy to the development of thought as symbolic substitutes for and adjustments to bodily activity. This is the larger behavioristic pattern developed first through the methods of associational psychology, and then through the original mnemonic conceptions of Semon, to take on a more configurational form (Wertheimer, Koffka, Köhler) in which the psychoanalytic method in its formulation of "overdetermination" offers the most efficient tool for concrete study of mental configurations. Psychoanalysis has been given this importance since, in the combined conceptions of "overdetermination" and the "unconscious," the full significance of Semon's engram patternings can be envisaged and a much more searching analysis of the highly complex and phyletically agglutinated configurations or total reactions made possible. Needless to say that in the phyletic laying down of engram patterns in "structure" the anatomical method has tasks of interpretation which it alone can answer; similarly, physiology as a method must be invoked to analyze other aspects of the problems of behavior. Biochemistry may be at the bottom and its methods are here relevant. At the top the "psychosociological" methods are relevant and offer the chief causal interpretative insights, even if descriptive explanations may be forthcoming at lower levels.

No one doubts that, for instance, "hyperventilation" brought about experimentally or unconsciously can wash out the CO_2 in the alveoli of the lungs. This calls upon bivalent kations (chiefly, so far as known, Mg, Ca), and depletes the alkali reserve. This alters the resistance threshold permeability to stimuli in receptor, connector, or effector synapses resulting in increased eidetic imagery,

heightened pain susceptibility, or more reflex excitability, from spasmophilic, tetanic, even to the epileptic motor discharge. In this chain of advancing configurational responses the biochemical and physiological descriptions are pertinent. But they fail to tell the story of the body acting as a whole. As yet they tell us nothing of the function of the eidetic imagery, the heightened pain, the increased reflex excitability, or the convulsion. They may say they are factors in the bringing about of these things, but wherein are these "things"—these "phenomena"—interpretatively understandable as biogenetically arrived at as total bodily reactions against the specific trauma, *i.e.*, in this instance, the hyperventilation? The "meaning" of the convulsion is not revealed a particle.

In a former paper this type of situation was put into syllogistic form. For instance, from de Jong's² very interesting experiments with bulbo-capneine, it is known that in lower animals, mice, and higher, and Mella, de Jong, and Baruk have shown us here the same for higher animals, cats, monkeys, that a type of motor response called catatonic can be brought about. Hence the syllogism reads,

Bulbo-capneine will cause a catatonic attitude,
Bulbo-capneine is a poison (morphine group),
Ergo, catatonic attitudes are caused by poisons.

In the anatomical discipline the syllogism would read as follows:

A thalamic lesion will cause anesthesia,
Hystericals have anesthesia,
Ergo, hysterical anesthesia is caused by a thalamic lesion.

And our present syllogism re hyperventilation could be expressed:

Hyperventilation will cause altered calcium metabolism,
Altered calcium metabolism will cause epileptic convulsion,
Ergo, epileptic convulsions are due to calcium metabolism disorders.

Stated in this crude and naïve manner, the fallacies are obvious. Part truths are contained in all of these syllogistic statements, but the body as a whole, its purposes in bringing about the phenomena observed, are revealed only fragmentarily. They are "standardized concepts of science only valid within narrow limits" (Whitehead).

² De Jong; De Jong and Baruk, see Quarterly Index.

These abstract vacuities are only logical constructs and have little to do with the interpretation of concrete situations.

In the terms used by Whitehead in his "Science and the Modern World"—"The concrete enduring entities are organisms, so that the plan of the *whole* influences the very characters of the various subordinate organisms which enter into it. In the case of an animal, the mental states enter into the plan of the total organism and thus modify the plans of the successive subordinate organisms until the ultimate smallest organisms such as electrons, are reached. Thus an electron within a living body is different from an electron outside of it, by reason of the plan of the body. The electron blindly runs either within or without the body; but it runs within the body in accordance with its character within the body; that is to say, in accordance with the general plan of the body, and this plan includes the mental state."

Hence it is only through the knowledge of the "mental state" that one can get the meaning of what is happening in the organs as well as in the electrons within the organs. Meaning should not be confused with causation.

In order to approach certain motor manifestations, then, as seen in the schizophrenic, or in any disorder involving the "personality," which is but another term for the "mental state," the psychological approach is not only desirable, it is imperative. Thus, as with Socrates in his celebrated dialogue in Charmides, "it is only through the mind that the body can be reached." A neo-Socratic formulation of the mental state is where meaning really can be said to be found.

Thus, in an understanding of certain motor manifestations as seen in schizophrenics, Head's conception of "vigilance," as the title indicates, has been chosen as particularly fitting to develop the relation of the body attitudes to the mental state. An outlining of Head's thesis would seem justifiable. There are a number of similar or related conceptions, but Head's term appeals from its philological and ethnological [see Oxford Dictionary—Murray] roots.

Were the scheme of approach usually outlined followed, one might, with Fr. Kraus, start with the "Tiefenperson" and work up from the ionic milieu and its relationship to vigilance. This would first present the as yet very meagre solid residue of an incommensurable amount of as yet unassimilated, uncorrelated, and still controversial material upon the biochemical conditions underlying muscle irritability, either as producing or modifying muscular action, at the back of which the imponderable "vital" factor of living muscle seems as unapproachable as ever in spite of physicochemical assump-

tions, hypotheses, and theories.³ One must content oneself by referring the reader to Kraus,⁴ Fulton,⁵ Zondek,⁶ and to the various monographs in the masterly series of Bethe u. Bergmann's^{7 8} Handbook for further orientation of these necessary structural foundations for maintenance of muscle activity and its relationship to vigilance.

One single ethnological or sociological note may be interpolated at this juncture. This would call attention to *fasting* details of "vigil" rituals. As Keble, in Lyra Luno: *But who is this that comes with mantle rude, and vigil wasted air?* This would lead to a study of how hypervigilance may be obtainable or maintainable by such chemical readjustment tensions in response to the mental state, *i.e.*, in the observance of rituals related to ethical or moral values. The accompanying accessory ritualistic *denial of sleep* may be included as an unconsciously arrived at forerunner to aid the ionic milieu disarrangement which would contribute to the vigilance at this level. Also compare Shelley in Peter Bell: *To wakeful frenzy vigil-rages, as opiates were the same applied.*

Passing rapidly on to a next stage, *i.e.*, the controversial material regarding vegetative innervation of unstriated muscular tissue, and also the unsettled problems of double innervation of striped muscular tissue, particularly in reference to cataleptic and catatonic possibilities of prolonged tonus at the next level of integration, the phylogeny of the reflex nervous mechanisms loom up, as bearing on the problem of this paper. This whole set of problems will not be entered into more exhaustively any more than those of the previous situation. In terms of "vigilance" they possess nevertheless most important phases.

If, for instance, the mode of approach towards certain of the problems which this paper would simply discuss were those already indicated by Kraus—and much followed in most contemporary thought—then up to the present stage the situation might be stated

³ F. Kraus. Allgemeine und specielle Pathologie der Person. Klinische Sysziologie. Besonderer Teil 1. Tiefenperson. Leipzig, 1926.

⁴ F. Kraus. I.c. Kraus u. Zondek. Beziehungen zwischen Elektrolyt, Nerv. u. Muskel. Springer. Biochem. Zeit., 156, 216, 1925.

⁵ J. Fulton. Muscular Contraction. Baltimore, 1926.

⁶ Zondek. Die Elektrolyte. Springer, 1927.

⁷ Bethe, Bergmann, Embden and Ellinger. Handbuch der normalen und pathologischen Physiologie. 1924 et seq. Springer, Berlin.

⁸ Also see Parker on Muscle and Nerve; Otto Riesser: Muskeltonus, Greifswald, 1925; Richter: Am. Jl. Physiol., 67, 612, 1924; Freund and Janssen: Am. Jl. Physiol., 71, 1, 1924.

thus: For encephalitis more evidently, and for schizophrenia not so certainly, since the histopathological and behavioristic correlations are still insecure, a diencephalic lesion, interfering with vegetative mechanisms, would seriously interfere with the water, temperature, and ionic milieu adaptations of the muscles and bring about the altered motor behavior.

The clinical facts which show marked lability in the ability to suddenly change the whole pattern of activity, in both schizophrenics and more particularly encephalitics, as innumerable observations have shown since Abrahamson spoke of mutation phases, chiefly those of song, dance, and other stimuli in encephalitis and pharmaco-dynamic studies in schizophrenics (Ether, Claude; Amitol, Lorenz, and the opposite bulbocapnine experiments, de Jong, Schaltenbrand, to mention but a few) are there. Histopathological explanations suddenly fail to be of any particular value for certain phases of this conduct. If by such a drug as amitol, all of the katatonic, increased tonus of both striped and unstriped muscular tissues may be abrogated for minutes or hours, to be resumed after the effect of the drug has worn off, it is quite impossible to assume a diencephalic lesion as an exclusive explanation, nor that there results from such lesions an ionic milieu—sympathetic—disintegration. It is necessary to go higher up to properly understand, or more fully understand the significance of the motor behavior. It is the purpose of this paper to try to show where, and that is why this phyletically old biological function which the term vigilance envisages offers the advantages claimed for it.

Priority factors or etymological precursors are not of interest for the moment, although no doubt such could be found in both directions. We are content then to take up the argument where Head begins, even though its preliminary stages, as here briefly indicated, were not touched upon by this investigator.

A big gap in the program is here left. This would take up all the structural and physiological problems centering about the "striatum" in the broad sense. The contributions of the Vogts, Wilson, Kleist, Lotmar, Levy, Magnus, Goldstein, Schilder, Hunt, and scores, if not hundreds, of others would need to be digested, but this may be reserved for another occasion.

Head opens his definition of Vigilance⁹ in a review of the mass reflex.¹⁰ As is well known, a flaccid, atonic condition follows sec-

⁹ Head. Vigilance. *British Journal of Psychology*, 14, 126, 1926.

¹⁰ Head and Riddoch, *Brain*, 40, 188, 1917; Head, *Neurological Studies*, 1920, II, 467.

tion of the spinal cord, with loss of bladder and bowel contractions, and loss of deep and superficial reflexes. In young and healthy individuals, after the spinal shock has disappeared, the deep reflexes return, first the ankle jerk, then the knee jerk, and then a partial Babinski reflex develops. Finally segmental automatic bladder and bowel contractions appear, and soon the typical "mass reflex" action. The slightest afferent stimulus may produce widespread automatic reflex activities. Almost any afferent stimulus below the site of the lesion brings about these astonishing sensitive mechanisms of response.

Higher up, in the decerebrate animal a similar high grade physiological efficiency is present in heightened extensor postural tone and acutely differentiated responses. Head would designate this general situation by the term "vigilance." "If we did not know," he writes, "that the whole of the brain had been removed we should say that the actions of the decerebrate animal were directed by consciousness. It initiates no spontaneous movements, but purposive adaptation is evident in every response." "The unconscious," as Freud has phrased it, "is always right. Anyone who has watched a trained sea lion balance a balloon, or seen Dr. Goodhart's pictures of some of his encephalitic patients catching a ball, or carefully followed a cinematograph of Bobby Jones' golf drive, or listen and watch attentively Paderewski's execution of a Chopin sonata will be struck at once with the sensation of complete automatic adaptation. The higher the grade of differentiation of the act the greater the demand for a high state of vigilance. Execution seems to be carried on without any need of conscious coöperation once a stimulus has started the movement. (Here what Head speaks of as automatisms carried out at physiological levels, the total reaction point of view, demands a further kinetic mechanism, namely, "repression." This type of mechanism acting at different segmental levels accomplishes successively spinal cord section, decerebration, or higher level diaschisis.)

"Every automatic act is an exercise of physiological memory," as Head puts it, or in Semon's phraseology "ecphorizes the engrams" of phyletic and ontogenetic engraving. (Compare Schilder's "development of thought from core to periphery of personality.")

This mneme of postural schemes (Schilder) is largely an unconscious gestalt, and in physiology is chiefly thought of as postural tonus. That these engram patterns or schemata are modified by a great diversity of energy disturbances acting at different levels from the periphery to the core of the personality is well known. The work so intriguingly begun by Marshall Hall, carried to a commanding

position by Sherrington, extended by Magnus and de Kleijn, and recently so ably summarized by Fulton as here to permit reference rather than to demand résumé, is in the front line trenches of neurological endeavor. Its extension into the psychiatric field was foreshadowed by Hughlings Jackson, made the foundation of a psychiatry by Wernicke, and more recently in the conceptions of Kleist, of Goldstein, Schilder, and others, even if quite divergent on first view, approach a synthetic view which offers some understanding of the mechanisms involved. When combined with psychoanalytic conceptions a more comprehensive view of processes operating in the body as a whole is obtained.

Head, when he states (p. 136) "that any lesion which disturbs postural schemata will interfere with postural tone," should have gone further and written "influence" instead of "lesion." Witness the innumerable alibis on the golf links for gross and minor fozzles, hooks, slices, etc., etc.

A stimulus once past the receptor threshold (and one may well inquire if what we are as yet able to test out as passing the threshold is after all but a small modicum of what actually gets through) brings about a response, gradually increasing in discriminative adaptation. Inhibition, at lower levels, in a sense may be said to be discriminative choice at higher levels. Ultimate expression in action may become effective through displacement of channels dynamically repressed.

It is not of moment to enumerate the mass of known, nor attempt to infer anything concerning the unknown stimuli, ultraviolet light, millikan's rays, vitamins, geodetic tremors, barometric pressures, etc., etc.¹¹ Concerning the totality of both only omniscience knows all, hence the significance of the psychoanalytic conception of the "Jehovah Complex" and the indicia of its activity in the "Id," attention to which may be directed later.

Continuing with Head as our spokesman for the time being, it may be assumed that all behavior, metabolic, sensorimotor, psychical, social, is correlated with this state of universal reactivity, this "vigilance," with its checks, displacements, and adaptive responses. It is at this point we part company with our guide, since, for Head, "consciousness" is made the equivalent of "mental." "I leave out of account altogether those mental states," he writes, "termed sub-conscious, which have once formed part of the life of the mind, and,

¹¹ Hellpach. *Geophysische Erscheinungen*.

although at the moment repressed or outside the focus of attention may under favorable conditions exert some direct psychical influence."

Can this be done? Is it not a chimera to believe that *any* bit of behavior, even a spinal reflex, can be adequately understood if the unconscious mental states are left out of the picture? It is here to be accented that the forepart of Head's argument whereby he has built up the conception of vigilance is in part negatived in this short statement of leaving out the "sub-conscious" as he would call it.

Bergson, in his "Creative Evolution," utilizes a more satisfactory metaphor in connection with the thought here sought to be expressed.

"The cerebral mechanism," he writes, "is arranged just so, as to push back into the unconscious almost the whole of our past, and to allow beyond the threshold only that which will further the action in hand," *i.e.*, to further useful work. Then he adds most penetratingly, "at the most a few superfluous recollections succeed in smuggling themselves through the half open door; these memories, messengers from the unconscious, dimly remind us of what we are dragging behind us unawares." "Doubtless it is with our entire past, including the original bent of our soul, that we desire, will and act. Our past is made manifest to us in the form of feeling, whereas but a small part is known in the form of idea."

What is inadequate in Head's conception of vigilance, which is made dependent more or less upon consciousness, *i.e.*, more or less an intellectual process, is evident. I would here equate it with the mnemic inheritance of all experience, *i.e.*, Freud's "*Id*."

In the terms of Whitehead's metaphor already quoted, then, the "mental states" in the body acting as a whole, which direct the entire organism as a whole, are quite validly conceivable in the metapsychology of Freud as the "*Id*," which he has divided into the Ego, the Super Ego, and the *Id*. In Head's outline one finds but a partial portrayal of the relationship of the function of the ego—*i.e.*, the conscious perceptive system of consciousness—to the underlying features which are of significance in the muscle states here under consideration. In the deepest layers of the *Id* are those mnemic "psychoids" (Bleuler) of phyletic experience, the most vigilant part of our organism, although apparently sleeping behind its automatisms. The "Super-Ego"—or "ideal ego"—is what theology has dimly defined as conscience, religion, and ritual; primitive society, made into folkways, followed by laws, ethics, morality, with advancing evolution. This super ego, wedged in between the Ego

and the Id, as it were, at its upper level, is in contact with the conscious perceptive system: at its lower level is in contact with the primary instinctual forces of the Id here patterned to entrain and to propel the cosmic forces received through receptor and connector channels into "useful work" through the Ego. A veritable "Charon" ferrying the forces of life across the Styx from Hell to Heaven or Heaven to Hell—as the life instinct or its ambivalent death instinct is at the helm. So the "Super Ego" is the more or less added barrier which adds its pressure—its resistances—so that the massive forces of the Id will not sweep away the comparatively weak "Ego." Weak because man's knowledge of "reality," *i.e.*, the laws of nature, and especially of his mutable, constantly shifting, social environment, is of but very recent formulation.

Historically speaking, it is known that the conception of the Super Ego was a logical outcome of Freud's study of dream "censorship." The most difficult feature in the study of the unconscious to understand has been the factors of "resistance," of "repression," and of "the repressed."

It is here argued for the evolution of life that at successive stages physico-chemical stability, as registered in the integrity of the ionic milieu, and controlled chiefly through the cortico-diencephalic vegetative chain; reflex automatisms, with their cortico-pyramidal-striatal sensori-motor chains, are all under the hierarchy of "repression," *i.e.*, controlled through the fronto-cortical-association chains. Expressed in Freud's metapsychological terminology, "repression" operates and permits to come to action those forces of the *id* that can be passed upon by or are acceptable to the "Ego" as already influenced by the adjuvant mechanisms of the Super Ego. As when a lawyer (Ego-reality tester) in picking a jury (the community judgment) asks the counsel of the prisoner (in touch with the Id). So the "Super Ego" (prisoner, between Ego and Id) advises the Ego what to accept or reject.

In Bergson's scheme, the mental states, Intelligence, are put in apposition to the "Instincts" and never touch each other. It is quite understandable that Bergson's study of the dream should be so inadequate and just herein why Freud's preoccupation with the economics of the dream dynamics should have led to the deep understanding of the mechanisms of his Super Ego and thus led out of the impasse of the chasm between Instinct (the "Id") and the Intellect (the "Ego," mostly). The Super Ego offers the transition phases and the dream work the intermediary.

During the waking life millions of stimuli are beating upon man's receptors; experience with reality is constantly accumulating. Only a small part of this cosmic reality can be permitted to crowd into conscious (Ego) response. A series of traps all along the line hold, side track, shunt, this constant engraphy, which if attended to would produce that figure of the humorist who asks "What will the chameleon do if placed on a Scotch plaid?" Without adequate repression this is what is here envisaged as hypervigilance. Lévy-Bruhl's finely drawn picture of mystic participation is a part of this hypervigilance to the cosmos, in the primitive who has no need of or makes no adaptation to the new reality—unrealities of a more complex, differentiated and shifty, cheating evolving goodly social cultural pattern.¹² During the night life, all of these uncountable engraphies are rearranged into their places of older patternings. They make up that wisdom of the individual which bridges the gap between the older wisdom of the body and the newer knowledge of the realities of the environment. Like a shuttle the dream work integrates the (phylogenetic) Id and the (ontogenetic) Ego, weaving in the "Super Ego," as the patterns derived from the early ontogenetic experiences of the child life. "As the twig is bent, the tree is inclined" is one of those old adages registering this "Super Ego."

Then in dynamic terms a strong Super Ego makes the work of repression comparatively easier; a weak Super Ego permits the instinctual needs to sweep away the comparatively weak Ego; viz., criminal thought or antisocial action. Hence arise the innumerable compromises that "smuggle themselves through the half open door" and make up the subtle kaleidoscopic variations of human behavior so ingenuously and deeply studied behind the mechanisms of conversion, substitution, projection, etc., by the methodology of psychoanalysis.

Just as those influences that Head has mentioned can destroy the mass reflex or the decerebrate automatisms in one or more of their manifestations, etc., so can the same and many more influence the "repressions" and bring about the modified motor conduct as seen in the schizophrenic and which is in the focus of attention at this time.

If from the topographical somatic side it may be assumed that definite lesions are present in schizophrenia, well and good. These are of enormous significance, no doubt, as correlated with the Ego

¹² Freud. *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*. Int. Psa. Press, 1930.

and Super Ego functions, and some day may be helpful in estimating questions of localization for other purposes, but the primary requisite in the study of the meaning of the motor behavior is after all still to be directed to the control of the instinctual needs through the function of repression. The psychoanalytic inquirer is still desirous of learning what part of the dynamics of the mental states is primarily involved and how. Repression has conservative and reparative functions. It would deal with painful affects, which might come to the conscious perceptive system, and which might develop all the way along the line from actual somatic pain, feeling of defect, uncomfortableness of disharmony, feeling of guilt, to concrete thoughts of this or that. Not only must repression itself as a mechanism be envisaged but the pathway taken by the repressed material, *i.e.*, "energy," must be traced and its final adaptive forms be found. At the "somatic wisdom" level, increased temperature, rapid breathing, oxygen need and leucocytosis may be correlated in the new energy system adjustment to meet an energy system of infection. So repression and that which happens to the repressed are to be conceived as adapting, balancing, restoring, or healing factors to meet the attacks of different energy system types. In the particular case of the schizophrenic the attack upon the personality comes chiefly through the libido force which is deflected from the object (*i.e.*, the world of reality). As Protagoras once is interpreted as saying,¹³ "It is only when we do not act at all that we can differ utterly from all others and live our private lives apart."

It is not the purpose of this study to enter into the discussion of the libido theory as pertinent to the psychoses. Rickman¹⁴ has done this in a very thorough review of the whole situation.

Approaching closer to the picture of motor behavior—even if tentatively, and in the Proustian manner—in its various degrees of intensity, from the mildest and very widespread average forms of slowness of speech or action to the severest forms of mutism or of catatonic rigidity, it has been thought of service to attempt to get a glimpse of the repressing mechanisms, and of the repressed material in a so-called pure culture of "motor holding," as expressed in the parkinsonian attitude or "haltung," or various stages of the parkinsonian bradykinesia, akinesia, stickiness of thought, etc., not from the levels already spoken of in the rapid glance taken earlier

¹³ F. C. S. Schiller. *Studies in Humanism*.

¹⁴ Rickman. *The Development of the Psycho-Analytical Theory of the Psychoses*. London, 1928.

in this paper—undoubtedly playing a part in the total reaction—but from the standpoint of the mental states involved. When speaking of a pure culture of the motor attitudes this is but a "*façon de parler*," for after all only one feature of this intricate mosaic is apparent. That is the infectious assault and the residual defect, whatever that residuum may be as to extensity or to localization. As said, the problem of localization is, in this connection, quite secondary, structurally speaking. Neither is it thought of much importance, here, to conceive of the encephalitic process as advancing, *i.e.*, from fresh attacks of the same virus, although in the sense of Head's vigilance conception it is allowed that any insult will aid regression. The regression from the struggle of repression and the repressed is real enough and in need of elucidation, by itself, and not to be complicated by adding the quite conceded possibility of the continuance of the infection. This interplay of psychological regression, due to added outside insult or to the result of personality defect alone, is a large problem of great significance.

In the parkinsonian there is evidence both of real danger and of neurotic danger. The former because the machine is damaged—greatly or slightly; the latter because regression puts added weight upon the repressions and the repressed. The whole dynamic situation is altered and here special attention is to be directed to the development of the character of the individual, and that more particularly to the "Ideal or Super Ego." One sees patients who have gone through an encephalitis but who have made a complete recovery although at one time the "negative signs," *i.e.*, those due to definite localizable destructive lesions in the nervous system, were quite pronounced. But they have been individuals who had built up a strong "Ego Ideal"; individuals who had had parent (images) of high character and of real power and who thus have been surrounded by cultural influences that from childhood have enabled them to conquer difficulties by reality testing and not shunt them by phantasy, day dreaming, or make believe. This Super Ego formation had been able, when advising the Ego, to prevent regression, and when repression of the Id and sublimation of the repressing forces have been called upon, the power of the Super Ego has enabled the Ego to handle the machine, really damaged, to advantage and towards actual restoration of function in spite of the defect. This combination of a strong Super Ego (in a sense Schopenhauer's Will to Power) (better, Freud's "sublimation") has an actual circumscribing effect upon an organic lesion—as anyone who has studied atten-

tively the "miracles" and "semi-miracles" of the past can understand.

But with a weak "Super Ego," either as seen in children (see the effects of encephalitis in the behavior of children), or in those of poor family ideals, neurotic anxiety is added to real danger and the problem becomes more complicated.

Psychoanalysis realizes that the careful study of the "Super Ego" is imperative if the "character" formation is to be understood and symptoms are to be evaluated.

Among the patients who come to mind one may be mentioned as a preliminary step to this study.

He was a single male about thirty. He narrated, among other things, generalized fears of contagion and that he would throw himself out of a high window. He worked fairly continuously, although always tired, and had supported himself well. He mixed in society. Drank, occasionally too much, and had been appreciated by more than one woman; but he lived at home with his father and mother and younger half brother. With these details no further concern is here contemplated. What is of interest in connection with this paper were his very deliberate motions, his slow speech, and his careful, prolonged, and precise diction. He read very slowly and reflected much upon what he read. This general and mildly pronounced trend to great deliberation, was further extended into his sports which made him choose wrestling to boxing, long distance running and long distance swimming. He never could spurt.

The analytic material bearing upon the neurosis need not concern this communication, but one feature showing what shall be more fully developed later may be mentioned. The slow motion is correlated with the father adaptation and represents a revolt against the father as well as its ambivalent desire to please the father as a part of the Super Ego incorporation of the father image. This came out more particularly in the association material connected with the following dream:

I am in the anteroom of some place waiting my turn for electrocution. Why I am to be so put to death does not appear. My thought is to escape this kind of death by jumping out of the window, but this is rejected because of two reasons: one that it might be very painful and secondly it might reflect upon my family. Then it appeared as if no one were interested and why not walk away, which I did. I then find myself in the outskirts of X (where I was born) and feel very lonely and as if hunted and will be hunted no matter where I go. I shall always be without a country. So I decided to

go back, which I did, and when I returned they all complimented me upon my coming back and I was very much pleased with their praise.

Why he was being electrocuted must have been for murder, since "that is the only crime for which electrocution is carried out," was his first comment. It is clear that his symptom of fearing to jump out of the window is a permitted thought, that the Ego could accept, in the place of the repressed hostile (murderous) craving—(other determinants are omitted). This led directly to the object of the hostile thoughts—his father. These were not by any means all "repressed." Electrocution brought out the response of the muscular fixation and rigidity with which he was partly familiar from experiments in college and with faradic current muscular contractions.

Then the father pattern opened up in the associations. During the patient's early childhood the father had been a very irritating person. He was a political henchman, mostly loafing, in one of the slowest departments of the city government, in one of the cities of the United States made a universal butt of what is conservative, slow, and unprogressive. Here was the positive pattern. On the other hand, with his children the father was extremely irritable, impatient, short and complaining, and the one slogan of the father that the patient remembers from early childhood was "Hurry up," "Hurry up," "Hurry up." No matter what he did, from attending to his toilet, going upstairs, on errands, dressing, school work, etc., this "Hurry up" was always hurled at him by this almost immovable and obstinate father.

It was quite consistent then that in discussing his slow movements that he should remark that he felt sure that his slowness was more due to the excessive desire to hasten than anything else. He was prepared to accept the "ambivalent" aspect of the situation and came to recognize the "hostility" with its earlier analerotic primary narcissistic fixations and their later homophilic secondary narcissistic elaborations in masochism as having been much involved in determining this slowness of action, speech, and thought. Its "Super Ego" sources and protective values against overhasty, aggressive, sadistic tendencies became increasingly apparent.

In several presenile arteriosclerotic parkinsonian individuals the marked repressed sadistic components were evident from the few exploratory excursions made into unconscious material. The violent resistances set up against getting into this type of material has prevented a thorough study of the evidence bearing upon this specific series of factors, but there is enough of this material to justify its

mention here and also permits one to call attention to earlier formulations along related lines which are more than "just significant."

It is reserved for another paper, started some years ago, to enter more deeply into the mental states of presenile parkinsonians, both as to (1) the objective clinical pictures and (2) as to the significance of mental factors as bearing upon both arteriosclerosis and upon diencephalic localization possibilities. Concerning the former aspect only a few references may here be made; as to the latter this is a larger problem and involves issues already dealt with in previous studies. In these studies it is emphasized that the psychogenic components are not under review in the narrower sense of psychogenesis. Psychical factors as *causes* and psychical factors as throwing light on the *meaning of symptoms* are to be rigidly separated.¹⁵

But to return to the psychical states in presenile parkinsonians. It has been noted for years that, even before Parkinson erected the syndrome, that "peculiar" mental states were frequent. Much before Parant¹⁶ (1888) modifications of "humeur" were on record. Mendel gives the rich literature to 1912. Among the depressed, euphoric, paranoid, and other types of character trend expressions there may almost always be noted an interesting tendency, especially in the early cases, to see a type of hypervigilance develop.¹⁷ Brissaud¹⁸ with great perspicacity noted this early in the motor sphere and called it "muscular impatience." Just what this develops to according to the character formation will be discussed more at length in another study. Suffice it to say here it has been found that, like the irritable, suspicious, paranoid states of concomitant or later developing attitudes, the factor is very striking. Often when the Super Ego has a good mask it is concealed behind great affability, or sometimes euphoria, but it most often comes through in a variety of ways which are analytically hall marked.

¹⁵ This statement seems necessary since in some reviews of previous communications totally false assumptions as to the purposes of these studies have been made. One reads that the "author advances psychogenesis as the *cause* of multiple sclerosis, of nephritis, of bony tumors, or respiratory attacks in encephalitis, of oculogyric crises," etc., etc. This is all so silly as to need no comment; but equally superficial copiers of opinions keep on repeating this kind of nonsense.

¹⁶ Lhermitte et Dupont. *Maladie de Parkinson pré-senile. Syndrome de passivité de Clerambault.* Rev. Neur., Feb., 1929.

¹⁷ For experimental studies see Zuckor. A. P., 79, 531, 1927.

¹⁸ Brissaud. *Traité de Neurologie*, 1895.

Another phase of a related type of situation deals with certain types of rheumatoid arthritis. In Jelliffe and White¹⁹ a brief mention is made of the principle which runs throughout this presentation. There are copious citations in the paralysis agitans, encephalitis, catatonia, and even the hysteria literature to show how fixed muscular states can bring about the tensions which ultimately become fixed in arthritic bondage. This, too, is reserved for further elucidation. Some most striking arthritides have been studied and a few definitely relieved or rendered stationary by a careful outlining of the hostilities which psychoanalysis shows are loaded in the affective life. It is footless to mumble-jumble the formula that one should not "hate"; or other variant of the same. It is of great service to these patients to carefully draw out from their own unconscious material how repressed anal erotic cathexis, at primary and secondary narcissistic levels, aid and abet constitutional or infectious factors, or may even be held to prepare the soil that will the more readily permit other factors to act. Here Brissaud's phrase "muscular impatience" can be shown to be closely related to hypervigilant holding of repressed sadistic tendencies. But of this more later.²⁰

Collateral study of certain arteriosclerotics has brought the conviction that repressed overcharged sadistic trends are most important etiological factors in the elaboration of many disorders with an arteriosclerotic background both as to cause and effect. Such convictions were well elaborated when Lewis²¹ important findings of the vascular condition in paranoid precox and paranoid states afforded objective evidence of the correlations.

This and other reasons as well determined the belief that the parkinsonian states of post-encephalitic cases could be probed for unconscious factors relative to these motor attitudes which are so well known clinically in katatonic schizophrenics, many of whom show quite similar pictures to the encephalitic parkinsonians. Certain aspects of these and related studies have been published else-

¹⁹ Jelliffe and White. *Diseases of the Nervous System*, 4th Ed., 1923; 5th Ed., 1929, p. 246 et seq.

²⁰ Arthritis citations: Carles et Massiere, *Presse Méd.*, 37, 251, 1929; May, *Rev. Neur.*, 1926, 1, 501; Danzer, *Med. Rec.*, Aug. 26, 1916; Sanz, *Am. Ac. med. Esp.*, May 22, 1916; Gilli, *Thèse de Paris*, 1900; Spiller, *Univ. Penn. Med. Bul.*, May, 1904 [for a few].

²¹ N. D. C. Lewis. *The Constitutional Factors in Dementia Precox*. Monograph 35, Nervous and Mental Disease Pub. Co., New York and Washington, 1923.

where.²² A wealth of material bearing upon motor rigidity is obtainable from several parkinsonian encephalitics studied. Some of the more outstanding symptoms have been discussed in previous papers upon respiratory phenomena, and upon oculogyric cephalogyric crises (*q.v.*), and are still being studied in post-encephalitic tics and other compulsive phenomena. A far greater supply of the studies of others upon the motor phenomena is also available. It has been attentively studied. If not here digested it is chiefly because this has been done sufficiently for the purpose in previous papers.²³

A few of these hundreds of studies may be referred to as of special significance in connection with this paper. Winkler's discussion of the acoustic and speech apparatus in his *Manual* first crystallized the point of view pursued through the various studies outlined, particularly as to the motor attitudes to the environment. Other studies have appeared after the formulations here expounded were already outlined and in part published. Schaltenbrand,²⁴ in his *Habilitations Arbeit*, calls attention to the motor reaction "as a whole," which he rechristens "motorischen Haushalt." He speaks of the "Stimmung der Motorik" to primitive stimuli and, quoting Darwin and v. Üxküll, speaks of the "Feinde, Beute und Sexualobjekte" as the surrounding objects giving rise to this "Stimmung" and the consequent type of reaction. "*Das Raubtier muss dagegen sofort seine Motorik verändern, wenn es seine Beute erblickt; es muss vor allen Dingen vermeiden, gesehen, oder gehört zu werden. Es geht gebückt und vermeidet jede Mitbewegung oder hält sich reglos.*" Thus Schaltenbrand for another purpose introduces the same thesis that is of interest here. Here it is maintained that this

²² Jelliffe, S. E. Psychopathology and Organic Disease, *Arch. of Neur. & Psych.*, 8, 639, 1922. The Neuropathology of Bone Disease, *Trans. Am. Neur. Assoc.*, 49, 419, 1923. Unconscious Dynamics and Human Behavior, *Prince Memorial Volume*, 1925, 331. Somatic Pathology and Psychopathology at the Encephalitis Crossroads, *Jl. Nerv. & Ment. Dis.*, 61, 561, 1925. Psychoanalyse und organische Störungen, *Int. Zeit. f. Psa.*, 12, 517, 1926; transl. in *Int. Jl. Psa.*, 7, 445, 1926. The Mental Pictures in Schizophrenia and in Epidemic Encephalitis. *Am. Jl. Psych.*, 6, 413, 1927. With W. A. White. *Diseases of the Nervous System*, Ed. I-V, Lea & Febiger, Philadelphia, 1915-1929.

²³ Jelliffe, S. E. Mental Picture in Schizophrenia and in Epidemic Encephalitis. *Am. Jl. Psych.*, 6, 413, 1927.

²⁴ G. Schaltenbrand. Die Beziehungen der extrapyramidalen Symptomenkomplexe zu den Lage- und Bewegungsreaktionen, zum motorischen Haushalt und zu den Stammganglien. *Deut. Zeit. f. N.*, 108, 209, 1929 (part IV).

"Stimmung der Motorik" is capable of further introspective analysis by the psychoanalytic and by perhaps other methods (Klages, etc.). This is the picture of "vigilance" that needs analysis, since man is not only a "Raubtier," he is all of his animal ancestors, and friend and foe are more sharply scrutinized than ever in view of the injury to the personality and thus holds himself as has already been described (see threatening attitude and tremor) or as Schaltenbrand (p. 239) expresses it quite correctly, "*Sogar die Tremoren, die bei Parkinsonkranken auftreten, sehen wir bei der Angst und der Wut in Erscheinung treten*" und "*der Mensch befindet sich, ohne es zu wollen, in einer Lauerhaltung, Angst oder Wuthaltung.*" "*Ohne es zu wollen*" is just the aspect here under investigation, namely, the "repressed material" which causes these attitudes of ambivalent shrinking and defiance; attack and retreat. Goldstein's many contributions might also be here cited and also the very illuminating and valuable study of Zutt,²⁵ whose "Innere Haltung" has many analogies to Schaltenbrand's "Stimmung der motorischen Haushalts" and to the present discussion of the motor symptoms and vigilance.

In studies of a patient with a marked respiratory syndrome,²⁶ and who also developed later an oculogyric spasm syndrome, it was stated that a further contribution would be made to the problem of tremor, motor rigidity, and psychogenic factors. Hence the extension of this case report in this direction.

For the purposes of this paper no detailed history will be given. Anyone interested can read the whole story. Suffice it to say this was a young boy who had a typical attack of lethargic encephalitis at the age of eighteen. After the recovery from the acute phase he passed through a severe respiratory syndrome. When seen about two years or more after the acute attack he showed:

- (1) Paroxysmal respiratory episodes; nasal and buccal tics, with trance states, salivation and tetanoid cramps.
- (2) Parkinsonian attitude with paroxysmal or intercurrent tremor, more marked right than left side.
- (3) Character anomalies—more marked in the previous year.
- (4) Mild greasy face.
- (5) Polydipsia and Polyuria. (Picture of attitude.)

He came under exploratory analytic treatment in 1924. Made a

²⁵ J. Zutt. Die innere Haltung. Monat. f. Ps. u. Neur., 73, 52, 243, 330, 1929.

²⁶ J1. Nerv. & Ment. Dis., 63, 357, 1926; Archives of Neur. & Psych., 17, 627, 1927; Nervous & Mental Disease Monograph Series, No. 45, 1927.

recovery with insight of his respiratory attacks and then later developed some oculogyric crises also described and published (l.c.).

During the analysis of one dream an interesting exhibit came to light. It is to this that particular reference will first be made.

March 10, 1925

Monday Morning.

Dreamt last Nite.

I dreamt Jerry and I were waiting for a train. A cop bumped into Jerry. Jerry hit the cop. The officer grabs Jerry. I stick up for Jerry. The cop (a great big blonde six-footer) grabs me too—by the collar. I cry like a baby. Jerry cries too. He walks us for a while and then takes us into an old shack. In the shack is an old dirty room. In the room is an old Italian couple. In the room next to it is a young Italian woman. (While the cop is holding me and taking me to the "shack, I am threatening him.") Meanwhile the cop goes to make a phone call in the shack. When he goes I say to Jerry, "Let's beat it." Jerry hesitates for a moment, then agrees. We run into the yard and hide behind a snow bank. At this stage of the dream I wake up.

Here I shall only call attention to the patient's writing where it is quite obvious, where he writes "*shack, I am threatening him*," there is a more pronounced tremor otherwise missing in the body of the dream. Had I not a lot of confirmatory material illustrative of the repressed sadism connected with the tremor in Parkinson's syndrome I should pass this matter over as too sketchy.

Interesting and significant of the "Innere Haltung" or "Stimmung der Motorik" as this tremor situation may be in response to hostile impulses made hypervigilant, the parkinsonian bent attitude of "defense" as made familiar to all in the ancient and modern statues of "boxers," the etchings of Bellows, etc., is even more vital. Here again from this same patient, a year or so later, a dream fragment, heretofore only incidentally reported, is held to be of significance, especially in connection with the whole story. Whether little or all of the material were reported, one would be in a somewhat analogous situation to that which Freud has so well commented upon in his "Bruckstück einer Hysterie Analyse."

Some comment has already been made to the patient's very hostile reaction when on one occasion I straightened out his shoulders and told him to brace up a bit. The facial expression (Mienenspiel—see Schaltenbrand) as well as the bent stiffening notified me at once of the "motor mood" response of the overcompensation. Here the

repression due to the Super Ego aid was sufficient to block any outward outburst of anger; the thought was there nevertheless. We went through the hour until the very end, when I asked him what had come to his mind as I poked him up. He hesitated and then finally blurted out, "I wanted to say, 'Cut it out—God damn you! I hate you!' You were so like father trying to make me get up in the

to it is a young Italian women [While the cop is holding me & taking me to the showers, I am threatening him] Meanwhile the cop goes to make a phone call in the shack when he goes I say to Jerry "Let's beat it" Jerry hesitates for a moment then agrees. We run into the yard I hide behind a snow bank. At this stage of the dream I wake up.

morning. The G. D. S. O. B." He was quite agitated when he left.

On the next visit, six days deferred, he told me he had had a terrible time. He had not wanted to come to see me. He had not wanted to get up in the morning. He had stayed in bed most of the time feeling awful. He had called his mother repeatedly to come and sit on the bed by his side and hold his hands. *He had ideas of her death. He was very apprehensive about her.* Sunday (November 30) he had stayed in bed all day. He called his mother frequently. He had several trance states with cold hands, contractures, face tight, and the muscles of the mouth were all twisted up. When he came, however, in the conscious there was a warm feeling of

friendship; an oversubmission was evident from his attitude. I had slipped into the mother rôle. He expressed his submission almost at the fellatio level. It reminded me very forcibly of the extreme affability of certain presenile parkinsonians, as well as the great friendliness of certain so-called normal individuals with markedly repressed strong sadistic tendencies. This has been very marked in certain arthritis deformans cases, mentioned here, since the relationships of the mechanisms are very close. This has been commented upon—written about also.

Bearing on anal erotic regression. Feb. 26, 1926. *Was in bed room with a girl. I recognized her (but cannot now recall). She used her lingua all over. My mentula and rectum. I awoke with an orgasm.*

Evidence re hypervigilance—ideas of being looked at. Knows it's a wheeze and often makes a quick jerk to catch someone at it, but it is not so.

Another encephalitic patient shows the same type of hypervigilance though in the dream form. In the dream "*he makes faces before a mirror and changes his face faster than the mirror does.*" His parkinsonism was quite marked.

To return to the case bearing on the motor attitude.

Feb., 1927: *Once in a boxing ring. I was in the outfit. There was a big crowd all around. An Italian fellow in the opposite corner. He then is standing up and talking to his seconds. I was standing paralyzed with fear. I sat down just before the bell rang. When the bell rang I woke up.*

April 28, 1927: *I was in the rear end of a street car smoking a cigarette and I was arrested by the conductor. He took me by the arm to the front of the car and then I made a break to get away but he held on to me tight. Then I insisted on seeing my father and the conductor brought me to our store. Then father, conductor and I went to the magistrate in a room (like this office). The Judge told father to look up the amount of the fine in the big black covered book. It was \$5.25 (masturbation super ego prohibition). He then told the Judge he could not find the amount and the Judge let me go saying never to do that again.*

May 19, 1927: *I was witnessing an electrocution. Two men and one woman were all bound stiff in the chair. It was a big barren room. The lights got dimmer and dimmer. I seemed to be tied down and could not move.*

Associations: It was a sort of a nightmare dream. I was

frightened. It seemed bad luck. Maybe I was thinking of the Snyder matter.

People: One woman was tall and thin. The men were short. As I look closer at the woman she resembles the school teacher. The school teacher was a "friend" of my brothers. The one he "had."

Two men: B. B. —: good friend of ours. Brother and mine. If I had to say who other one was, it was his brother. Funny they were both going to be electrocuted—murder.

Electric shocks: Often had them in the penny slot machines. See how much one can stand. Once grabbed one with both hands. Like taking hold of the penis. Masturbation. Hands and feet tied, like running a race with the feet tied. Died myself.

These were some of the associations upon this particular dream. These were quite clear in their general implications. Especially when taken in connection with other clear cut Oedipus dreams, which

I am feeling wonderful with this exception. For the past week I have had a cold in the head. You know it annoyed me quite a bit because my nose was congested quite a bit. It seems to be breaking up now and everything looks "hotter to say."

I haven't had even a sign of a breathing attack since I saw you last and all my other symptoms seemed to have left me entirely. I know you're glad."

situation appeared in numerous dreams. A dream of the same night showed clearly the desire to possess this same school teacher. He soaped her all over nice and smooth and awoke with an orgasm as he was about to penetrate her. This soaping was characteristic of his masturbatory activities. His mastery over the brother (father) was very clear and the connection of the dream picture with the mother was also evident in a fragment of a dream of the same night. He was demonstrating how good the springs of a bed in the store were by having vigorous intercourse with an old lady of fifty. The associations were clear as to the mother identification.

The whole dream dealt with the ambivalent desire and fear to possess the girl (woman) who belonged to the brother (father) even by murder of the brothers (brother and father). This resulted in the need for punishment—being tied hand and foot and himself being electrocuted.

Hostile impulses, in other words, ambivalent love and hate to the brother, were manifest. This brother had devoted himself to the sick boy with a very remarkable fidelity and persistency for years. His need for punishment for the guilty (repressed) hostility, as well as his need for biological protection against the homosexual regression, were the most outstanding features of his entire picture as seen in the analysis of the Super Ego identifications.

The actual trauma—encephalitis—has produced a state of helplessness, *being tied hand and foot*, was but one of the numerous symbols of his helplessness, and hence his regression to that stage in secondary narcissism, more clearly recognized behind the homosexual material—excessive masturbatory phantasy; excessive regressive intercourse phantasies—in the waking as well as the dream life. The regression also included the most frank primary narcissistic perverse stages: fellatio, cunnilinguus, cannibalism, sodomy, etc. As already reported, some of the conversion phases were cleared up when the function of the respiratory grunting and suffering and dyspneic-apneic attacks were cleared up. But some of the deeper cathexes related to the patient's personality defects still operated in addition to the patient's "fear" connected with his trauma.

This double situation, as Freud has shown in his *Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety*, and which can be studied to great advantage in these encephalitis cases, is one of extreme complicity. Probably the schizophrenic suffers also from this double situation, and Head's line of discussion in re the vigilance, as seen in spinal cord and decerebrate conditions, as modified by trauma, toxins, fever, etc., has seemed a useful way of approaching the problems and attempting to separate the psychological components, which Freud has discussed as fear of real danger and neurotic anxiety.

In this communication full discussion is impossible to outline in how far the disease process (encephalitis—*dementia precox* as somatic process) has involved the machine so far as the Ego—as conscious perceptive system—reality tester—is involved; nor how far the same process has attacked the "Super Ego" synthesis. In either case, the psychological mechanism of repression has a double load. The ambivalent swing is rendered excessive. The "*stim-mung der Motorik*" returns to a much more primitive stage. The individual's vigilance begins to approach that of the drug sensitivity so well known as an attendant upon earlier mystic religious activities and related pharmaco-dynamic states. As already intimated for the wild animal (lion—tiger), the love and hate swings to extremes of

motor patterning. In the hypervigilant hyperkinetic encephalitic and schizophrenic the combination of craving and guilt is a determinant, in part at least, of the motor patterning.

SUMMARY

It hardly seems necessary to reiterate the observation that we constantly meet with behavior in the psychotic that is clearly beyond our understanding. It is also not a new statement, although one frequently forgotten, that this is largely because the behavior under view is a synthesis of many patterns, some older, some newer. It emerges as a whole, undecipherable, and, as said, apparently unanalyzable. Certain features of the entire behavior, such as that which appears as more preëminently motor shares in this perplexity of interpretation.

It is here outlined that the encephalitic process is quite a different type of process seen as a whole than the schizophrenic process, but that by its differential vivisections it may help us at least partly to analyze the more complex schizophrenic process and throw some light upon some features of the motor behavior, notably that which has come to be designated as catatonic motor behavior.

In many encephalitics this catatonic behavior is proportionately disintegrated or fractionated, and appears as part of the fixity of the parkinsonian rigidity, or even in the parkinsonian tremor, where a still greater fractioning is apparent. A detailed discussion of tremor is thrust to one side for the moment, but it should be held in mind, since "rigidity sine tremor" has such inbound relations with "rigidity plus tremor" that to think of them as different save as quantitative situations is held to be illusory. In the schizophrenic the catatonic inner holding is a much more complex synthetic process to elucidate, all of the features of which will require much time and study, biochemical, anatomical, physiological, and psychological, to completely analyze and of which this study offers citations of such various efforts. Biochemical studies of the relation of tonus to Ca metabolism are among the first; anatomical discussion of the phylogeny of the motor apparatus for the second; the rich collection of physiological efforts at analyzing reflex activities the third, and finally the psychological outlining of what is termed vigilance the fourth.

We have pitched upon Head's term "vigilance" as useful for our purposes and roughly sketched its features as under the actioning of these four aspects. The psychological aspect has been thought

of as that which alone gives meaning to the others, since the purpose of the organism determines the actions of its constituent parts even to its ionic milieu.

The influence that disarranges the orderly patterning of the individual and results in some fraction of the catatonic rigidity is not here thought of in any other terms than interference; whether such interference is conceived of as censorship, *i.e.*, *repression*, as physiological *inhibition*, as anatomical *blocking*, or as chemical balance *disintegration*, such conceptions are all equally worthy of and have received extensive consideration, with the exception of the psychological level here termed "censorship of the vigilance." This I venture to say has only been inferred and never directly held up to stating and criticism.

The test boring is made into the unconscious life of a parkinsonian with rigidity with and without tremor, with side cuttings from character traits of arteriosclerotic parkinsonians and from catatonic behavior itself.

The spotlight is directed upon dream evidence in the encephalitic which indicates fairly clearly in the psychoanalytic methodology that the patient is "condemned to electrocution, bound hand and foot in the electric chair for murderous impulses directed against the brother who stands between him and incestuous promptings directed towards a sister." What this may mean in the terms of the method of study is outlined.

Thus the fraction distilled out of the rigidity, in the encephalitic, and placed alongside of its homologue, in catatonia, bears upon the myth of Cain and Abel and the old, old problem condensed in the Mosaic law—thou shalt not kill. The hypervigilance is thus conceived as containing as a constituent a supreme effort to repress coming into thought or action the *hated* and *feared* thing. This hypervigilance is necessary both on its positive (murder) and on its negative (suicide) form.

Emphasis is laid upon the thought that this is but a fraction of the whole process, but an equally earnest plea is made to view the widespread manifestations of the hostile impulse component in man's behavior which has called into universal utilization the sense of guilt, and the need for punishment, religion, ritual, and compulsive behavior. Yes, even the mechanistic tendencies to convert man into a type of economically efficient rubber stamp, at the expense of the life of the spirit.

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PSYCHOANALYTIC DIAGNOSIS IN A CASE OF GAMOPHOBIA

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The term "psychoanalytic diagnosis"¹ has been used only once or twice, and this without significance, in psychoanalytical literature. There is no reason, however, why the term may not be employed in a specific sense where it would be of some assistance in practical clinical work. The material of the unconscious gained from first sessions can be made to serve in the construction of a "diagnosis" of the formation of the neurosis in regard to fixations, regressive tendencies and characteristics of resistance and transference. Such a procedure would, naturally, have to be based upon numerous cases and be entirely empirical. A desire to make a preliminary attempt in this direction led me to examine notes on a number of discharged cases in order to observe the relation between the material of early sessions and of complete analyses. To indicate the nature of the relation of "psychoanalytic diagnosis" to the whole course of analysis, one of these cases, a case of Anxiety Hysteria,² may be given.

SYNOPSIS OF THE CASE

The case was noteworthy insofar as it represented an outstanding *variation of locomotor anxiety*, the mechanism of which has been observed in a number of psychoanalytical studies.³

Mrs. B., in her thirties, married eleven years, mother of a ten-year-old girl, suffered from phobia which incapacitated her from

¹ Based upon Clinical Communication made before The New York Psychoanalytic Society, May 26, 1925.

² This has been chosen for illustration especially because it proved to be one of those cases where it was possible to take extended notes without interference with the analytic procedure.

³ See especially: FREUD, "Analysis of a Phobia in a five-year-old boy" (1909) and "The Predisposition to Obsessional Neurosis" (1913); ABRAHAM, "A Constitutional Basis of Locomotor Anxiety" (1913) and "Hysterical Dream-States" (1910); JONES, "Relation between Anxiety Neurosis and Anxiety Hysteria" (1913).

having a home of her own with her husband and her child. In the first year of married life, during which she lived, apparently normally, with her husband in a home of their own, the neurosis developed. It consisted of periodic attacks of fear, mild depression, crying spells and insomnia. The patient sought a solution by leaving her home and returning to her mother, where her condition soon improved somewhat. Since later attempts to restore her home with her husband resulted in repeated relapses, she finally abandoned her intention, and had been living for the past ten years in her parents' home when she came for analysis. Her improvement was only temporary and the patient gradually developed a deep-seated neurosis. Whenever any reference was made to her taking a home of her own, or she herself reconsidered keeping house, she invariably had paroxysms lasting from a few hours to several days. She had crying spells which were accompanied by sensations of trembling, a sinking feeling in the breast, a dullness and heaviness in the stomach, mostly on the upper right side, and an urgent impulse to empty the bowels. The crying, generally the climax of the spell, brought the patient some relief. When free from attacks, Mrs. B., normally of good disposition and a devoted wife and mother, felt perfectly contented and had a striking fondness for dancing and music.

Analysis revealed that whenever she was away from home she felt a peculiar *anxiety* and apprehension about her mother. Sometimes this hardly rose above the level of a painful sensation; at other times, her concern appeared in fully articulated ideas, such as "something may happen to my mother." In the crying spells, these apprehensions assumed the character of definite death ideas. Occasionally, too, Mrs. B. had a compulsive association: "If mother died—would my spells become worse?"

In contrast, however, to her admiration for her mother, she always spoke of her father in terms revealing pronounced aversion, accusing him of possessing an intractable and intolerant disposition and of uselessness.⁴ It might be interesting to note that throughout her analysis the patient spoke of her parents' home as "mother's house," in spite of the fact that her father had always lived at home.

Mrs. B. was, for a long time after her marriage, sexually anaesthetic; in fact, reacted with disgust. Only a protracted tactile stimulation of the genitals—"external irritation" as she called it—was a source of some satisfaction to her. In her attacks she was

⁴ Her father had been suffering for many years from fainting spells of unknown character.

intensely preoccupied with her mother. She compulsively feared that "something might happen to mother" and also compulsively—"cannot look or even think of men in general without a feeling of hatred."

With regard to the patient's *frigidity* and disposition to protracted "fore-pleasure," analysis brought forth sexual assaults to which, at the age of nine, she had been subjected by an elderly man (father!). This, together with other shock experiences in early childhood, were found to be responsible for the formation of her aversion against the other sex—*identification with father*. Normal development did not take place; the attachment to mother absorbed the libidinous energy, checking any tendency to heterosexual cathexis. In her married life, she identified her husband with mother, transferring the anxiety and death wishes from mother to husband. Inability to have a home of her own with her husband was, therefore, grounded in her latent homosexuality.

Fear of living away from her mother appeared as *gamophobia*, a variation of *topophobia*.⁵ The unconscious wish of death of mother—the complementary element in her love-hatred-relation to her parent—underwent a thorough repression through the compensatory establishment of excessive affection and solicitude. In Freudian terminology: the patient's Super-Ego was shocked and troubled at the hatred within the primitive Id, and the Ego, with refined diplomacy, took the burden of the suffering upon itself and, under the *guise* of hyper-solicitude, satisfied cravings for death of mother. Staying with mother, therefore, a kind of *sympiosis*, was striking because of its contrast with the unconscious separative tendencies, actual death wishes. We are reminded in this connection of a case of *hysterical phobia* touched upon by Freud.⁶

⁵ As a corollary to the familiar *agoraphobia* it may be called *gamophobia*, since the provocative of anxiety reaction was "*gamos*" (marriage).

⁶ "Die Traumdeutung," section "Die Träume vom Tod teurer Personen" (translation A. A. Brill, "The Interpretation of Dreams," p. 220): . . . "In the state of frenzied excitement with which the illness started, the patient showed a very strong aversion to her mother . . . Then there followed a clear but somewhat apathetic state with very much disturbed sleep . . . An enormous number of these (her dreams) dealt in more or less abstruse manner with the death of the mother; now she was present at the funeral of an old woman, now she saw her sisters sitting at the table dressed in mourning . . . During the further progress of the convalescence hysterical phobias appeared; the most torturing of these was the idea that something happened to her mother. She was always having to hurry home from wherever she happened to be in order to convince herself that her mother was still alive." A striking parallelism!

The patient's dreams were mainly of the type of phantasies of intrauterine life and were characterized by symbolism of birth and death. They concerned almost exclusively mother, and were anxiety-dreams.

The typical structure of a phobia and also the particular disposition of neurotics to phobias, were present in this case.⁷ Analysis disclosed that the patient's unconscious *identification with father* and ambivalence to him were the foci of her neurosis. Moreover, the paroxysms were accompanied with the specific mental tension, anxious expectation, fears, and oppression. Between spells, the subject was characteristically in good spirits and knew of no greater pleasure than dancing, even walking and travelling being sources of bodily pleasure to her. Abraham's "pleasure in movement,"⁸ against which the phobic patient erects his taboo as inability to move—"transformation of pleasure in movement into fear of movement"—was thus present in the case of Mrs. B. It was sublimated by marked enthusiasm for rhythm, dancing and music.

After eight months of analysis physical symptoms disappeared, crying spells and apprehensions ceased and sexual life improved materially. Finally, having, as a married woman and herself a parent, clung to her mother for ten years, Mrs. B. broke away and established a home of her own successfully; and this katamnesis confirmed three years later.

EXTRACTS FROM THE FIRST EIGHT SESSIONS⁹

SESSION 1

Exterior, Behavior, State of Mind, and Transference: Mrs. B., short, muscular, but slender and well-proportioned; very unshapely protruding nose; small brown eyes, straight forehead, coarse black hair; powerful hands; general masculine appearance; voice, approaching the masculine, hoarse and loud, sometimes to the point of shout-

⁷ See ABRAHAM, "Selected Papers" (translated by D. Bryan and A. Strachey), The Hogarth Press, London, 1927, pp. 235-243.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ Each *extract* is based upon analysis of the material gained from a session, supported by my own observations and by observations to be found in psychoanalytical literature. Of course, these evaluations will not seem either significant nor justified to anyone who has not had actual experience with the psychoanalytic method. The reader, at the very least, would have to be well grounded in the psychoanalytic theory.

ing, with marked expression of resentment in intonation.¹⁰ Patient lay in a coiled-up position as if hugging the couch for about half an hour when becoming aware of it, she changed position abruptly. Patient associates with difficulty. Material formulated generally sparse. Associations given at intervals of many seconds, spoken in a rather explosive manner. Mild depression; worries over illness, which "is certainly altogether different from that of other people." Extreme anxiety: "What will folks at home believe happened during this hour—since they accuse me of having talked myself into my illness?"

Extract 1. Identification with father—exterior; regressive tendencies to mother—symbolic "embryonic" position on couch; signs of positive transference—fears, sense of guilt.

SESSION 2

My sister-in-law had a baby; came to me, told me that a wagon had run over my child; my little daughter had been out riding; I was not excited; I thought she was fooling me because she was not excited herself; I was at a show, dressed only in a bathrobe and sweater; was embarrassed and ashamed; I was in a dark street and felt afraid; a woman came, asked me whether I wanted to walk with her.

The dreamer associates great fondness for walking and riding and the muscular pleasure she derives therefrom—"riding"; friend—"sister-in-law"; I know nothing happened to "my child"; last night I was at a "show," "woman"—not an old woman; it seldom happens that I go out alone—"dark street"; when patient was ten years old she experienced her first crying spell, returning home from funeral of four-year-old sister; that day she had at school compulsive thoughts of this sister; two days before her own child was born, she experienced a similar crying spell; a third crying spell occurred two weeks after birth of child when she was still in the hospital, reason why patient came from the hospital directly to her mother's home.

Dream Analysis. The dream is definitely characterized by anxiety and irritation ("not excited"). It brings to light a series of most vital conflicts closely interrelated. In the first part, through the identification with a sister-in-law the castration complex—envy, desire and fear of penis—is revealed ("a waggon had run my child

¹⁰ This tone of voice persisted throughout most of the analysis. The voice alternated between a subdued, pleasant quality (when she was making a positive transference) to exaggerated shouting.

mother with husband (husband's "boxes"). Resistance against analysis (yawning spells).

Extract 3. Auto-eroticism, an escape from heterosexual relationship. Identification of husband-mother-analyst.

SESSION 4

*A dark room*¹³ *with sliding doors; mother rolls the doors back; suddenly begins to speak, as if out of her mind, totally out of her mind; I was astonished, went out to call for people, but soon she began to speak normally again; of a sudden, I see a child in my arms.*

Patient recalls first spell of crying. About six months after the birth of her daughter she went to the mountains, and the following day she fainted; felt as though losing her mind—"out of her mind." Does not remember whether she had seen mother's face in the dream; perhaps her mother looked older than she really is. "Room"—a room just like yours, here. "Out of her mind"—many times I fear losing my mind. (Patient frequently connects the method of free associations in analysis with "talking out of her mind")¹⁴ "Child in arms"—I had no child for ten years.

Dream Analysis. Typical transference dream. Identification of analyst-mother. Castration complex (unstilled penis-envy, hallucinatory acquisition of child-penis—"child in arms"—morbid fear of "losing the mind").

Extract 4. Regressive tendencies towards prenatal stage—death-impulse. Identification of analyst-mother. Resistance.

SESSION 5

A small fire; they put it out before it became big; they were not big flames. I saw my sister-in-law's friend.

Patient in her associations reveals that she feels calmer now. A fire occurred in her workshop when she was fifteen years old; she recalls the smoke and excitement and her experiencing a panicky feeling which culminated in a hysterical crying spell. She remembers simultaneously another fire, in the kitchen of her home—she cried and father came; but he was awkward in the situation, helpless, and of

¹³ *Ibidem.*

¹⁴ She was one of those patients who throughout analysis succeed in associating freely only now and then.

no use to her. "Friend"—a very nice, tall man; I did not have the chance to meet him. My sister-in-law claims she does not care for him.

Dream Analysis. Penis-phantasy (erection; "flames," "small," "became big"; "nice, tall man"). Disappointment and lack of faith in father's (analyst's) potency ("they put it out before it became big"). A transference dream, but shows ambivalent attitude to analyst because of identification of him with father. On a deeper level the castration complex becomes evident: the patient's unwillingness to accept her female (penis-less) sex determination and her accusation, of course, of her parents for penis-deprivation ("they put it out before it became big").

Extract 5. Castration anger. Substitution of herself for father; introjection and identification with him.

SESSION 6

I was coming to see you at another place; in the hall there was a medical laboratory; you and another doctor were there; you had a bottle in your hand, half filled with medicine, and said, "I want you to take it. This is for you."

A high place like where I used to work; you occupied a little corner there and were making shoes like a shoemaker; I thought "Isn't that funny, a doctor making shoes." You looked entirely different.

I was going up to my house; it was not the same I live in, but a different one; I was going up the stairs with packages in my arms; right behind me was a young man; he also had a package in his hands; I was a little afraid; I thought he was following me; I walked a little faster so that he might not overtake me; a boy says: "This man is following you." I entered the house; my people were there, my married brother, his wife and a little baby; they brought the baby to my mother because they were moving; the baby appeared older than it is.

Patient associates: "the man behind"—you; "a package in his hands"—I had the same kind of package as the young man. You are trying to make me think as you do. "Boy"—a little boy in my house. "Moving"—associations arrested!

Dream Analysis. (a) Postitive transference to the analyst (bottle of medicine—"bottle"—mother's breast) and, at the same

time disapproval of him ("another") and acquisition of the bottle—mother's breast-penis for herself—castration complex. (b) Obvious degradation (castration) tendencies ("analyst-shoemaker," "entirely different"). (c) Emulation with analyst—man ("packages in my arms"¹⁵—"he also had a package"—"you trying to make me think as you do." Note the frequent "little" (penis) in this part of the dream). (d) Persecution by the "young man," "right behind me" (analyst) indicates further extension of the identification (father)-penis-child to the series (father)-penis-child-feces ("behind me"). Moreover, the chronic constipation of which the patient has frequently complained, appears to be a "holding back"-symptom, viz., holding back of the penis ("Kotstange") which, when missed in the genitals, was regained per anum. The arrest of associations at "moving" (=the bowels) may, thus, be interpreted to be a symptomatic manifestation of anal-eroticism.

Extract 6. Further manifestations of ambivalence to analyst. Anal-eroticism. Ideogeny of constipation: conservation of penis.

SESSION 7

I was a school teacher; had a whole class of girls; some were bad; tried to talk to them very nicely; could not do anything with them; a quarter past eleven another teacher came in; she, "Why don't you let the children have their lunch?" I, "They have their lunch at twelve o'clock"; then came lunch time. I had for them unclean chicken, feathers on it. I thought "Isn't it funny how they eat that"; tried to taste it myself, but I could not stand the feathers. I was going home; I walked down the stairs into another room where the teacher slept; a young man up the stairs; asked him where he was going; he, "I want a room to sleep in"; "There are no rooms." In the meantime there appears a lady who said, "I can let him have a room, here are my keys"; I walked up the stairs into the room where the teacher was sleeping; this young man followed me; I started and cried, "Hello girls, look, a young man is in the room"; they all jumped into their beds and cried, "Ooh!" and with that "Ooh" I awoke in fear. Ten to fifteen minutes after awakening I was still in a fright.

Patient, after some hesitation, associates: I do not know what to say to you. I always dreamed of becoming a teacher. I had no opportunities to study. In connection with "a quarter past eleven"—

¹⁵ See "child in arms" (=penis) in dream, Session 4.

- I arrived here three-quarters of an hour ahead of time and resented it when you took the other patient and let me wait all that time.¹⁶ Patient further associates that there is now much talk in the papers about the danger of typhoid through diseased chickens. "Teacher sleeping"—I often feel so sleepy, here on the couch. "A lady"—the middle-aged woman in your waiting room I saw yesterday when leaving. "A young man"—the male patient whom I see every day here waiting for Dr. M. (This man used to go to Dr. M.'s office a few minutes before my patient would enter mine. During those few minutes Mrs. B. would overhear the other patient, as he spoke in an unusually loud voice. She marveled at the faculty with which he brought up associations and envied him.)

Dream Analysis. Transference dream. (Jealousy of other patients—sexual phantasies—defence against sex—fear of sexual infection by analysis ["chicken feathers"—"unclean sexual thoughts"—analysis].)

Extract 7. Faculty for positive transference present.

SESSION 8

I was in my own home or in somebody else's; whole place was upset; felt nervous as when in a hurry; one of the rooms looked to be a bedroom, and one of my sisters-in-law was lying in bed; it was windy, cold; the shades were blowing against the windows; I asked, "Why do you keep the windows open, you are always wanting fresh air." Outside there was a veranda; another brother-in-law of mine was holding a little baby; I said, "What's the matter, it's entirely black like a colored baby." The baby was crying; my brother-in-law tried to quiet it by shaking it; I woke up.

Emotions in her dream were haste, irritation and surprise. Patient associates: last night was very cold and I complained about the open windows—"shades blowing"; I told you the other day that the

¹⁶ Patient's appointment was for two; but she made a mistake and came three-quarters of an hour earlier. This mistake was the result of her jealousy of other patients. The relation between dream and fail-act—coming too early—that followed the next day, could, I believe, serve as a good instance in refutation of so-called "prophetic dreams." In this instance it is quite clear that the patient did not "foresee" her coming too early, but that her dream betrays her intention to come to analysis before her appointment, because of jealousy of other patients. (See in this connection: FREUD, "Die okkulte Bedeutung des Traumes," *Ges. Schriften*, III, pp. 180-184.)

sister of my husband told me a secret, that is, of her pregnant condition—"baby"; I asked her how she felt about it; she said she had tried to prevent her pregnancy by medical means, but that she was unsuccessful; I, myself, am too nervous to think of having more children; I was in a street car coming here and was fascinated by a colored baby, I always look at colored babies. I don't dislike them. "In a hurry"—Yesterday I was in a hurry to come to you; "like a bedroom"—on the couch here; "veranda"—I was very delighted by a home that I saw in Rockaway.

Dream Analysis. Actual coldness in the dreamer's bedroom effects provocation of her fear of pregnancy; this castration-fear transferred into the analytic situation.

Extract 8. Defense against motherhood or her sex-determination.

The psychoanalytic diagnosis of the case would then consist of

1. (a) *fixation on the anal and phallic stage;*
 (b) *castration fear predominant;*
 (c) *regressive intra-uterine tendencies;*
 (d) *ambivalence to husband and, hence,*
 (e) *transference difficulties and resistance foreseen.*
2. *Disappointment and lack of faith in father's love appear to be the catastrophe that almost destroyed her hetero-sexual disposition. Result—fixation on mother. (Nevertheless, she escaped overt homosexuality.)*
3. *The anxiety-symptoms seem to be rooted in the castration complex, the anxiety producing agent being wish-fear of mother-death.*

[Further development of the case gave corroboration to the psychoanalytic diagnosis.¹⁷]

¹⁷ See Synopsis of the Case.

ACTIVE THERAPY IN THE ANALYSIS OF STAMMERING

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In a previous publication¹ certain observations were made concerning the value of active therapy in the analytical treatment of stammerers, particularly in prohibiting the tic-like movements associated with speech, without elaborating the more general practical and theoretical details. Further experience has led to more extensive formulations, and the purpose of this communication is to call attention to this phase of psychoanalytical therapy to other analytical workers in the field of speech disturbances, thus supplementing the methods already utilized. The technical innovation first introduced by Ferenczi under the designation of "active therapy"² has become of increasing value in stammering as in other neurotic disorders.

The willingness of stammerers to be cured and the compliance with the analysis may be only apparent, acting as a cover for resistances which are often reinforced through a mobilization of physiological habits relating to the oral libido. These habits automatically stimulate the oral apparatus through the pathway of the ego when a compulsive necessity arises for oral libidinal discharge. As the analysis is an attack upon the stammerer's narcissism, the battle against these modes of libidinal satisfaction is active therapy, because what the stammerer can achieve therapeutically depends in part on overcoming the external circumstances which activate and strengthen his oral libido.

The technique of active therapy in the analysis of stammerers is a deprivation of various external forms of oral gratification or rather an abstinence from those external factors which tend to prolong the gratification or to reinforce it. To sit back and passively wait for improvement in the speech tends to unnecessarily prolong the treatment, as the patient has other means of oral satisfaction at his command which act as resistances, even when the original sub-

¹ Isador H. Coriat. "Stammering. A Psychoanalytical Interpretation." New York and Washington, 1928. Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Monog., Se. No. 47.

² "Technical Difficulties in the Analysis of a Case of Hysteria" (1919). Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1926.

stratum of the oral libido has become weakened in the speech mechanisms through the analysis. These means, sanctioned by custom and social usage, tend to prolong and reinforce the original oral pleasure. The oral fixation of stammerers produces that narcissistic gratification of the symptom which it is so necessary to influence and overcome. Therefore, in stammering, as in other narcissistic neuroses, as Freud has emphasized, our present technical methods must be replaced by others.

Active intervention aimed at deprivation of oral gratification should be directed towards any external factor which tends to act as a continuous reinforcement of oral pleasure, that is, as substitutive gratifications which serve to increase the tenacity of the oral libido. To this end, all forms of smoking should be prohibited, particularly pipe smoking, as the latter, through its well known oral symbolism, produces a relaxed state, resembling the after effects of nursing in an infant. As Brill³ has observed, smoking represents a regression to infantile auto-erotism or is a continuation of it, and its infantile root is thumb sucking. When it is considered that many stammerers remain thumb suckers until a rather late period of childhood, the parallelism is significant. In both cases we are dealing with a regression to the earliest stage of libido organization, the oral erotic level. Gum chewing, with its prolonged oral and dental gratification, must also be prohibited, and in addition the eating of candy in any of its forms, particularly hard candies, should be discontinued. Gum chewing specifically represents an incomplete separation of infantile oral activities at their most primitive stages, the biting and the nursing tendencies. These desires for external gratifications are compulsive repetitions of previously experienced narcissistic pleasures at the oral stage of the libido, for to the stammerer the oral zone is the most important of the erotogenic zones.

The active prohibition of the utilization of one of these substances produces a certain resistance tension which must be worked through, and parallel with this, speech improves up to a certain point. Then a second deprivation must be enforced in order to make necessary a further working through of the instinctual opposition. A sudden spurt of improvement in speech usually takes place at each phase of active intervention, because each step serves to overcome the resistances towards retaining the primitive oral libidinal satisfaction. Sometimes, as a result of the resistance produced by active

³ "Tobacco and the Individual." *Int. Journal Psycho-Analysis*, III, 4, Dec., 1922.

therapy, there may result a temporary regression to rudimentary speech, resembling a child learning to talk. During this phase of active intervention the dreams are apt to cease altogether, because the patient is no longer desirous of providing unconscious encouragement in the form of analyzable dream material.

On the contrary, however, there sometimes occurs a further piling up of resistances after each form of external gratification is removed, a sort of an unconscious resentment directed towards the deprivation, resembling the reaction of a child when it is restrained from its oral satisfactions. Under these conditions, the free associations become disconnected and superficial: their selection is a form of resistance, that is, a cover for the unconscious material which the patient wishes to avoid. The resistances are attempts to retain the methods of the original oral pleasure. The desire to gratify the oral libido hides behind these superficial resistance productions, in order to preserve the general narcissistic gratification.

Deprivation increases the pressure of oral libidinal tendencies, that is, it increases the resistance. The working through the increased resistance assists in overcoming the oral gratifications and so regulates the course of the localized oral libido that it finally overcomes it by freeing the libido fixation from the oral apparatus, through a discharge of libidinal excitation. Clinically, it acts as sort of a trauma in the analytical situation. Thus this active intervention directed against satisfaction from external factors is required in the analysis of stammerers in order to unwind the libido from its pregenital oral fixation.

This external oral gratification is a form of oral onanism or its equivalent, and the analyst's duty is to abolish it. As Ferenczi⁴ has pointed out, "These apparently harmless activities can easily become hiding places for the libido." Active intervention, therefore, must assume increasing importance in the analysis of stammerers, as it tends to free the anchored libido from the mouth zone, it becomes a renunciation, against resistance, of the pleasurable oral activities. In fact, in stammering, the mouth, tongue, and lips are overcharged with oral libido, and this is often reinforced by the social sanction of external factors. It becomes necessary to gradually deprive the patient of these external factors, thus eliminating at the same time from the oral zone what may be termed an increased dose of the oral libido.

⁴ Loc. cit.

This oral libido is tenaciously retained through both internal and external factors, and of the latter, smoking, gum chewing, and the use of sweets are the most predominant. Their use is rationalized through social customs, hence the patient is unaware of the part they play in increased gratification, because their repetition is associated with an economy of oral expenditure.

The favorable therapeutic effects of the deprivation are in direct proportion to the suffering and tension which the deprivation produces, particularly in the case of smoking, where the physiological effect of tobacco is combined with its oral pleasure. Too great a degree of oral satisfaction or comfort is therefore detrimental to analytical success in the treatment of stammerers. As previously pointed out, the resistance is a sign of unconscious hate directed against the analysis of the oral erotism. The satisfaction must be deliberately removed in order to increase the tension for the purpose of working through the resistance. Freud has formulated the rule that "the analytical treatment should be carried out, so far as possible, under privation in a state of abstinence,"⁵ and in no neurosis is this more necessary than in the narcissistic stammerer.

The oral erotic gratification which produces the stammering is a substitutive gratification for nursing, and this is reinforced through other forms of substitutive gratifications, such as smoking or gum chewing. Active therapy is therefore necessary at some stage in the analysis of every stammerer, because the patient continually tends to invest the oral libido with extreme substitutive gratifications in the form of long words, in a predominance of words possessing labial or dental components, and finally in the form of smoking, gum chewing, etc. These external satisfactions must be prohibited step by step, and speech begins to improve only under conditions of excluding those pleasurable oral satisfactions which can be controlled.

The patient must be induced to talk without any external sustenance for oral gratification. Active therapy should not be employed in the early stages of the analysis of the stammering, but only when a certain degree of transference has developed, in spite of the difficulty of obtaining a suitable transference in the narcissistic stammerer. Then the external pleasurable factors should be prohibited step by step, otherwise the accumulated resistances may lead to a premature termination of the analysis. In stammering, this is

⁵ "Turnings in the Ways of Psychoanalytic Therapy." Collected Papers, Vol. II, C. XXXIV.

a danger to be carefully avoided, for at its best the transferences in these cases are weak.

The additional tension produced by the active intervention is gradually worked through by sort of an auto-erotic (or oral erotic) repetition; the primary binding of the oral erotism to the speech symptom is thereby slowly weakened. This gradual oral weaning is accomplished only in the analytical transference situation through a renunciation of this form of narcissistic gratification. Active therapy in stammering applied either to the speech tics or to external oral gratification, acts as sort of a psychical trauma which hastens the therapeutic result. Furthermore, as the patient is deprived step by step of these external oral gratifications, there is gradually reached a point where the primary oral libido presents itself in what may be termed a pure culture, thus becoming more accessible for analysis without any extraneous admixture, due to an increased assimilative capacity of the ego.

Active therapy interferes with the psychic activity and facilitates the appearance of material which would otherwise have been prevented by resistance from becoming conscious. It educates the ego to tolerate the forbidden and at the same time the desired oral gratification. However, this active interference must be used with caution in individual cases, for if the stammerer improves too quickly it means that he has not improved permanently, because the internal factors still activate the unconscious material which seeks an outlet in oral gratification.

In addition to the above situations, symptomatic movements with the left hand are occasionally observed in stammerers. These symptomatic movements may assume several different forms, such as putting the left hand to the mouth with a tendency to press the fingers on the lips or rhythmical patting movements with the left hand. These variable movements are observed only in attempts to talk and are associated with sucking movements with the lips (oral nursing) or with grinding of the teeth (oral sadism). Under these circumstances, when a word is finally enunciated there results an appearance of gratification.

The purpose of the first type of movements is to reinforce the strength of the oral muscles, and of the second, a substitutive grasping of the mother's breast. These pleasure functions of the hands (Bernfeld) are forms of regression to an infantile nursing activity, and during the course of analytical treatment of stammerers they likewise should be forbidden by means of active therapy. Under

this prohibition the symptomatic behavior with the hands gradually disappears and with it an improvement in speech.

As a rule, during the analysis there is a willingness to coöperate with the various prohibitions, even if they produce a feeling of conflict and resistance tension. Occasionally a rationalized disobedience takes place to a certain extent, such as placing an unlighted cigarette or an empty pipe in the mouth, associated with a wish fantasy of smoking. Under these circumstances a punishment for the prohibited oral gratification may take place, such as in one instance where there resulted a dream of having pyorrhoea with a consequent loss of teeth. This dream was followed by an actual improvement in the speech. It seems here as if the super-ego had actually gratified its punishment tendencies on the offending organ, thereby stilling the conscience anxiety for the breaking of the prohibition. The speech then improved, because in a metapsychological sense the dream and the amelioration in speech were economically connected.

ABSTRACTS

British Journal of Medical Psychology.

(Vol. 6, No. 1, March, 1926)

ABSTRACTED BY SMITH ELY JELLIFFE, M.D.

1. TREDGOLD, A. F. The Definition and Diagnosis of Moral Imbecility. 1-9.
2. BURT, CYRIL. The Definition and Diagnosis of Moral Imbecility. 10-46.
3. SMITH, HAMBLIN M. The Definition and Diagnosis of Moral Imbecility. 47-54.
4. THOMAS, REES WM. The Definition and Diagnosis of Moral Imbecility. 55-69.
5. SHRUBSALL, F. C. The Definition and Diagnosis of Moral Imbecility. 70-.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Here are five papers, contributions to a Symposium arranged by the Education and Medical Sections of the British Psychological Society in March, 1926. Although there is little or no reference made to the psychoanalytic study of any particular individual or individuals that according to the British Mental Deficiency Act of 1913, and classed as "Moral Imbeciles," a few lines might be given indicating the general scope of the discussion.

Moral Imbecility is one of four classes of mental defect illy defined under this Act. The discussion is aimed at the effort to clarify the concept for medicolegal purposes. It is more or less remarkable that the closely allied grouping, so outstanding in German psychiatry, psychopathic personal is mostly passed over.

Tredgold in his opening remarks shows that the legal concept is that of a combination of mental defect and marked misconduct. His discussion is chiefly clinical. Organic instinctive behavior patterns of long ancestry are first posited. These are at first egoistic and antisocial and later experiences give rise to sentiments of rightness or wrongness which serve as brakes to control the primitive selfish instincts. Moral sense he thinks is essentially emotional and conative. Moral perception or discrimination is a purely intellectual process, the former having greater influence upon inhibition of antisocial conduct than the latter. Three stages are laid down. For the first few years of life conduct consists in the carrying out of certain ingrained tendencies. Second, following precept or example habits of obedience to authority are formed; finally feeling towards acts

develops. Rightness or wrongness are attached to these. This is stated to be a very bald outline. Thus innate control and environmental influences are important. An individual possessing strong antisocial propensities, with defective moral sense and wisdom; this is what he would call a moral imbecile. Such an one is not incapable of acquiring ordinary school knowledge. He may be clever or even intellectually brilliant, nimble witted, engaging in conversation, plausible and often a ready liar, lying when truth even might be more serviceable. Moral and altruistic feeling are defective. Static conceptions prevail throughout this first paper.

Burt's contribution starts with the analysis of a single case. This analysis is conducted upon the basis of a point, percentage system in which innate intellectual conditions, acquired intellectual conditions, innate temperamental conditions, acquired temperamental conditions, and acquired moral conditions check up certain percentages. In fifteen years he has put his calipers upon nearly 3,000 delinquents and mental defectives, of which 116 he has classed moral imbeciles. These are set down in beautiful percentage figures even to the decimals. [One sometimes wonders what 6/10 of a delinquent can be, or 2/10 of a precox or paretic is, or 3/10 of an epileptic means, but of such is the fiction of pseudoexactness. Decimals in this kind of presentation reduce the thing to a force. J.] Nevertheless the general clinical states are of some value. At all events he is sound in being out of sympathy with the British Act definition. An interesting historical summary of the whole concept is to be here found. Naturally specific moral facilities are remnants of early scholastic and theological dogmas. Psychoanalytic ideas of ethics in the dynamic sense are found in footnotes (p. 24) but in general Burt's discussion is scholastic with certain inclusions of the semischolastic developments of Shand's and McDougall's social psychological notions. For practical medicolegal purposes the discussion is quite advanced, especially that part of it that deals with the code. His objections to the clause defining the moral imbecile as of the Act of 1913 are well set forth in his Summary.

M. Hamblin Smith would also like to begin with a definition of the undefinable which is "ill defined" in the Act. Morality, *i.e.*, ethics, is his nubbin of discussion and he would try to pin morality down to etymologies. The folkways are outlined, common sense is the slogan. An absolute system of morality does not exist. If there was, all would be altered! Only theology—as revelation—knows this. [From Moses to the Rev. Roach Stratton.] Rivers, and the herd instinct are introduced, and relativity in ethics is sensibly presented. He regards the whole discussion on the present lines as futile. From the jurisprudence side, moral imbecility is of no standing, the cases can all be brought under feeble-minded categories or psychotic categories, or of mental conflict and repression.

Rees Thomas admits the difficulty of the situation, both because the Act lacks clearness of meaning and possibly fails to outline what it is all about; excellent reasons for conceiving it as difficult. He also cannot

localize the moral sense. Psychoanalysis is mentioned (p. 61) because "through its application certain of these patients are 'cured,'" i.e., no longer are "moral imbeciles" and yet in the next line, no "specific cure" is to hand, when the antisocial conduct has persisted a long time and furthermore to apply the method of psychoanalysis in all cases of social maladjustment is impracticable. [In 1870 the same argument was used as to the uselessness of surgery.] Back to the child. Thomas is an individualist and writes a lot of sense about the problem as "each tub standing on its own bottom."

Shrubsall's contribution sticks closely to the legal requirements of the situation.

On the whole the 83 pages are well worth reading.

(Vol. 6, Part 2, Sept., 1926)

1. FLOURNOY, HENRI. The Biological Point of View of Adolf Meyer in Psychology and Psychiatry. 85-92.
2. GLOVER, JAMES. Divergent Tendencies in Psychotherapy. 93-109.
3. BURKE, NOEL H. M. Some Aspects of the Inter-Relation between Bodily and Mental Disease. 110-120.
4. Descriptive Notice. GLOVE, E., of Freud's Hemmung, Symptom und Angst. Book Reviews.

1. FLOURNOY, HENRI: *Adolf Meyer's Biological Point of View in Psychiatry*.—This is a paper which constitutes a part of a larger discussion appearing in the "Archives de Psychologie" in which a former pupil of Dr. Meyer gives an appreciative summary of his ideas, and therefore a résumé of a definite development of psychiatry in the United States under the leadership of a number of neuropsychiaters of whom Meyer is here picked out for special attention. The science of the behavior of the organism as a whole, biological, and dynamic is the slogan of this school, in which Meyer, Campbell, Kirby, White and Jelliffe are more or less outstanding figures. What the general formulations are are here well considered.

2. GLOVER, JAMES: *Divergent Tendencies in Psychotherapy*.—In the history of the development of a true psychotherapy two trends are noticeable both tending to minimize its validity in the medical mind. On the one hand a tendency towards transcendental explanations has to be fought with, with its many quasi religious and magic working formulæ, on the other nonmental explanations. Both have advanced from crude to subtle stages of development. Modern psychopathology is ripe now to develop its own concepts, strengthen its own formulations, and perfect its own technic. Physiological bias is always at hand to weaken reliance on purely psychological technics. Its tendency is to unduly accent the significance of the stimuli from without, i.e., the environmental factors.

It neglects the stimuli from within, i.e., instinctive forces which are all too easily summarized as 'constitutional.' Modern psychopathology has paid particular attention to these instinctual urges. Out of them have come reaction patterns which a dynamic psychology founded upon genetic lines can observe and apply for the treatment of those disorders for which a scientific psychotherapy is adapted. Such a scientific psychotherapy is in sight when it is realized that neurotic illnesses are the outcome of imperfect cultural modification of primary instinctual impulses directed to culturally archaic goals, and that their unrealized persistence behind the too precarious acquisitions of the cultural self, maintains a state of internal conflict which unfits the patient for adequate adaptation to his social environment. This state of internal stress may bring about somatic disturbances, endocrine or visceral. Actual details of the grouping of the instinct units or details of psychogenesis are secondary, in view of the validity of the main formulation. This will survive and the details be rendered more clear as application of its principles progresses. It does not need the support of crass drug therapy on the one hand, nor of philosophical or religious doctrines on the other hand. Individual patients may need such adjuncts temporarily or even permanently but this does not change the situation so far as a scientific psychotherapy is concerned.

Glover then calls attention to the crucial affective situation in psychotherapy, as particularly embodied in the classical conception of *transference* in psychoanalysis—he restates what happens in the free association method. The analyst becomes a blank screen upon which are projected pictures of the patient's infantile life. Now the analyst may satisfy one of two drives: one epistemophilic, which harnesses the forces of his curiosity for the purposes of science, or the other he may gratify his will to power which as unconscious desire for omnipotence exists in us all. In Glover's view the acquiring of a psychotherapeutic technic demands only the wisdom of an intelligent medical graduate and the morality of his Hippocratic oath.

3. BURKE, NOEL H. M.: *Some Aspects of the Interrelation between Bodily and Mental Disease*.—The author disclaims that there is little strictly psychological in this paper. Four cases are cited: A. had hysterical signs(?) but a gastric ulcer perforated while under psychological treatment. An X-ray would have demonstrated it. B. had anxiety symptoms and a radiological examination showed an ulcer of the stomach. C. was thought to have an hysterical weakness; myotonia atrophica was the outcome. D., a so-called neurasthenic, had renal calculi. Mistakes of this kind often cause an overcompensatory chuckle on the part of the materialistic organicist; he makes the same kind of mistake, perhaps in an opposite direction probably (ten to one) by piling in drugs, etc., in purely mental cases. The author then goes on to a rapid résumé of the vegetative nervous system and of the endocrinopathies. He then mentions the Jackson level hypothesis and cites gastrointestinal, thyroid, glycosural,

and other syndromes and concludes that a psychotherapist must always remain a physician who is treating a patient who is ill.

4. *Descriptive Note.*—An excellent extensive abstract of Freud's recent work upon *Hemmung*, Symptom and Angst by E. Glover.

(Vol. 6, No. 3)

1. McCURDY, J. T. Hypothetical Mental Constitution of Compulsive Thinkers. 159.
2. GOITEIN, P. L. A New Approach to the Analysis of Mary Rose. 178.
3. BURROW, T. The Reabsorbed Affect and its Elimination. 209.
4. Report on Symposium on Moral Imbecility. 219.

1. McCURDY, J. T.: *Compulsive Thinkers.*—In this paper the offer of an apology is made that there is no case material. It is the outline of a scheme, an hypothesis, which the author states has helped him to get around problems of psychopathology which have bothered him for years. Compulsive thinking is meant in a wider sense than compulsive neurotics. Compulsive thinkers are those who cannot give up their efforts at solving situations, valuable or the reverse. What lies behind unprofitable compulsive thinking? With what taboo is the personality of the compulsive thinker guarded?

An even more puzzling conjunction is that of unconscious sadism with exercise of intelligence. The cruelty of wit, thanks to Freud's brilliant analysis, we can understand. But others than himself have seen evidence in their patients of unconscious sadism motivating intellectual keenness that seems to have the discomfiture of no one in view. In other words mental acuity seems to be one mode of expression for sadism and this may be quite constructive in character. Constructive intelligence is at bottom fantasy-building. If the fantasies in question had the injury or destruction of others as their object, the association would be understandable. But evidence for this is often lacking. Of all the aberrations of sex none is, of its very nature, so definitely inimical to constructiveness as sadism. One might suspect that we were here dealing with some kind of a reaction formation. But sympathy—the antidote to cruelty—although not destructive is certainly not constructive in tendency. It works much more for the maintenance of the *status quo*. The conclusion seems therefore justifiable that the connection between sadism and constructive thinking is not direct and causal in spite of the intimacy of the association. We are consequently forced to look for some other impulse with constructive potentialities so closely integrated with the sadism that action of the one means action of the other, that they reinforce one another mutually. What can this X be?

A hint may, perhaps, be secured by correlating this problem with the one before. The compulsive thinker acts as if in terror of loss of his personality. He also acts as if he must destroy something—something, more-

over, that is dear to him, else it would not be sadism. Here, then, is the sketch of a conflict and, judged by its seriousness, a deadly one. Now in any fight the issue depends on the comparative powers of the antagonists. Weakening of self is strength to the opponent; strength to one's self is a weakening of the opponent. Thus we arrive at a clue. Our search must be for some conflict still progressing in the unconscious. The personality of the patient is threatened; he can protect himself by destroying another or by making himself the stronger. One characteristic of this hypothetical conflict must be pointed out at once. It is not a physical battle, for the patients do not present bodily symptoms. The sufferer from compulsions is harrowed by purely subjective woes and rarely presents anything more like physiological disturbances than stammering. (McCurdy can recall only two cases of compulsive thinking in which there were physical complaints and in both of these the whole clinical picture was singularly confused.) If the struggle be carried out on the mental plane, in terms of fantasies, this would naturally be a stimulus for intellectual activity—an activity that would have compulsive force, if the issue meant life or death.

To elaborate this hypothesis logically we must look for some conjunction of circumstances in childhood that would make such a strange conflict probable. This might be found in a marked discrepancy between the behavior of the most-loved object and the characteristics assigned to this object in imagination. In other words it would be a sharp contrast between the character of the real object and of the Imago. Before describing this situation further one must try to make clear just what is meant by the Imago and how it comes into being.

Mention is made of the great stumbling block to treatment which the rigidity of personality in the compulsive neurotic presents. They have insight for their symptoms but none for defects of character; nay, further, they are unwilling even to discuss such defects. This point need not be labored further. But it should be pointed out that this complication in treatment is not confined to the compulsion neurosis. It occurs whenever symptoms become integrated with the personality. Such union is particularly liable to occur in invalidism, when the patient actually gains something from his symptoms. One example of this is, perhaps, worth citing. The patient was a woman who had suffered for eight years with a facial neuralgia, the behavior of which showed it to be neurotic. During these years she had spent all her money on doctors and had become dependent on friends, one of the "brave sufferers" with whom analysts are all familiar. Analysis was attempted. She accepted placidly the usual Œdipus and lurid autoerotic interpretations and actually began to show some improvement. Then it was suggested that it was time she got a job and earned a little money. As this was accepted without enthusiasm the analyst ventured most inconsiderately to remind her that she was not paying for her treatment. At this she exploded almost literally. She had

never been so insulted in her life, of course she was going to pay me, and so on. The next day came a letter enclosing a small sum of money. She wrote that she had never suffered so in her life, only her tremendous strength of character had kept her from suicide and she charged me never to say such an unfeeling thing to any patient again. I have not seen or heard of her again.

If the hypothesis about compulsive thinking be sound, it may offer some grain of hope therapeutically. So long as the personality remains rigid symptoms are bound to recur. But if the central defect of his make-up be brought home to the patient he may be able to make a virtue of it. All that is necessary—although this is a Herculean task—is for the central egoism to become engaged in the task of reconstruction. Let pride and self-preservation once be turned to the task of self-analysis and it becomes compulsively necessary for the patient to anticipate the analyst in his discoveries. One such case is cited. The patient worked as if possessed, in a frenzy to detect his complexes and to interpret them accurately. It excluded practically all other thoughts from his mind until each dream was analyzed, even if this took him all day or all night. But in his endeavor he was, in the main, successful; in fact this hypothesis is largely the outcome of that analysis.

In conclusion McCurdy enumerates the characteristics of the compulsive thinker which he ought to show, according to this hypothesis and which, if demonstrated consistently in a large series of cases, ought to go a long way towards validating the theory. In the first instance there should be a history indicating a marked discrepancy between the characters of the object Imago and of the person who ought to be the representative thereof. Secondly, the personality of the patient ought to show rigidity of the type here described. He ought to be unduly resistive to criticism and much less amenable to suggestion than is the normal man. One should be surprised to meet an individual with prominent compulsive thinking who identified himself emotionally with groups or group ideas unless he were the dominating figure in the band. In other words he could lead, or more likely drive, but he could never follow. Similarly his jealous maintenance of the idea of self would prevent his having true religious experience; or, if he did achieve this a revolutionary change of character would ensue. Marked development of compulsive thinking and the abandonment of self which true religion demands are, I believe, utterly incompatible. Finally, if treatment be undertaken and a survey of the patient's dreams be made, the symbolizing of his unconscious motivations would be found to involve an unusual amount of intellectualization.

Summary.—The problem is to correlate the following phenomena in compulsive thinkers: compulsive thoughts, often of extraordinary crudity; prominence of unconscious sadism; intellectual superiority; and obduracy to treatment. The hypothesis is that there exists in early childhood a marked discrepancy between the actual behavior and that expected from

the idealized object of love (Imago). This leads to a conflict between the idealized mother (or father or their surrogates) and the idealized self, which can be solved only by the victory of one over the other. The instinct of self-preservation is attached to the ideal of self rather than to the body, and so that ideal becomes inviolate. The real object must then be destroyed in order to preserve the ideal of self and its related idealization of the object. This tends to make expression of interest in the real object take a sadistic form. But physical expression of animosity is futile in a child, so it plans the destruction of the object in fantasy. This is an intellectual operation and is carried out compulsively because the life of the Self depends upon it—it is a panic reaction. Sadism and the compulsive use of intellectual processes are thus established and intertwined. As the individual matures, the ideal of self becomes more elaborate and socialized but remains peculiarly sacred. When failure of adaptation occurs, the unconscious sadism emerges: it shocks the personality and so the personality is not adapted to it; it comes compulsively and in relatively its original form. Treatment is difficult, not for lack of intelligence, but because there is a stubborn refusal to allow change of outlook which means change of personality; *i.e.*, treatment resuscitates the old panic reaction. Insight is present only for symptoms and not for defects of character. This type of mental constitution probably occurs in many people of intellectual vigor who never develop compulsive symptoms.

2. GOITEIN, P. L.: *Mary Rose*.—The dream tragedy *Mary Rose* (which tells of the emotional stirrings, storm and calm, in a once vivacious household when they find that their son is married to a fading Shadow), is made the subject of a reflective analysis in the light of the poet's phantasies, personal experiences and belief. It sharply differentiates the 'manifest content' for the spectator, from the all-significant 'latent story,' for the dramatist; but emphasizes that just as a fusion of diverse personalities in life creates the composite figure of the dream, so divers themes in the Unconscious make up the 'manifest Drama,' by fusing their currents back into a complex whole. These themes are variously reconstructed from the viewpoints of audience, philosopher, mystic and poet; and the analytical bearings of each discussed. The impress of symbolism in the last-named is analyzed at greater length; and opportunity is taken of approaching the problem from different levels of mind, down to the play's basic Unconscious significance and back to its highest sublimation, in the form of a Sacred Drama. Certain psychological determinants from the individual and from life are finally suggested as motivating the surface story; and a judicious interweaving of comparable quotation from other literature is attempted. But to appreciate its finer subtleties the original essay must be read of itself, in view of its detailed citations from Barrie's play; and for the gradual steps in justification of, what is offered as, a fresh analytical approach. The essay is written in nontechnical language, and is evidently intended for a wider circle of readers than the initiates

of the new psychology. Its concluding passage in summing up the heroine (who gives her name to the play) says:

" . . . But as we cast a last long lingering look behind on our fading Eurydice, we realize that that sad character is there to give us consolation in the knowledge 'that hope keeps breaking through,' and in the feeling of which she provides the living evidence—that those we loved of yesterday and whose memories we cherish, grow younger ever younger as we grow old; and our love for some Elder's image at the first, is still fostered unchanged as we advance, even kindly rejuvenated somewhere while we sleep, until in after years, we the aging turn back to glance at it, to find it is the image of a child!"

3. BURROW, T.: *The Reabsorbed Affect and its Elimination*.—A theoretical discussion without case material of the early formulations about "you and me" in infantile psychology and their later evolution into subjective images of values to the individual's own narcissism with further estimations of the value of group analysis.

4. A continuation of the symposium on Moral Imbecility with no psychoanalytic material.

(Part 4)

1. HART, BERNARD. The Conception of Dissociation. 241.
2. JONES, ERNEST. The Psychology of Religion. 264.
3. RICKMAN, JOHN. A Survey. 270.

1. HART, B.: *Dissociation*.—The aim of the present paper is to consider the nature of Janet's conceptions of dissociation and of the sub-conscious, to elucidate the difference of plane which marks off these conceptions from those created by Freud, and to discuss the relationships and oppositions which exist between them.

The hypothesis that mental elements may exist outside the limits of ordinary consciousness can be traced far back in the history of philosophy. In one of its forms these extraconscious elements, *e.g.*, the 'petites perceptions' of Leibniz, were regarded as being identical in nature with the constituents of normal consciousness, and differing from the latter only in intensity. This corresponds to the 'fringe of consciousness' of later psychologists, and describes a range of phenomena which has nothing to do with the conceptions we are now examining, although the term 'sub-conscious' is sometimes confusingly applied thereto. In another of its forms, however, the hypothesis assumes that mental processes exist outside consciousness, which are radically different from those occurring within consciousness, but which are able to modify and affect the course of the latter. This notion is to be found in Kant and Schopenhauer, and is elaborately developed in Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious. It is clearly to be regarded as the logical ancestor of the Freudian 'unconscious.'

The value of Janet's conception as a weapon of understanding is beyond question, and it has cast a flood of light upon some of the problems of hypnosis and hysteria. Nevertheless it presents certain defects and inconsistencies which, at any rate in the form in which Janet cast it, oppose considerable difficulties in the way of its complete acceptance. Janet is a descendant of the associationists, and he talks glibly of the sticking together and unsticking of bits of mind-stuff, in a manner which is repugnant to the psychology of today. Moreover, his conception of dissociation is constructed in that spatial metaphor which so often produces a superficial appearance of clarity at the expense of a gross distortion of the underlying facts. Dissociation is for Janet the separation en masse of a number of mental elements from that greater aggregation of elements which constitutes the totality of the mind, a splitting of the mind into two independent pieces. Now this picture cannot be satisfactorily reconciled with the observed facts.

The unconscious of Freud has been created by him in order to explain the processes occurring in consciousness. It is not in itself a fact of consciousness, and its existence cannot be demonstrated in the way in which the existence of Janet's dissociated streams can be demonstrated, any more than we can demonstrate the existence of the ether which has been created in order to explain the facts of light and heat.

The 'subconscious' of Janet is a description of phenomenal facts, while the 'unconscious' of Freud is a conceptual construction, an imagined entity created in order to explain phenomenal facts.

These criticisms upon the fascinating speculations of Das Ich und das Es are put forward with some diffidence, because they have been hastily cast together, and are in need of further thought and consideration before they can be clearly presented, but they will serve to indicate the difficulty experienced when we endeavor to envisage, from the standpoint of methodology, the extraordinarily fluid and plastic concepts which Freud employs. Freud's work has been carried out along the road of clinical observation, and he has made and modified his concepts as he went along. It is to this circumstance that the fluidity and plasticity are presumably to be ascribed. The modification of concepts in the light of further facts of observation is of course an unimpeachable proceeding, but it carries with it the possibility that the concepts may ultimately have ascribed to them a complex mass of attributes which do not easily hang together. Such a characterization, while it facilitates the fitting of the observed facts into the theories, inevitably blurs the precision and definition of the latter, a serious defect when we are dealing with a system of conceptual constructions.

2. JONES, ERNEST: *The Psychology of Religion*.—This is a very condensed paper read at the International Congress of Psychology held at Groningen. Psychoanalysis has called attention to a region which should logically be investigated before recourse is had to the more obscure and

remote region of the inherited instincts. This is the infantile mind, which is continued in later life as the unconscious mind and constitutes the essence of the latter. Both the content and the mode of functioning of the infantile mind differ widely from those of the adult conscious one and the greater part of it becomes buried in later life, 'repressed' and inaccessible to consciousness, as the result of powerful forces acting in this direction. There is the strongest possible tendency to depreciate the significance of infantile mental processes, which are felt to be merely 'childish,' so that any attempt to correlate them with important adult ones meets with instinctive incredulity. To take a simple illustration of this: If one were to correlate the object fear of supernatural agencies that has been experienced so many countless times, and the fear that can still be experienced of the awful wrath of God, with the fear that a child may feel for his father, no one can well appreciate the significance of this who has not had personal experience, through psychoanalysis of the unconscious, of how intense the child's dread of the father can be.

In the past quarter of a century a vast experience has accumulated from psychoanalytic investigation of the religious life of individuals, and in addition a great number of works have been published containing psychoanalytic studies of various aspects of religious beliefs and other phenomena. The outstanding conclusion that emerges from all this investigation is that the religious life represents a dramatization on a cosmic plane of the emotions, fears and longings which arose in the child's relation to his parents. This is a sentence which must remain without much meaning for those who have not taken cognizance of the modern study of the unconscious, but it is pregnant for those who have.

The five aspects of the problem of religion thus enumerated may be commented on in order: (1) Relation to a supernatural spiritual order, characteristically to supernatural beings. The attributes of power and taboo connected with these, and the varying emotional attitudes, notably those of dependence, fear, love and reverence, are all direct reproductions of the child's attitude towards his parents. The child's sense of the absolute as felt in its original attitude towards his own importance is, when it becomes impaired by contact with reality, partly continued as the anthropocentric view of the universe implicit in all religions and partly displaced, first on to the parents and then, when this also fails, on to divine beings; the earthly father is replaced by the Heavenly Father. The conflicts with the parents that necessarily arise during the process of upbringing, the essence of which consists in the regulation of—or interference with—the infantile sexuality (or child's love life, if the phrase be preferred), are for the greater part unconscious even at the time. They lead to repressed death wishes against the parents, with a consequent fear of retaliation, and from this comes the familiar religious impulse to propitiate the spirits of dead ancestors or other spiritual beings. The accompanying love leads to the desire for forgiveness, reconciliation, help and succor.

(2) All the emotional problems surrounding death arise, not from the philosophical contemplation of dead strangers, but from ambivalence towards the person's loved ones. Dread of death invariably proves clinically to be the expression of repressed death wishes against loved objects. It is further found that the themes of death and castration (or the equivalent withdrawal of the loved object— are extremely closely associated and that anxiety concerning indefinite survival of the personality constantly expresses the fear of a punitive impotence.

(3) The primal self-love and self-importance of the child, which more nearly approaches the absolute than any other experience in life, is commonly displaced on to a selected portion of the mind called the superego, an ideal of what the ego longs to be as the result of its moral education. The sense of supreme values, of a rich 'meaning' in life, which plays a cardinal part in all the higher religions, is a typical manifestation of this striving. It is, of course, related to the desire to be reconciled with God and to be approved of by Him.

(4) The constant association of religion with morality is another aspect of this same feature.

(5) The sense of inadequacy in coping with life, Janet's "sentiment d'incompletude," Freud's "inferiority complex," may appear in any aspect of life, physically, morally, intellectually, and so on. Psychoanalysis of the phenomenon, however, reveals a unitary origin, namely, in the sense of sin or guilt aroused in the child in his endeavor to make all his impulses conform with adult standards. It is thus psychologically comprehensible that all manifestations of inadequacy, in whatever sphere, can be allayed by dealing with their origin by religious means; to be reconciled with the Father is the same thing as to obtain assistance from Him. It is well known what a central part the conviction of sin plays in religion; without it, and the consequent necessity for salvation, the Christian religion, for instance, would be well-nigh emptied of meaning. In conclusion Jones writes that the simplistic appearance of the foregoing propositions be not taken as a token of their nature. It is an inevitable result of the attempt to present in a few words an exceedingly complicated and novel body of doctrine.

3. RICKMAN, JOHN: *The Development of the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Psychoses*.—This is a condensation of a paper since elaborated and published as a monograph (International Journal of Psycho-Analysis Monographs, No. 2) which gives a masterly summary of the developments of psychoanalytic theory to the study of the psychoses. Only one part of three is here given. The Schreber case is digested very completely. (See Adolf Meyer's discussion of the same in White and Jelliffe's *Modern Treatment of Nervous and Mental Diseases*, Vol. II, 1913.) (See Vol. 7 for further installments.)

SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS

AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION

The sixth annual midwinter meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association was held in conjunction with the New York Psychoanalytic Society at the Academy of Medicine, New York City, on December 26, 1929. An informal dinner preceded the meeting. The papers read were as follows: (1) Some Remarks on Transference by Dr. L. E. Emerson, Boston; discussed by Drs. White, Schilder, Zilboorg, Lewin and Sullivan. (2) An Observation of Super-ego Formation by Dr. P. R. Lehrman, New York City; discussed by Drs. Zilboorg, Schilder, Lewin, Wittels, Broadwin, White, Sullivan, Meyer and Emerson. (3) The Problem of the Termination of Analysis by Dr. Dorian Feigenbaum, New York City; discussed by Drs. Glueck, Stern and Brill.

At a short business session which followed the scientific program, Dr. Brill was authorized to appoint a committee to revise the constitution of the Society.

C. P. OBERNDORF, *Secretary*.

The following is a digest of the above papers:

I. L. E. EMERSON, M.D., Boston. *Some Remarks on Transference.*

A brief history of the development of the idea of transference in Freud's mind will serve as an introduction to my remarks. So far as I can find out, Freud first defined transference in his "Studien über Hysterie," published 1895. "If the patient fears lest the painful ideas emerging from the content by the analysis would be transferred to the physician . . . " no progress can be made until that resistance is overcome. He goes on to say: "The transference to the physician occurs through false connections," and illustrates it by an example (p. 118). Fourteen years later, in his lectures at Clark University, Freud said: "The study of transfer can also give you the key to the understanding of hypnotic suggestion," and ten years later still, in his "Introduction to Psychoanalysis" he says "Bernheim, with unerring perspicacity, based his theory of hypnotic manifestations in the statement that all persons are open to suggestion in some way or other. Suggestibility in his sense is nothing more than an inclination to transference, bounded so narrowly that there is no room for any negative transfer" (pp. 385-6). In other words, according to Freud, there is a state of mind in the condition called transference and its state is hypnosis which is identical. He says, in his book on Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, "The hypnotist

avoids directing the subject's conscious thoughts towards his own intentions, and makes the person upon whom he is experimenting sink into an activity in which the world is bound to grow uninteresting to him; but at the same time the subject is in reality unconsciously concentrating his whole attention upon the hypnotist, and is getting into an attitude of rapport, of transference on to him" (p. 97). What I would like to add to this conception of transference, for, so far as it goes, I think it is correct, is the conception of organization. Persons may be divided, in my opinion, into three classes: (I) Those who become organized in the course of development sufficiently and strongly enough to maintain their organization throughout life, notwithstanding the assaults they meet with from time to time. (II) Those who are well organized, and, except for extraordinary circumstances, can maintain their organization, but who, for one reason or another, do become disorganized. (III) Those who are insufficiently endowed, constitutionally, with an intrinsic capacity for such organization.

From my point of view sexuality is a stage in the development of the organization of personality. Complete sexuality implies the harmonious organization of mind and body, of the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious; and here I enlarge Freud's conception of the unconscious to include what is ordinarily meant by the body. One of the most important conceptions Freud has introduced into the science of psychology is that of conflict. And correlated with that, of equal, if not greater importance, is his insistence on sexuality. This implies, then, the importance of the conflicts and coöperation of the sexes both homo and hetero. By his insistence on sexuality, Freud wishes, undoubtedly, to keep close to the concrete realities of actual persons, each of whom is either of one sex, or the other, as well as, more or less, a mixture of both. Now, in the matter of the transference, the significance of this, I think, lies in the field of the affections, controlled and guided by the intellect. Therefore, in my opinion, next in importance to the transference of the patient for the physician, is the transference of the physician for the patient, but, in the words of Kipling, that is another story. [Author's summary.]

II. P. R. LEHMAN, M.D., New York. *An Observation of the Early Formation of the Super-Ego.*

Observations of a child in anxiety at an ascending balloon revealed a complicated series of phenomena which was provoked by the child's realization that she missed the penis. Her own experimentation in destroying her doll's eyes was a symbolic activity of this dawning of castration. Tracing the anxiety, led to a consideration not only of those situations which were experienced ontogenetically, but of those factors which in the broadest sense are phylogenetic and which find their way in the individual as his constitutional endowment, and express themselves psychologically as the Super-Ego. In the young child this Super-Ego,

in statu nascendi, can be observed as being formed from resources of its own instinctive life and from its environment. At this time instinct can be seen in projection and object cathexes in assimilation. The full force of the castration complex now comes to the fore as it is the summation of all the renouncements the child experienced in its weaning from pre-genital activities. The libido from the pregenital stage finds an outlet into anxiety and thus serves the psychic apparatus economically. The unity of the psychic apparatus is preserved when the ego has a medium of exchange (as for example, anxiety) for libido which it can soon enough dispose of to serve its two masters, the Super-Ego and the Id. [Author's summary.]

III. D. FEIGENBAUM, M.D., New York. *The Problem of Termination of Analysis.*

What are the criteria indicating the end of analysis? The views of Ferenczi, Jones and others are discussed in this connection. Development of sublimation capacity as criterion is insufficient, disturbing qualities of the neurotic character must be altered. Transformation of symptoms indicates approaching recovery—for instance, from hysterical to compulsive symptoms, or vice versa (Freud). Analysis, in severe cases, has to be carried to the point of complete satiation and exhaustion of primitive tendencies. Patients in advanced stages of analysis are likely to make efforts to convince the analyst of their improvement or cure. An illustration is given in which the patient betrayed thereby still existing marked symptoms. Is it possible to predict or even set a date for termination of analysis? The conclusion is in the negative, and is illustrated by a case where the patient following setting of a date endeavored to recreate past symptoms by a sort of vengeance against the analyst; being fixated on an infantile level, he refused to be weaned. Setting a date is a kind of dismissal, no matter whether the patient submits or rebels: always the result will be imperfect cure. It is necessary to protect analysis against endlessness; patient's attachment to analyst leads him to wish to prolong analysis forever. Discussion of the "deserter type" of patient, who terminates analysis without giving notice and never appears again. Contrary to myth of his being the ideal patient, he is considered as representing a case of imperfect cure, because fear is found to be responsible for his disappearance. For practical purposes, however, such a patient may be cured, since he may no longer exhibit symptoms. "The paranoiac complex" of the analyst is discussed. [Author's summary.]

VARIA

Die psychoanalytische Bewegung: A. J. Storfer, the enterprising manager of the Psychoanalytic Press of Vienna, has put forth a new and interesting bimonthly periodical, dealing with the general aspects of the psychoanalytic movement. The first number reached us in July and only after the summer vacation have we had the opportunity of reviewing it.

In the opening number Thomas Mann has a very stimulating article on Freud's Position in the History of the Mental Sciences. Other shorter discussions are by Ferenczi on Male and Female, by Sachs on the Acquisitions of Psychoanalysis, T. Reik on Conscience Anxiety, Wälder on Sexual Symbolism among Primitive People. Storfer contributes a short bibliography of recent works and there are minor topics in addition. This is a well worthwhile publication.

Oral Eroticism: Striking example of oral eroticism seen on train. By Smith Ely Jelliffe, M.D. Man over 70, wearing black skull cap—blue polka dot bow tie—constantly pushing out and pulling in his lips—not extreme but limited in its excursion about—120 times to minute. Will stop for a few seconds if attention is riveted on something, then to resume the movements. Looking over pages of Yale Review. Looking out of window. Occasionally winking eye—puts tongue out, wets lips and goes on pushing out lips, cheek muscles move a bit in the movement. Observed him over an hour—no cessation in movements, save as indicated. No signs of paralysis agitans in hands, movements a bit synchronized with train movements.

A Note on Rosa Bonheur: Rosa Bonheur, the famous French artist, who has achieved immortality through her painting of the *Horse Fair*, was born in 1822. As the eldest of four children, she was over-active, impetuous, impatient of restraint, and detested study while showing a love for all objects of nature. At the age of eleven she revealed a strong independent spirit, and an overwhelming inclination for life out-of-doors.

Her mother dying at that time, her father soon after remarried, placing her with a seamstress to apprentice her in that trade. But he was quickly to be disappointed at the failure to make an orderly and industrious needle-woman of his wild daughter. So she was sent to a boarding-school, where she stepped in immediately as a leader among her young companions in their games, inventing pranks and caricaturing the teachers. But her contrasting poverty, and especially the inferior quality of her clothes, made her strongly self-conscious and possessed of a feeling of inferiority. It was said of her at this period that "too generous to be envious, the proud and sensitive child recoiled from an

unreasoning sense of injustice." Secretly disappointed, she neglected her studies, her health became poor, and she was allowed to return home.

In the studio of her father she sought refuge, and began to draw under his instruction with considerable ardor. Encouraged by him, an artist of considerable ability, she made a conscious endeavor to emulate his skill, so that by the time she was seventeen she had attained a high degree of capability in portraying landscapes and in producing historical paintings.

But one day, while making a study of a goat, she became so enchanted at her new and most successful attempt that she started to concentrate her energies on animal portraiture. Too poor to pay for live models, she tramped the streets and woods, and even sat for hours in the abattoirs of Paris, sketching the animals which were waiting in their pens to be slaughtered. She literally haunted all those localities in which animals might be found, spending considerable time at horse fairs and cattle markets, wearing male attire as a protection against interference. It was stated that "in her masculine habit Rosa had so completely the look of a good-hearted, ingenuous boy that the graziers and horse-dealers whose animals she drew would frequently insist on standing treat."

Furthermore, she procured anatomical treatises and plates with casts and models of different parts of the human frame, and also dissected various parts of animals which she obtained from butchers, in order to learn the details of musculature. Finally, after success came to her, she owned a large collection of animals, including sheep, goats, gazelles, deer, horses, bulls, cows, wild boars, lions, monkeys, dogs, squirrels, and eagles. Acclaimed by the world as the foremost painter of animals, she died in 1899, leaving behind a great and very valuable variety of animal studies.

Her intense and deliberate predilection for animal themes was the direct outcome of her early history and personality. Thus it is manifest that Rosa Bonheur, by her behavior, her attitude towards life, and her artistry, accomplished a complete rejection of her femininity, with the exclusive vigor and virility of her animal interests and creations representing the apotheosis of an emotional drive from that direction.

LOUIS J. BRAGMAN, M.D., Syracuse, N. Y.

BOOK REVIEWS

MARRIAGE. By Edward Westermarck, Ph.D., Hon. LL.D., Aberdeen and Glasgow; Martin White Professor of Sociology, University of London; Professor of Philosophy, Academy of Abo, Finland. Published by Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, New York, pp. 115 and Bibliography Note. Price \$1.50.

This little book of only 115 pages by the noted Finnish authority on marriage, Professor Westermarck, is not to be considered a condensation of his three volume study of the same subject. It is rather a brief account of marriage in its various historical aspects, with very little comment thereon. It discusses such subjects as the origin, frequency and duration of marriage, endogamy, exogamy, monogamy, polygyny, polyandry and group-marriage, marriage by capture, consent and consideration, and marriage rites. Aside from the brief statement of actual practices there is little speculation or philosophizing by the author, but it is significant that this great student of this important subject in closing this little book makes the following statement:

"The existence of marriage does not depend on laws. If the main thesis in this little book is correct, if marriage is not an artificial creation but an institution based on deep-rooted sentiments, conjugal and parental, it will last as long as these sentiments last. And should they ever cease to exist, no laws in the world could save marriage from destruction."

The book unfortunately lacks an index.

WHITE.

FACTORS IN THE SEX LIFE OF TWENTY-TWO HUNDRED WOMEN. Katherine Bement Davis, Ph.D. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1929.

Under the auspices of a coöperating committee of women prominent in sociology and education, the Bureau of Social Hygiene has produced that study of the sex experience of normal women which is the next step so long waited for in this field of research.

The foundation of this structure is Freud and the forerunners are those long accounts of sexual suffering and neurasthenia produced by the psychoanalysts, each one a vertical shaft, in stark isolation. Here, in the analysis of 2,200 cases, masses are smoothed and modelled into forms conventional to the eye. The predecessors were wild with vitality. This study is objective and restrained, coming severely within the rules. Yet the interrelationship is apparent, the general effect is the same and the qualitative difference has its roots in method.

It may be regarded as established that this corroborative evidence

is contributed by what we call "normal" women. Their social and economic status is chiefly that of college graduates in the thirties, some with advanced degrees. They have worked at least three years, usually much more, as teachers, social workers, librarians, nurses, employees in business, writers in journalism and advertising and miscellaneous occupations open to such preparation. The half which is married has had about two children, and more than 50 per cent of them is still within the period of fertility. Three out of four say that they are healthy, happy and successful. They understand answering questionnaires and their self-analysis compares favorably with that available in other subjective data.

The definite conclusion is that auto-erotism, homosexuality, heterosexuality and the social control of sex have been problems touching the majority. Auto-erotic practice at some time is admitted by 40 per cent of the thousand married women, sixty-two of whom continued it after marriage. Of the single women, 30 per cent practiced it formerly and 31 per cent at the time of writing the questionnaire; nearly half of these began in college or afterward. Homosexuality in the sense of intense emotional relationship for another woman has existed in half the cases, with 450 admitting "overt" experience.

Heterosexual experience in its problematic aspect is indicated in statements that seventy-one of the married women had coitus before marriage, that the first coitus in marriage repelled one woman in every five, that only one-half of the married women have found coitus pleasant during their entire conjugal experience, and that 371 single women say they do not regret remaining single, with 197 maintaining that they do not expect to marry even if they "meet the right man."

Socially, all these factors must have a coexistence as mental conflicts. Only half the married women think that they were properly prepared for marriage; of the single 41 per cent still have sex problems and some of them react violently to test questions asking their opinions about certain sexual ethics.

Quantitative evidence about personal experience introduces necessary modifying elements into the study of sexuality. This observation from 2,200 cases is valuable, authentic and new. The weight which at first appears destructive comes out of a preference for dealing as far as possible with facts. The author does not intend to make a diagnosis but only to assemble certain elements of diagnosis. These data tend to enumeration without the palliatives of reasons and interpretation. Although the point of view is what we refer to as scientific and the technical treatment is that approved by contemporary statistical method, the residue of rhythm, texture and color in the work seems characteristically feminine. The limitations of the questionnaire method, so especially dangerous for highly educated people, suggest that the statistics are over-refined for rationalized material. Compensation for this possibility

is in the comparative evidence accumulated automatically by this book, upon the psychological difference between the response of the single and the married to the impact of a questionnaire about the sex side of life.

Of major topics stimulating to further and intensive investigation, the data about coitus and those about periodicity of sex desire in both the single and the married must be studied for their unlikeness as well as their likeness.

These married women may have more children, these single women may marry. Memories of sexual life fade. As this book sifts through professional circles into popular opinion, it is important to maintain that this is a cross-section of life taken at a given period and not the complete story.

L. E. BEAM.

THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY. An Introductory Study. By Raymond Holder Wheeler, University of Kansas. Published by Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. Pp. 525+References, Appendix and Indexes.

This volume is a new departure in textbooks of psychology. The author has bravely made a complete break with the old academic psychology and gone over bodily to the organistic and configurational points of view in writing his work. In order to do this the whole material of psychology has had to be presented differently. In fact the difference is no less than a complete revolution, or at least a revolution of 180 degrees, while the point of view assumed necessarily requires that the material be presented in the reverse order from that usually chosen. The old structural academic psychology assumed that on the psychological side the finished product, the idea for example, could be traced back to its elemental constituents, which in this instance were sensations. The sensation was the unit of psychic structure and the psychic state at any particular moment was a mosaic of such sensations, very much as one might conceive a bit of matter to be a mosaic of molecules. Similarly the nervous system was constructed of units. In this case the unit was the reflex, and the complicated processes of the higher centers was but a mathematical summary of reflex arcs. During the present century, however, these views have been slowly changing. The study of child psychology, for example, has demonstrated that the child does not acquire first a series of discrete sensations and then put them together so as to form perceptions, etc., so that these perceptions are nothing more nor less than the sum of the sensations which compose them. This limiting mechanistic hypothesis has been headed for the discard for some time and is now definitely in the waste-basket. The child's first experiences are not of such a nature. The first experiences are comparable, using a biological analogy, to the protoplasm which is the basic substance of life. The first experiences of the child are already perceptions, percep-

tions with respect to which it attempts to relate itself. The difference between these perceptions, as the difference between protoplasm and the higher forms of life, is a difference in differentiation. The specific and the concrete are not amalgamated to make the complex, but out of a relatively homogeneous background these concrete constructs differentiate and emerge; so that development and evolution proceed by a process of differentiation and emergence and it becomes evident that the whole is not expressed in the sum of its parts but the whole is more than the sum of its parts, for by the organization of the parts and their relation to each other something enters the situation which is possessed by none of those parts separately.

This point of view is already getting familiar to those who are feeling the changing points of view of scientific thought. And in this book the most notable expression of this point of view is found in the complete reversal of its subject matter. Instead of the first chapters beginning, as we have been wont to see them, with a description of the nervous system and of the sense organs, these comprise the last chapters of the book, and the first chapter instead of being at the end is now in the front and deals with man in his social relations. In other words, the author proceeds from the most familiar and the least predictable to the less familiar and the most predictable, from the more general and indefinite to the more particular and definite, from the unknown toward the known. This is precisely the way it should be and the book can be commended for setting forth psychology in an orderly and logical way and in accordance with those points of view which today are pregnant with the most creative possibilities. It is precisely the method of presentation which Dr. Jelliffe and I discussed some years ago when we got out the first edition of our book on Diseases of the Nervous System, whether we should not put the disturbances at the psychosocial level first and follow through the cerebrospinal nervous system and wind up with the vegetative nervous system. This was fifteen years ago and we had not the courage of our convictions and so we followed the old rule.

Aside from the change in arrangement mentioned above, the book may be said to present the very great advantage of following out this method of presentation in detail. Every psychological question that is raised is discussed from the configurational point of view, and when so discussed it is found to have a very different appearance than when it is discussed from the old point of view of the major significance of the parts, leaving out of consideration in any adequate way the whole.

The reviewer is impressed with the book as representing a very distinct advance in the method of presenting psychology to college students, and it goes without saying that it is a great improvement on the old academic textbook.

WHITE.

THE CHILD AND THE WORLD. DIALOGUES IN MODERN EDUCATION.
By Margaret Naumburg. Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York. 1928.
Price \$3.50.

Few among the modern educational experiments are more interesting than the Walden School, which was founded in 1914 by the writer of the present volume. After eight years, the active management of the school was delegated to two of her associates, and Margaret Naumburg became Advisory Director.

In this book Miss Naumburg has presented the salient features of her scheme and for some not very obvious reason has chosen the Socratic method. The chapters of the book are a series of imaginary conversations about the school, the protagonists symbolizing various aspects of society. Thus there are several conversations between the school psychologist and typical parents, one between a father and the director, one between the new-school physician and the old-fashioned pediatrician, etc.

Every one of the readers of this periodical is doubtless familiar with the Walden School. One of the best-known of the so-called experimental or laboratory schools, it has voiced a passionate protest against formalism in education; where the Babbitts and the Bonsons and the Fords have preached standardization and social service and mass methods, this school has held out for individualism and human values: Philosophy rather than efficiency, poise instead of pep.

In her book Miss Naumburg makes out an excellent case for her school. Especially interesting are her comments on the requirements a teacher should have:

"The new teachers need a deeper knowledge of their own unconscious emotional life, as well as that of their pupils. But it is equally important that parents as well as teachers should know more of this inward life of their children. For when subject matter is no longer permitted to displace human values, the growth of a creative school depends on the constant development and transformation of all the human beings concerned with the school; this includes teachers and parents as well as children." (Page 36)

Already results are seen, children have gone out from the Walden School to other schools and astonished the advocates of orthodoxy by leading their classes. Already a steady stream of really educated individuals is going out from the Walden and similar schools; it is the social vaccine that may some day prevent an America of robots.

LIND.

THE BOOK OF THE IT. By Georg Groddeck.

"The Book of the It," a unique collection of thirty-three "Psycho-analytic Letters to a Friend" presents a style and content all its own. The author at once disarms all critics by asserting that he has no intention to be scientific, or to follow any particular creed, but wishes to

discourse and speculate freely upon whatever presents itself for consideration. The term "It" or "Es" is apparently used to include whatever is impersonal in our nature or that which is subject to natural laws; and it is here regarded as though it were the "life force" or "life energy" itself—"Every Es unit has within itself two *Es* units, a male and a female"—"The *Es* animates the man; it is the power which makes him act, think, grow, become sick or sound, the power in brief which animates him."

The *Es* Unit originates at fertilization, but it is even then really a multiplicity which has descended from an ancestral chain from the animal world in which the two sex elements lie in confusion but never mingled. In the fertilized ovule it is the *Es* which is able to initiate and direct all of the subsequent cell divisions and differentiations, giving them distinctive forms and functions. The *Es* not only takes charge of this cellular division, but thus divides itself as well so that there must be innumerable *Es* beings in every man. If the male and female *Es* component drifts down through the ancestral chain, then each cell has these two *Es* factors and also an individual *Es*. Moreover, each tissue would have its personal *Es* as well as those of its countless cells, all of which would become multiplied in terms of organs and groups of organs until an appallingly complex swarm of *Es* factors would be encountered in an integrated man. On the basis of this, a man's instinctive life as a whole would be represented by the function of groups of cell, tissue, organ, system, and general *Es*-units, as well as right and left, surface, leg, arm, etc. *Es*-units—truly a very confusing scheme of affairs, but the author intends it to be so: and in a clever manner arrays his arguments to show how crude our general biologic explanations really are and what a distance we still have to crawl before approaching the understanding of behavior in health and disease.

He comments at some length upon the pre- and post-natal existence of the child, upon its narcissism, its fecal interests and its mother attachment in connection with the so-called character formation, and later likes and dislikes of the individual. The Ego forces are not neglected. "Over against the *Es* stands I . . . for men there remains always the verdict I am I." . . . "We are forced to imagine that we are masters of the *Es*, of the many *Es*-units and of the one Common *Es*—yes, masters even of the character and the actions of a fellow creature, that we control his life, his health, his death . . . As a matter of fact we know nothing whatever of the connection of things, we cannot determine for twenty-four hours ahead what we shall do and we have not the power to do anything of our own design." Conceit and over-estimation of self are characteristic qualities of man, of which he is unable to rid himself. He is obliged to believe in himself, in his potentialities and in his doings . . . "If there were really so great a difference between the doings of a surgeon and those of an

internist, a neurologist or a quack, one would rightly boast of one's successes and be ashamed of one's failures. But one has no such right, although we do it."

Groddeck believes that in addition to the unconscious of the "thinking brain" there are analogous unconscious processes in other **organs**, tissues and cells and that through an intimate connection between all these throughout the whole organism, a beneficial influence may be brought to bear on these individual units by means of analysis of the brain unconscious. In his opinion, "Every sickness of the organism whether it is physical or psychic is to be influenced by analysis." When disease is considered as a vital expression of the organism, it will no longer be regarded as an enemy, but as something which has both an internal and an external cause—an event in life with these two sides to it. We have pitted our strength against the external causes of disease with some success, but we have neglected the internal causes because they are unpleasant to contemplate—the Edipus conflict, the masturbation complex and the impotence complex, etc. are terrifying and are therefore shunned. Moreover, "One must not forget that recovery is brought about not by the physician, but by the man himself. He heals himself by his own power exactly as he walks by means of his own power, or eats, or thinks, or breathes, or sleeps." Therefore, the aim of all medical treatment is to gain as much influence as possible over the Es and its various groups of *Es*-units.

In several of the "letters" there are themes, ideas and comments so constructed and presented that the reader is at a loss to know whether the author is serious or "just joking." But after all many a truth has been uttered under the cover of humor, and "truth" or fiction if it is thought provoking has served its only purpose. The text is also unusual in its free use of common sex expressions, urinary and skatological terms, but these should worry only the puritan and the anti-psychoanalytic neuropsychiatrist and not the psychopathologist or the intelligent layman, both of whom understand the real meaning of such terms.

It remains to be seen whether such a book will be well received or not. It deserves a hearing, not only on the basis that it has been written by a comparatively well known author, but it is in itself at least an entertaining volume.

LEWIS.

THE DOCTOR LOOKS AT MARRIAGE AND MEDICINE. By Joseph Collins. Doubleday, Doran & Co., New York. 1928. Price \$3.00.

Doctor Collins approaches the art of criticism triply armed: he has the gift of literary appreciation, he has sophistication, and he has no mean knowledge of psychology. With all these attributes it is small wonder that in certain quarters he is regarded as something of an oracle. There have appeared in rapid succession a group of books from his pen

whose titles flavor somewhat of pretention: "The Doctor Looks at Literature," "The Doctor Looks at Love and Life," and the present tome, "The Doctor Looks at Marriage and Medicine."

The gifts of the good doctor, let it be reiterated, are many. His intelligence is far above the average. His natural aptitude for dialectic has stood him in good stead in many a courtroom battle. He is thoroughly conversant with psychiatry. And he has a real flair for literature. His taste, in fact, is good, and his literary judgments, in the main, coincide with those of the judicious, everywhere.

Having set all these qualities down in black, however, we regretfully dip our pen in the red ink. Unfortunately, for many years, Doctor Collins has been hag-ridden by an obsession. He has fancied that he could write. He has vainly imagined that his views on life, literature, and other topics (if there be others) were entertaining and instructive. And so he has poured forth article after article, book after book.

How often has the prize-ring witnessed the spectacle of an individual richly endowed by nature with weight, muscle and agility, flounder about in painful exhibitions? Lacking the spark which distinguishes a fighter from a dub, all his efforts are useless. Lacking the divine afflatus, what reams of paper, what acres of canvas, are sacrificed yearly. The mills of the publishers grind steadily and some of the stuff they grind is exceedingly small.

LIND.

THE PROBLEM CHILD AT HOME. A STUDY IN PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS. By Mary Buell Sayles. The Commonwealth Fund, Division of Publication, New York. 1928. Price \$1.50.

The term "problem child" has come to be rather glibly used to cover a multitude of family maladjustments. As the veriest novice in social work knows, the usual problem child represents the most concrete evidence of a disharmonious family. Thus the inquiry, originally begun with the child, usually at some welfare clinic, rapidly broadens until its ramifications include the whole of the child's social *milieu*.

In her present book Miss Sayles has limited herself, so far as possible, to those problems of behavior which arise in the child as a direct result of family situations, incorrect handling of the child, fixations, jealousies, parental complexes, and the like. The book, in fact, might be taken as a clinical addendum to J. C. Flügel's, "Psychoanalytic Study of the Family."

The first part of the book is devoted to problems which arise as a result of the interplay of emotional forces in the family and the second part to the harm which results from mistaken ideas and erroneous methods of instruction and discipline. The third part is clinical and given over to a number of very interesting case-histories.

The book can be recommended unqualifiedly to the visiting teacher,

the social service worker, and indeed should be in the library of everyone whose work is at all concerned with the problems of behavior.

LIND.

RECONSTRUCTING BEHAVIOR IN YOUTH. A STUDY OF PROBLEM CHILDREN IN FOSTER FAMILIES. By Wm. Healy, Augusta F. Bronner, Edith M. H. Baylor, J. Prentice Murphy. Alfred A. Knopf, New York & London. 1929. Pp. 325.

This is perhaps the most important book of the year bearing upon the problems of childhood and youth. Eleven years ago the authors planned a careful study of the possibilities and methods of the reconstructing of children and youth whose behavior had differed markedly from the accepted standards of our society. To quote the preface, the study was to be one "of accomplishment or failure in the modification of behavior tendencies during a period of years. It would be based on what actually happened with young people when there was, first, an attempt scientifically to understand the basis of their personality or conduct deviations from the accepted norm, and second, when, in the light of such understanding, remolding their behavior trends was aimed at in a changed situation—during placement of the young individual in a foster family." The book is a record of facts, and as such is at once the most helpful and most stimulating reading that the worker concerned with young people, be he psychiatrist, psychologist, social worker or even plain teacher or parent, can find in a day's journey.

A short introductory section reviews the growth of foster home care and discusses the necessity of thorough study both of the child and the home, using all our modern facilities, before a child is placed. The second section discusses the treatment of special problems. Here we have a discussion first of delinquency, then of habit problems and lastly of problems of mentality and personality; the section concludes with a chapter on psychiatric principles in foster home care, in which the theories of Freud, Jung, Adler and Watson, are reviewed together with W. I. Thomas's views on delinquency as the result of the frustration of fundamental desires. Here we see the advantage of not being committed to any one school of psychiatry in dealing with children, and being able to apply the principle that best fits the individual case. The third section deals with the technique of child placing and is packed full of material never, to the reviewer's knowledge, before brought together. Detailed discussion of the principles guiding the selection of foster homes, of the preparation of foster parents, of the first placement and of replacement when that becomes necessary, numerous illustrations of how this visitor or that foster parent dealt with a situation; the thousand and one questions and pitfalls and difficulties that arise in a program of placement, are all here set forth. In addition the interested reader gets from the material much that can be applied in solving the problems that arise

with children wherever they are found, in the average school and the average good home, as well. One feels no hesitancy in saying that every teacher of children or adolescents ought to peruse this section carefully for the light it throws upon normal childhood. Section four deals in detail with the experiment in foster home care with 501 children, all of the Judge Baker Foundation cases of delinquency and personality difficulties which were studied and treated in foster homes during eight years. They were especially difficult cases, because frequently the Foundation's services were sought only after all other means had failed. The results are set forth in Chapter XXIV, where the general conclusions that begin the chapter state unqualifiedly "first, with good standards of work a high degree of success in the placement of problem children is possible, and second, the fine promise of this type of work is dependent upon the introduction of scientific methods and discriminations." The tables display the success or failure of delinquents (repeated offenders and non-repeaters) and of children with personality and habit problems in relation to normal and defective mentality and to abnormal mentality or personality. Dr. Healy has long been asserting that there is slight if any correlation between delinquency and abnormal mentality, and in a footnote on page 245 he stresses again his belief that "even the severe delinquent is not at all necessarily a diseased individual." He sees "great danger in the establishment of any principle of social treatment based on a conception that abnormal personality is the same thing as delinquency" and deplores the fact that even in psychiatric circles of good standards there is often a tendency to view delinquency as the outcome of pathological trends in the individual. Since Healy has had as much or more experience with young delinquents as anyone in this country it would seem that he should be heeded. What this study does show beyond any question is that even extremely delinquent children, or those with very difficult problems of habit and personality, stand an excellent chance for rehabilitation if they are mentally normal. Ninety per cent of such cases placed succeeded. On the other hand, for those of abnormal mentality (exclusive of defectives) the figures are only half as high—forty-five per cent. Furthermore, no one type of delinquency seems to weigh heavily against the chances of success in placing; nor does the combination of delinquencies seem to have much effect. There is some evidence that repeated offenders are less likely to succeed, but the difference is only about ten per cent in favor of the non-repeaters. Where the problem is one of habit or personality uncomplicated by delinquency, the chances are ten per cent greater—ninety-five per cent of such cases succeeded. But delinquency complicates the problem to a considerable extent in the mentally abnormal. One sex has practically no advantage over the other. Having a court record does not in itself make against success in placing; our courts vary so greatly in their social points of view and in the intelligence of their methods that comparisons here are unfair. Nor does

age at which the child is placed seem to have much to do with it when the mentally abnormal are ruled out. What is ordinarily called poor heredity plays little part compared to other factors in the situation. Follow-up work shows that almost ninety per cent of those who did well in placing, did well later on, as did eighty-six per cent of the delinquents; which would argue for the actual reconstruction of these individuals.

The one group that stands out as almost unamenable to this type of treatment is, as the psychiatrist would expect, that made up of psychopathic personalities. Many of these were placed as an experiment, but only a small percentage succeeded. The authors conclude that there is as yet little knowledge of effective methods for dealing with the mentally abnormal youth, and are convinced that some such measure as colonization under the guidance of educational and psychiatric experts is necessary, and promise us a future monograph dealing with the whole subject of mentally abnormal youth.

There are a number of valuable appendices. One contains an outline for observation of a child's progress, and another two illustrative cases worked out in detail. A third is devoted to statistics.

RICHMOND.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS IN OTHER SCIENCES. By Charles S. Myers.
(The Herbert Spencer Lecture Delivered at Oxford, May 14, 1929.)
The Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1929. Pp. 24.

This is the Herbert Spencer Lecture delivered at Oxford May 14, 1929. The reviewer can best indicate something of the trend of thought of the lecturer by the following quotations:

"Instead, on the one hand, of adopting Spencer's procedure of attempting to describe the apparently complex in terms of the apparently simple; instead, on the other hand, of resting content with the supposition that entirely new principles emerge as we pass from lower-level to higher-level systems of activity within the Universe, I propose to ascertain whether some of those 'higher' principles are not, however vaguely, already recognizable at lower levels. I propose, in fact, to consider how far our knowledge of the mental world is helpfully applicable to the material world, how far conceptions and attitudes which have been specially employed and developed by Psychology may also prove—or have also proved—useful and common to other Sciences."

"Psychology has long insisted on this standpoint. There was a time when, *more physico*, the belief was held that in its mental development the infant first experienced separate elementary 'sensations' of whiteness, softness, warmth, etc., and that by combining these he ultimately obtained the 'perception' of an object, say of its mother's breast. But we now realize that the percept of the whole object is given, with meaning however vague, from the start; that with growing experience it acquires even fuller meaning; and that from such maturer percepts the

so-called 'sensory elements' become differentiated. These sensory elements in their pure form—that is to say, stripped of all meaning save that relating to their quality, intensity, extensity, and the like—are not the first, but among the later, to appear. They are the narrower abstract formations constructed by broad experience. First comes the relatively homogeneous, which already contains within itself the germs of the later heterogeneous."

"Even the acceptance of such a psychological conception as 'guidance directed towards some end' does not imply a denial of the sufficiency of mechanism for Physics in the past. Nor does it necessarily deny that in the realm of Physics, as in the phenomena of volition, of heredity, and of evolution, if all the conditions could be known and had been observed together before, prediction would be certain. What it does suggest is that for Physics, as for Psychology and for Biology, the past is really different from the future, that the future of any organized (or individual) unit is unpredictable, and that the passage from one side of a mathematical equation to the other is strictly and actually irreversible throughout Nature."

"The once striking characteristics distinguishing Matter from Mind are fading rapidly. Mind appears to be no more 'unsubstantial' than Matter; Matter to be no more 'predictable' than Mind."

WHITE.

TECHNIK DER PSYCHOANALYSE II. DIE ANALYTISCHE REAKTION IN IHREN KONSTRUKTIVEN ELEMENTEN. Von Dr. Otto Rank. Franz Deuticke, Leipzig und Wien. 1929. Pp. 121.

WAHRHEIT UND WIRKLICHKEIT (ENTWURF EINER PHILOSOPHIE DES SEELISCHEN). Von Dr. Otto Rank. Franz Deuticke, Leipzig und Wien. 1929. Pp. 112.

The first volume of Rank's "Technik der Psychoanalyse" was reviewed in this journal about a year ago. (PSYCHOANALYTIC REVIEW, 1928, XV (Jan.), 115.) It considered that part of the subject having to do particularly with instinctive mechanisms and fixation points, and discussed at length the multiform phases of the Edipus situation. The present monograph (Vol. II) is concerned with the various aspects of the therapeutic experience, the personality of the therapist and the constructive elements in the analytic reaction. Rank discusses in a systematic manner first the patient's comprehension of the therapeutic situation and its temporary effect on the Ego, then in turn the psychology of choice or the adjustment of the "will problem," the manner in which the Will mechanisms are utilized as resistance, its various characteristics in health and disorder and finally its action in the "terminal conflict." For Rank this "Will therapy" is a very important part of the analytic situation. He also describes the methods by which the patient gains insight and self understanding, how mechanisms are made conscious and become inte-

grated in consciousness in terms of the dynamic contents of the problem, its psychogenesis and how the Ego finally writes with its appropriate psychic past, the elements or experiences of which are utilized in present adjustments, resistances, disavowals, etc.

In this monograph he endeavors to throw light upon the symbolism of the ideological contents and although he mentions the rôles of the castration and inferiority complexes, he particularly stresses those parts in the neuroses which may be interpreted as Will and conscious problems. The distress of self-consciousness, moral condemnations and the effect of those love demands which are victorious over individual will are afforded special attention. Other topics which the author has elaborated and extended in his characteristic way are the inversion of reality and unreality in the analytic situation, the development of the guilt conflicts in the analytic situation and the methods of interpreting the infantile sexual urges, as expressed in family situations.

The separation phenomena have been interestingly outlined. Separation must be made from the past as well as from the present analytic investments. The separation experience includes many parental, familial, ethical and personal elements, but the final urge for separation and freedom for destiny and self-determination becomes united to the so-called "reality" of life; but after all adjustments to reality are built largely upon illusionary mechanisms.

"Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit" is an outline of a philosophy of mind wherein the author has delved quite deeply into metapsychological realms. In the introduction he offers his concepts on the "birth of individuality" in which Will psychology consciousness, universal forces share importance with individual instinctive creative urges, and with the "glorified" unconscious. He again gives special attention to the will as a psychological and moral problem and includes it in discussing the psychology of the therapist and patient. In the section devoted to "knowledge and experience" is a scheme for developing a Constructive Will psychology (a "purpose psychology") which includes notions regarding primitive psychology, the development of conscious purpose, all of creation as a Universal Will manifestation and the origin and meaning of the guilty conscience. He considers the neurotic as a modern human type, and the neurosis is once referred to as an illusion of incapacity.

The subject of reality as a psychological phenomenon receives liberal attention in connection with the feeling sphere (pleasure and pain), as a content and as a feeling and from the analytic viewpoint of life. The author also develops his concepts of the Ego and the Ego Ideal and explains how the individual ideal is constructed out of the self in various stages. In this part he includes his ideas on psychological dualism and monisms, on feelings of guilt, guilt phantasies and unconscious guilt, on the urge for freedom and on the developmental stages of choice. In connection with the building of the Ideal, he would emphasize the rôle

of the hero types of human creators, the characteristics of the Jew, Greek and Christian philosophers, the various concepts of the God construction and individualistic moral attitudes with conflicts and denials.

Finally the author describes the analytic therapeutic experience as a restitution problem in terms of creative components with remarks on happiness, redemption, and the longing for success. These contributions should be read carefully by those interested in the development of psychoanalytic doctrines since both monographs represent recent extensions of Professor Rank's particular point of view.

LEWIS.

CROSSROADS IN THE MIND OF MAN. By Truman L. Kelley. Stanford University Press, Stanford University, Cal. 1928. Pp. vii+238.

This work presents a number of very important contributions to the statistical treatment of mental environments. It grew out of the discussion concerning the existence and nature of general intelligence which has been going on since Spearman published his article on the "Proof and Measurement of Association between Things" in the *American Journal of Psychology* in 1904. This discussion culminated in Spearman's invention of the tetrad difference criterion. The present book of Kelley may be regarded as having its origin in the analysis of the work of Spearman.

It is of particular value in that it presents a new and ingenious method of handling the problem of detecting general and group factors underlying a number of variables or measurements. The symbolism which Kelley has developed has enabled him to present a clear simple proof of the tetrad criterion which is entirely independent of Spearman's demonstration. Not only has he given us an independent proof of the tetrad criterion but has laid down a series of sixteen propositions giving various criteria for the presence of group and general factors. Some of these will prove to be of distinct value.

A special technique is presented in the fourth chapter for determining what group factors are present in a set of tests. Unfortunately this technique is inadequately described so that it would be very difficult for any one to make use of it. Furthermore, it seems to be cumbersome in the extreme and incapable of utilization by one who might not have at his disposal a number of trained assistants.

It might be suggested that in future editions of this book it would be well to point out a clear distinction between group factors and general factors and to use the terms consistently throughout. The reader's attention should be called specifically to the fact that if the pentad criterion holds, it does not mean that two general factors are present, but only that there are *not more* than two general factors or more than one general plus one group factor. It may be shown that the pentad criterion holds when there is one general factor only or one general factor plus one group factor of the second or higher order. (cf. McDon-

ough: Empirical Study of Character. Studies in Psychol. and Psych. II, 4, p. 209.)

So far psychiatry has done little to utilize modern statistical technique in the interpretations of its data. It is to be hoped that in the near future psychiatrists will realize the importance of methods such as are presented to us in Kelley's "Cross Roads in the Mind of Man."

THOMAS VERNON MOORE.

THE FUTURE OF THE EARTH. By Harold Jeffreys, M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S. Published by W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York. Pp. 79.

A brief account of recent scientific theories regarding the origin and the probable future of the sun, moon and earth, with particular reference to the theory of the tidal origin of the solar system. Excellently well done.

WHITE.

SOCIOLOGY AND SIN. A PLEA FOR THE EXCLUSION OF UPLIFT FROM ECONOMICS AND THE POLITICAL SCIENCES. By P. Sargant Florence, Ph.D. Published by W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York. Pp. 98.

A plea that sociology shall not be tainted with ulterior motives, such as the uplift of the human race.

WHITE.

THE NEUROSES. By I. S. Wechsler, M.D. W. B. Saunders Company, Philadelphia and London. 1929. Pp. 330.

This timely volume is an expansion of a chapter on the neuroses appearing in the author's "Text-book of Clinical Neurology." Dr. Wechsler has here condensed the views of the several "schools" of abnormal psychology and has also expressed his personal adaptation of these doctrines. The subject has been introduced with a brief history of psychiatry, beginning at the dawn of scientific thought and ending with the latest developments of psychopathology. He emphasizes that the knowledge of human behavior has slowly accumulated from all sorts of sources, including the study of children of primitive peoples, of mental defectives, and investigation into animal behavior, myths and folklore. The study of the "neuroses" has contributed the most illuminating information of importance in recent years, since it has made possible the conclusion that "abnormal" mental mechanisms are not different in kind from the "normal" ones and that "what is regarded as intellectual not only springs from the instinctive or emotional side of life, but cannot be easily dissociated one from the other"—"a dynamic psychology came to replace the descriptive one."

The author makes a clear and concise discussion of the Freudian principles of abnormal psychology including the terminology and compares them with the modifications of Jung, Adler and others. In the

midst of this discussion he remarks, "The validity of much which has been said so far and practically of all that follows depends upon the acceptance of the theory of the unconscious. Unless this is done, little insight can be had into the psychopathology of the neuroses," and later on at the end of the chapter on "Mental Mechanisms" he states his opinion regarding the status of psychoanalysis in psychopathology—thus "We have thus far considered all the mental mechanisms from the point of view of psychoanalysis. As has been repeatedly stated much of it is purely theoretical and from the practical point of view could, of course, be dispensed with. A number of the concepts are admittedly subject to dispute. Many no doubt will be revised, modified, amplified, substituted, or altogether discarded. But there are several which cannot be dispensed with at present, if one would speak the language of psychopathology, and there are a limited few which are absolutely fundamental to the theory of psychoanalysis. Among the latter must be included the following: (1) The theory of a dynamic unconscious; (2) The theory of unconscious conflict; (3) The theory of repression; (4) The theory of transference; (5) The concept of infantile sexuality."

The chapter on "Etiology" is well arranged and contains adequate comments on the inheritance, somatic, organic, pathologic, physiologic, behavioristic and social or social biologic theories of neurotic developments. Here also are described the various concepts of suggestion, as well as the views on the specific neuroses originated by Freud and by Janet. A chapter on "Classification" is written to include many of the modern taxonomic ideas, but in general an arrangement of the neuroses made possible by psychoanalytic revelations has been adopted. The following quotation closes the discussion, "It is worth reemphasizing that our actual knowledge does not permit the creation of exact nosologic entities, that every neurosis is colored by a definite character make-up, that is, it is silhouetted against an hereditary, ineradicable constitutional factor; that a certain schizoid element tinges practically all of them; that mixed, transition and borderline cases predominate, and that in every neurosis there are evidences of normal behavior, of abnormal regressive phases, and of restitution phenomena."

The largest section of the book treats of the various clinical manifestations of the different types of neuroses and discusses such symptoms as anxiety, hypochondria, phobias, war neuroses, etc., etc. Thirty-two case notes are interspersed to illustrate the diagnostic points, but they are too abbreviated to be of any particular value. The differential diagnosis, course, prognosis of the several forms and their complications are outlined in a separate chapter. The well known varieties of therapeutic attack are outlined, with the emphasis placed on types of psychotherapy, and particularly on psychoanalysis and its mode of application for certain forms. He speaks freely of the limitations of methods employing surgery, serology, endocrinology, and schemes other than psychotherapeutic principles, and says, moreover, "There is no objection, of course, to the use of medicines, though the less given the better,

nor to electricity, massage, exercise, hydrotherapy, gymnastics, hypodermic injection, or what not, provided the physician is aware that he is thereby influencing the patient by means of suggestion."

An appended section presents some suggestions on history taking and the examination of mental patients, some interesting and important findings in the field of general intelligence and mental level of psychoneurotics by Dr. David Wechsler, and an outline of psychometric tests. Sixty-eight alphabetically arranged references are listed.

As a textbook presentation this volume makes an excellent impression, in fact, it should give the medical student and the physician such a background, as is not at present available in any other book on the subject. It will enable those who do not have the time or opportunity to consult or interpret the original psychoanalytic and other psychopathologic publications, to acquire a comprehensive and practical knowledge of modern concepts in this field. Moreover, it should be warmly recommended to those clinical neurologists who do not "believe" in psychoanalytic "doings," as it has been written by a well-known neurologist who speaks their own language, and who is keenly aware of the value of the contributions made by the psychoanalytic school.

LEWIS.

THE TRAUMA OF BIRTH. By Otto Rank. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method). Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York. 1929.

The original German edition of this book, which created such a sensation in the realm of philosophy and psychology, was previously reviewed in these columns. The work is so well known by psychoanalysts that it is only necessary here to mention the English translation which is an excellent one (name of translator not given), but it is difficult to refrain from making a critical comment. It is to be regretted that the learned exponent of the "birth trauma" which is so valuable in many respects, at least as a research focus, should see fit to include in it every manifestation of human activity (normal, neurotic, psychotic) under the sun and to conceive that all thought and action represents either an attempt to reconstruct the intrauterine situation or to escape the "memories" of the traumatic birth event. If such a concept should be universally accepted analytic research would cease or suffer paralysis and in fact the author in his chapter on "therapeutic aspect," commenting on the technic of an analysis states in part, "Analysis is now in the position to free itself to an extensive degree from the work of investigation, since we know from the outset not only the whole content of the Unconscious and the psychical mechanisms, but also what for the time being is the final element, the primal trauma." While the birth trauma theory explains many phenomena more satisfactorily than any other concept has yet been able to do, it has been expended to the outer margins of meaning.

LEWIS.

THE ADOLESCENT; HIS CONFLICTS AND ESCAPES. By Sidney I. Schwab, M.D., and Borden S. Veeder, M.D. D. Appleton & Co., New York. 1929. Pp. 365. Price \$3.00.

This interesting work on adolescence was written by the professor of neurology and the professor of clinical pediatrics in Washington University (St. Louis) Medical School. Dr. Veeder writes the first three chapters, which stress the physical side of adolescence and discuss briefly the function of work (school work) and play during this period. Dr. Schwab then takes up the discussion and throughout the remaining chapters develops the thesis shared by both authors, *i.e.*, that the adolescent problem is essentially a social one and to be understood only in so far as we can understand the environmental setting in which the adolescent finds himself. This is an interesting point of view and one which has been more or less neglected in our studies of development.

The approaches to the study of adolescence, *viz.* through pedagogy, pediatrics, experimental psychology, intelligence measurement and the traditional knowledge which has been accumulating through ages of observation, are discussed. Though the contribution of psychoanalysis is later touched upon, no reference is here made to the clinical studies of delinquent and abnormal adolescents, to which we owe certainly the greater part of whatever knowledge of the subject we possess. Dr. Schwab's method is to "try to view the person in as detached a manner as possible and to avoid putting into his problem those of one's own and further to make guarded use of any and all methods which seem to promise accurate information."

The definition of adolescence is found on page 52—"that period in the life cycle which represents impulses towards conscious social adjustments and the overcoming of conflicts, which naturally arise, by their final molding into sets of habitual patterns," Adaptation, repression of both actions and ideas, and phantasy are characterized as the chief mechanisms whereby the adolescent handles his conflict. The conflict itself is initiated when the child becomes aware of the environment, composed "not only of things, persons, institutions and qualities, but also of the intangible press of views, customs and habits," as set over against himself. He is one against the world, with its hoary stupidities and brutalities, and the awareness of this fact is what gives to adolescence its peculiar "flavor." A number of chapters follow which discuss and analyze the environment in its various aspects. The state and the family, work, religion, education, are evaluated in the light of their meaning to the adolescent. There follows an interesting discussion of sex as environment, which gives it a place coördinate with the other environmental factors "and that is all." This chapter contains a brief discussion of Freudian psychology which, while attempting to give it its just due as regards the vast influence it has had upon present day psychology, throws it overboard as an explanation of what is happening to the adoles-

cent. We may be allowed to remark, parenthetically, that Dr. Schwab seems hardly well enough acquainted with the ramifications of Freudian psychology to be permitted to dispose of it in this wholesale fashion. He is intent upon his idea of sex as "something biologically evident and important because it is inherent in all living beings" which thus can take its place along with the other phenomena of life. This, to the reviewer, smacks a little too much of the armchair. Most of us who work with adolescents would be too devoutly thankful if we could take so nonchalant a view of sex—such a view as a god might take, regarding the phenomena of life from some Olympic height and concerned not at all with individuals but with some all-embracing cosmic plan. And it would perhaps be better for the adolescent as well as for ourselves if we could thus occasionally detach ourselves.

In succeeding chapters Dr. Schwab discusses the usual phenomena of adolescence, phantasy, masturbation, swings of mood, methods of escape from the conflict, including industry, dreams, delinquency and suicide. He minimizes the rôle of sex in adolescent phantasy, and looks upon masturbation as a physiological incident rather than an abnormality. He seems quite unaware of the rôle that phantasy plays in masturbation, at least in the male. In fact, the whole discussion is so far removed from the psychiatric approach to the study of adolescent behavior that it reads like an erudite essay that might have appeared in the 1890's.

The three concluding chapters, on adolescence as social adjustment, society and the individual, and some general applications, enlarge further upon the authors' original thesis and discuss sex education and the effect that attempts at formal schooling, often have upon the adolescent. An apologia appears as the last chapter.

One closes the book with rather a baffled feeling. It is difficult to read, and the numerous changes that are rung on the main theme make it almost tiresomely repetitious. So much of the adolescent conflict as one learns of it in the mental hospital and the consulting room is not touched upon at all. But even so, the work merits thoughtful reading. It may be that we have looked upon adolescence from too narrow a viewpoint; it may be that the concerns of the developing youth are not so much with his personal problems as with the attitudes of society toward his problems; and it may be that our attitude toward the question needs to be reorganized with this possibility more definitely in mind.

WINIFRED RICHMOND.

FIVE HUNDRED CRIMINAL CAREERS. By Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor T. Glueck. Published by Alfred A. Knopf, New York. Pp. 339+ Appendices and Index.

Another splendid book from the pen of Sheldon Glueck, this time in association with his wife, Eleanor T. Glueck. It is a serious attempt to evaluate the work of the Massachusetts Reformatory by studying the

output of that institution over a period of five years following the expiration of their discharge or parole. Realizing as he does that most of the talk about crime and law enforcement and about criminals and punishment and reforms in our penal system have very little factual background in actual detailed studies of methods and their results, he expresses himself in the preface thus:

"The history of society's efforts to cope with criminality teaches a moral the significance of which seems to have been overlooked. Too many of the 'crime commissions' of recent years have started operations with the sounding of war-whoops and the flourishing of tomahawks. To the distinguished but naïve ladies and gentlemen who are members of these commissions the crime problem is exceedingly simple: all that has to be done is to 'speed up justice,' to make punishment 'swift and sure,' to 'treat 'em rough,' to 'remember the family of the victim' (as if, alas, even the thumbscrew and the rack applied to the criminal will mysteriously bring back the victim). This may be called the stage of short-sighted ineptism."

Contrary to this inept method he has undertaken at tremendous pains extending over a period of three years to follow the careers of some 500 graduates of the reformatory. The results of his work are exceedingly interesting, significant and important. We have been brought up in this country in the past fifty years or so on the theory that our reformatories were really successful institutions, turning out from 75 to 80 per cent of rehabilitated youngsters. Those of us, of course, who have come in personal contact with the products of the system have had our doubts, but now here we get an actual, detailed examination of the material and we find that these institutions that have been running along these many years assuming that they were accomplishing this tremendous amount of good have been actually turning out 80 per cent of failures. The Massachusetts Reformatory under consideration shows precisely this net result. As bad as this is, it is not a complete indictment of the reformatory system. Reformatories were originally intended for first offenders. Unfortunately, however, "first offenders" got to mean first convictions, and the reformatory population soon became something very much like that of a state prison. Aside from this, the reformatory inmate, it must be remembered, is one upon whom all the other social agencies which are maintained to correct antisocial conduct have already failed and therefore he is a serious case to begin with. Dr. Glueck analyzes upwards of fifty components of behavior which can be reduced to percentages, with reference to the prereformatory, the reformatory, the parole and the post-parole periods, and discusses each one with reference to the effect the reformatory has had upon it. These detailed analyses should be of the greatest significance for the future progress of penology. One of the most important chapters in the book is the

chapter on the predictability in the administration of criminal justice, in which by the same method, namely, the analysis of certain behavior traits, he is able to draw up tables showing the probability of certain results in certain lines of treatment. Such tables would be of inestimable service to the judge who has to decide whether to send the prisoner to the reformatory or to parole him.

The book is an admirable piece of work and aside from adding facts to a situation that needs them sadly it calls attention again to the pretty nearly complete breakdown of our whole criminal system. So long as we have legislators making laws, prosecuting officers enforcing them, and judges passing sentences and institutions confining individuals about whom they know nothing, we may expect to continue the present unsatisfactory state of affairs. Dr. Glueck's book ought to go far towards pointing the absurdity of this situation.

WILLIAM A. WHITE.

AN INTRODUCTION TO ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY. By V. E. Fisher. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1929. Pp. 512.

The author is the assistant Professor of Psychology, and Director of the Mental Clinic of New York University. Primarily the book has been prepared as a text in abnormal psychology for beginners who have had some training in general psychology. In general the main emphasis has been placed upon two points of view, viz. (1) it is assumed that mental abnormality is a relative matter that must be understood in the light of transition phenomena, or through an insight into the intermediate degrees between more normal and more abnormal, (2) and that mental abnormalities can be better understood when viewed as disorders of the total individual rather than as distortions of special mental processes or reactions.

After stating some of the problems found in the field of abnormal psychology, the text first discusses the "normal" individual, with chapters devoted to the different types of normal people, the common modes of reaction to difficulties and the current concepts of the conscious, sub-conscious, coconscious and unconscious mental processes. The emotions and innate dispositions are discussed to some extent, but this part leaves much to be desired. More than two-third of the book is given to a description of the mental behavior characteristic of the neuroses and psychoses, the particular attention to the definition of the various terms used in psychopathology.

Case histories illustrating several of the common disorders have been taken from well known textbooks and current literature, and gleanings from the writings of McDougall, White, Janet, and Strecker and Ebaugh are oft encountered. Special chapters have been prepared on sleeping, dreaming, hypnotism and suggestion, and on the feeble-minded

types. It may be said that Freud's contributions to psychopathology have been liberally discussed throughout the book, but not always have they been presented with clarity.

By means of the book the beginner in abnormal psychology should be able to gain a fair orientation in the general subject matter of this branch of psychology, and he will be materially aided, should he take advantage of the original references in the text and of the "Suggested Readings" at the end of each chapter. There is a glossary of 194 of the more technical terms used in the text.

LEWIS.

PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS ON THE CAUSAL FACTORS IN ANIMAL LEARNING. By J. A. Gengerelli: (Thesis for Degree of Ph.D. in the University of Pennsylvania). Pp. 54. Philadelphia. 1929.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AUDITO-VOCAL DIGIT SPANS. By Mary H. Young: (Thesis for Degree of Ph.D. in the University of Pennsylvania). Pp. 14. Philadelphia. 1928.

AN ANALYTIC STUDY OF ONE CLASS IN HIGH SCHOOL. By Anna E. Biddle: (Thesis for Degree of Ph.D. in the University of Pennsylvania). Pp. 22. Philadelphia. 1928.

These theses, while they have no direct bearing on the psychoanalytic field, are well presented from the standpoint of experimental psychology. They emphasize that the problem of learning with its various components should occupy the focus of attention in present day psychology. In the first paper the theory of "trial and error" in learning has been made the basis of experimentation and discussion. The rat has been used as the experimental animal.

The second paper mentioned represents an attempt to work out a standard method for determining the child's "learning span" by means of special arrangements of groups of digits, and by presenting them to the subject in a variety of ways.

The third paper deals with the application of several performance tests to groups of school girls in the 9th grade in order to study certain sets of norms. Several partial conclusions, which suggest additional problems, were made.

LEWIS.

CRITIQUE OF LOVE. By Fritz Wittels. The Macaulay Company, New York. 1929. Pp. 317.

This clearly written and fascinating book offered under a title which seems to have little or no bearing on its contents, has been prepared by one of the older members of the Freudian School, who is also a successful writer of interesting novels. In the light of his extensive knowledge of psychoanalysis and of human life in general, Dr. Wittels has discussed

a wide variety of activities which involve the libidinous expressions of the personality, in a way which ably demonstrates that he has been able to identify himself almost completely with the American point of view.

He has promised that this book will be followed by others applying psychoanalytic principles to criminology, pedagogy, politics, and business, but the present volume endeavors to give a psychoanalytic explanation to the subject of love or sex including such manifestations as sex deviations, masked sadism, bisexuality, narcissism, relationships between parents and children, great haters, etc. These matters, which are always of universal interest, have been so entertainingly developed by the author that the book is bound to have a wide reading, and the reader will have little difficulty in maintaining his interest to the last page.

So many "psychoanalytic expositions" have been written by amateur authors, or by those who have made a fast bid for reputation by consciously formulating "complexes" in their literary productions in order to keep step with the "new thought" in psychology, that the publication of a book for popular consumption by a trained and experienced analyst may be regarded as an important event. The problems of sex are here discussed in a manner which brings into the foreground Freud's basic discoveries, concerning repression, unconscious conflict, the interpretation of dreams and the structure of the ego, and removes from them some of the stigmata of filthiness projected by a certain type of lay and scientific mind. Wittels says, "I made up my mind . . . to prove to the American public that the new truth in connection with sexual life which Freud has brought to us in his illuminating work is not as loathsome as many people imagine. In other words, I have attempted to deal with sex in this book in the way it should be treated from a scientific point of view."

The first and last chapters, "Freud's Pathway" and "The Child-woman," respectively, are among the best in the book. The former in spite of the startling opening statements that it begins with—"America is the ear of the world. It was the first place where Freud's voice was heard," settles down into an interesting explanation of the development of Freud's ideas and their associated trends; while the latter offers information of a nature about a certain type of woman that should be gratifying and highly instructive particularly to the male reader, but also to women who are curious about the motives underlying the behavior of certain of their contemporaries.

In criticism one might say that many points still mooted in the psychoanalytic field are expressed in a manner implying that they are settled and accepted matters, but this attitude is not an easy one to forego when one is writing for popular consumption. Those who are acquainted with Wittel's work, "Sigmund Freud" and his novel, "The Jeweler of Bagdad" will be anxious to read the "Critique of Love."

LEWIS.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS ADJUSTMENT. By Edmund S. Conklin. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1929. Pp. 340.

This little book is in a way the culmination of many years of reading, thought, and personal contacts by the author who is Professor of Psychology in the University of Oregon. He has approached the subject with the conviction that it is well to keep the field of psychology distinct from theological and philosophical speculations, and has presented the subject as a study of certain aspects of human behavior, including the conscious accompaniments of such action, but there has been no intention of favoring any kind of religious faith or any sort of anti-religious doctrine.

His principal aim has been to assemble facts and various interpretations of religious conduct and to discuss them according to modern psychological thought. His attitude has not been dogmatic and he has recognized the difficulty, inherent in the nature of the material, of evaluating many phenomena of a so-called religious nature. A vast literature, on the psychology of religion has arisen from many sources and has accumulated in an appalling way. From this mass of literature the author has gleaned many things of interest and has been fairly liberal in his footnote references.

There are in all eighteen chapters devoted to numerous subjects including instincts, religious appeals, nature of conversion, emotions, religious sentiments, ecstatic states, mysticism, faith healing, distortions of religious behavior, etc., etc. He has occasionally offered the psychoanalytic viewpoint of certain religious phenomena, but is apt to make qualifications which are not always clear and understandable. He concedes that "Psychoanalytic thinking has in some ways contributed valuably to the interpretation of religious behavior" and "From this dynamic point of view the individual human being is not thought of as a bundle of central nervous patterns awaiting stimulation—rather is the individual looked upon as a whole and especially as a living, growing, peculiarly dynamic whole—it is the behavior of an individual in the process of overcoming stimuli rather than merely reacting to them." Then "Does religion conform to this dynamic or drive concept of instinct? In many respects certainly. Although perhaps the conformity may be observed more clearly in the life of the race, than in that of any given individual. The unconquerable nature of religion throughout history has been frequently observed by historians. Efforts to crush it have always been futile."

In the development of his concept, the author, after sifting the evidence, concludes that religion is not fundamentally an instinct, although religious beliefs and institutions are influenced by instinctive drives, that religion is rooted in what is generally human, that religion although emotional in nature, is not a specific or single emotion, and that there is no such thing as a characteristic religious attitude. It is then said,

"So in the eyes of the psychologist, religion is that vast department or field of human experience, and its products, which is related to belief in some concept of a god. Theology, art, ceremony, worship and the records of the acts of the lives of the religiously motivated, as well as the cognitive and emotional phases of the religious experience itself, are all parts or phases or effects of religious behavior."

He emphasizes that when people are in depressive moods, are in despair, are conscience or grief stricken, they tend to respond to religious appeals—depression engenders a seeking, groping, longing responsive attitude which religious emotion is able to relieve to some extent, at least temporarily. Moreover, religion and love are found to possess striking similarities in their manifestations, since both make the individual responsive to nature, tend to develop fanaticisms, tend to self-abasement and exaltation, etc.

Mysticism means a more complete identification with the Supreme being—the mystic is at "one with the infinite"—"at oneness with the absolute . . ." in perfect union with God, etc., a state which the general psychologist has some difficulty in explaining on the basis of conscious activity and awareness, but a definite feeling is present. The "consciousness of God" in relation to the conduct of man, according to the author, is infrequent in everyday life as compared with the amount of time consumed thinking of business, vocational, and professional activities. Most people many times a day experience consciousness of their domestic problems and financial status, but consciousness of the "higher things" rarely appears.

Subheadings are numerous throughout the book and a large field has been briefly covered in a manner that makes its various parts available to the reader, but it may be said that more of the facts revealed through modern dynamic psychological studies might have been utilized to throw additional light on many obscure points.

LEWIS.

WAR AND PEACE IN THE NEW LIGHT OF INTELLECTOLOGY. By Abraham S. Schomer. Privately printed, Los Angeles. 1929. Pp. 80.

The author is a member of the New York Bar, a dramatist and a founder of "Intellectology," one of the future functions of which is to attempt the banishment of the war motive from the world of sin. The thesis proposes to show (1) "The real meaning of war, its root cause, and the scientific control and prevention thereof, and (2) the real meaning of peace, its root cause, and the scientific enforcement and advancement thereof, and its lofty ideals are expressed in its loving dedication "To a new and higher type of Education—of Civilization—of Thinking—of Conduct."

In spite of the fact that the author has proceeded with his material in a logical manner and has incorporated an enormous amount of informa-

tion from past and contemporary writers, the text is rather difficult to read; principally because of the condensed form of the presentation, but also because of the tendency to tautologize freely. The subject of war constitutes a difficult problem and anyone who attempts to study it in the light of the intellect, bites off a real chunk of academic tripe, which usually resists finer metabolic analysis for the simple reasons that its roots are among the deepest seated of all emotions, that man is a part of the problem he is attempting to solve and, that in the midst of it he is prone to suffer from emotional indigestion and from emotional stupidity.

The author of the present thesis has made special chapters on the mystery of war, on the force of war, on the intellectual processes of war, the war illusion complex, etc., and has emphasized the scientific control and prevention of war by means of education, religion, and law. He has discussed the various features of war as propounded by dozens of writers and finally concludes that "the force of war is intellectual—the force of deliberate thought," that the object of war is "conquest and enslavement, and that among other things it is the product of civilization." He discovers that the real root cause of war is expressed in the phrase, "I have the right to make war." "Peace also has a root cause. It is not a natural phenomenon—in nature, physical, chemical, plant, or animal, there is no such thing as peace." "Peace is an intellectual (thought) movement in human social life" and "the intellectual movement of peace has arisen from and in opposition to the intellectual movement of war." "I have the right to make war" is the expression of a "nation's criminal state of mind." "Warriors are not enemies, they are criminals" and thus we might go on giving examples of the meaning of war and peace in the light of "intellectology."

In order to deal constructively with the question of war in a manner to control or prevent it and thus, of course, to promote and enforce peace, the concluding chapter suggests that the mental batteries of "noted representatives" of Psychology and Psychiatry, of Sociology, of Education, of Religion, of Jurisprudence and of Government be concentrated respectively in "World Conferences," a movement which would "gain momentum" by and be enhanced by world conferences composed of the most high in Philosophy, in History, in Political Studies, in the Press and in the Fraternal Societies. Truly a sufficient number of conferences to satisfy anybody, excepting those unenlightened ones who do not believe in the efficacy of conference (particularly of war conferences), and who realize that conferences are composed of human beings whose "intellections" may at any time be determined by the same, more or less unconscious emotional factors affecting the warriors.

We should be open minded and, therefore, willing for "Intellectology" to have a try at the war problem. It is not impossible that it may succeed in modifying the situation, at least. However, it is not easy

from a biologic viewpoint to agree with many of the main tenets of the thesis, as the basic sadistic cravings (regardless of how they may be described and interpreted) which are part and parcel of every individual, are created anew at each birth, and no method has yet been devised that will serve to drain them entirely into "peaceful" channels. They tend to come to a focus periodically in organized battle, be it biologically "good or bad," and there are many studious souls who are not entirely convinced that war is altogether "bad." The thesis is a worthy effort and endorsed by several noted educators, including David Starr Jordan.

LEWIS.

THE SUBTLE TRAIL. Another Goldfish Story. By Joseph Gollomb. Published by The Macmillan Company, New York. 1929. Pp. 276.

Another Goldfish Story, which, like the previous one, *The Portrait Invisible*, rests primarily on the assumption that one may empathize himself into another's feelings and tendencies by imitating closely his postural attitudes, doing what he does, reading what he reads, etc. Further than that, it is the description of a man 100 per cent of whose libido is poured into the single channel, curiosity. Although the story gets rather grotesque in places, still the theme is interestingly followed out and the net result is somewhat different than the average detective story.

WHITE.

STERILIZATION FOR HUMAN BETTERMENT. (A Publication of Human Betterment Foundation.) By E. S. Gosney and Paul Popenoe. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1929. Pp. 202+xviii.

During the period from 1909 to 1929 some 6,000 operations for sterilization were performed in the state of California, and in this publication the authors have presented the results obtained by a study of the records of numerous cases. The United States Supreme Court has in the past few years sustained the legality of eugenic sterility of hereditary defectives, and since certain laws were passed not only are "all feeble-minded patients now sterilized before they are allowed to leave the state home at Sonoma," but "one in twelve of all the insane admitted to the state hospitals" and "one in five or six of the new admissions is now sterilized." The authors have studied the subject from a great many angles, including the history of sterilization, the effect on the sexual life, the psychological effect, from the personal, social and eugenic reasons, and the effect on the patient's general behavior.

They attempt to meet all arguments against the cause of sterilization; for example, it has been said by the opponents that sterilization may perhaps prevent the birth of some genius. After marshalling their facts the authors conclude, "In short, sterilization of the mentally diseased as it is now being practiced in California, will prevent the birth of

very few superior children while it will certainly prevent the birth of many children who would be eugenically inferior. The case is even clearer among the mentally defective. A genius may occasionally be the offspring of an insane parent, but where is the genius whose parents were feeble-minded?" The word "Sterilization" as it is used in this work always means vasectomy and not testicular or ovarian castration. They also emphasize that "Sterilization destroys no organ or gland of the body. Our investigations show that it has no effect upon sex desire, sex performance, or sex feeling of the subject, except a favorable psychological effect in some cases, particularly where the fear of pregnancy is removed."

Vasectomy does not unsex the individual, nor is it a punishment. There may be overzealous workers, "but the conclusion is inescapable that sterilization is a matter of public concern; that it must be in general considered an integral part of a state system of supervision of the incompetent, whence it follows that private sterilizations, performed outside of the state institutions designated under the law, should also be subjected to some sort of state supervision." We must heartily agree with these enthusiasts that some sort of rigid control in the selection of suitable cases is imperative, as the sterilization program now includes individuals subject to classification as helpless defectives, troublesome delinquents, hereditary defectives, manic depressives, precocious patients and epileptics and also a certain number of women (otherwise normal) who have too many children. In short sterilization is indicated wherever it may prevent propagation of the misfit, protect physical health, and relieve mental strain in women who are having too many pregnancies. Such an expansive field for sterilization could easily assume the proportions of a castration orgy unless controlled by a board on which are serving a few "doubting Thomases."

The operation, contrary to general opinion, does not encourage rape; the males are no more apt to do so, and the female is as safe as she ever was. "She is always subject to rape, and, in the lower class of home, to incest, which is common enough among a certain stratum of feeble-minded." In reply to the objection to sterilization sometimes made on the ground that we need morons to do rough and routine work, and that after all they are good law abiding citizens, the authors state that there is fortunately or unfortunately little possibility of stopping the production of morons altogether, as a sufficient number are born in families of normal intelligence to always insure a supply of sewer diggers and garbage collectors, etc.

Withal the experiment seems to be an interesting one and in most respects seems to be working out satisfactorily, at least from the present cross section aspect, but when man lays such a heavy hand upon the arrangements of natural selection and adjustment he should do so cautiously, therefore, it might be well to play safe for a time and limit

the procedure to one political division of humanity, *i.e.*, to one state such as California and note objectively if a really superior group of individuals are created in this fashion (perhaps it will require twenty years more to prove this). If this should be the result it will then be high time to advocate a universal adoption of sterilization principles. The little book should be carefully read by all who are interested in the various problems of eugenic import, as a short review cannot do it justice.

LEWIS.

THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. By E. E. Hewer and G. M. Sandes. The C. V. Mosby Company, St. Louis. 1929. Pp. 104.

Among the many manuals on neurology and neuroanatomy that have appeared during the past few years, this contribution by the English authors is outstanding in several respects. In the first place it has been primarily prepared for students and for those workers who have a limited amount of time to spend on the subject, therefore, a large amount of information is offered in a condensed form. In the second place those parts of the subject usually treated fully in the general run of textbooks have been more briefly presented, while other aspects not ordinarily adequately treated in the texts are here more prominently mentioned. The subject matter is arranged in rather rigid classified form. Not the least of its virtues is the informative way in which the diagrams have been designed to make clear the anatomic relationship of the various structures. There are fifty-five of these line drawings, in which the principle features are depicted in colors. Controversial matter, neuropathology, and gross anatomical descriptions have been omitted, but minute structure and function with some emphasis on clinical application have been considered together in a manner to stress certain points in teaching and to facilitate an introductory presentation of neurology.

In short the volume is the result of an attempt to improve the teaching technic in neurology and to furnish the student with a helpful guide and outline with which to pursue his studies. It should be successful within limits and deserves a thorough trial as a brief guide for students in medicine and psychology.

LEWIS.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY. By Ernest R. Groves, Research Professor of Social Science in the University of North Carolina. Longmans, Green and Company, New York. 1928. Pp. 568.

This volume on sociology is written primarily as a textbook for college and normal school students, as well as for others interested in the subject of the social thought of the day. The author aims to give the student a clear and comprehensive survey of social thought and experience, in accord with the present mode of human and psychic factors in social phenomena. An outstanding feature in this work is the com-

parative interpretation of the social experience of the child and the savage. In the child, he follows the development of the socialization of the individual as it occurs in the growing personality which in adulthood takes on the cultural experiences of the training. In the savage, the experiences remain at an elemental level. Professor Groves is not only a sociologist but also a psychologist with a good understanding of psychiatry, which is a necessary attribute in logical sociological thinking since mental hygiene has now become one of the most important phases of sociology with ramifications into the various strata of society today, and is one of the social sciences which must be accorded its place in the scheme of human relations. The arrangement of the volume, including an introduction, is divided into VII Parts, which are subdivided into chapters, complete and inclusive, on the subjects discussed. The appendix is well adapted to the student. The author provides an extensive bibliography, selected from a variety of sources.

Parts II, Man and His Social Equipment; III, Man and His Social Experience; IV, Man and His Social Organizations; V, Man and His Social Failures; VI, Man and His Social Resources, such as Play, Art, Science, and Education, and also Social Adequacy and Social Progress, and VII, Development and Field of Sociology.

Part V, Man and His Social Failures, is subdivided into chapters dealing with forms of social problems, causes of social problems, social problems and public policy, criticism and defense of philanthropy, prevention of social failure, and history of American philanthropy and public welfare. Part V is of special interest to psychiatrists for it deals with topics which are included under the mental hygiene movement: poverty, physical and mental disease, mental deficiency, crime, child welfare, vice, illegitimacy, problem of race, etc. The author, recognizing this fact, states that "Recent science has discovered how largely mental disease and abnormal personality traits show themselves in conduct as originating causes of social problems."

MARY O'MALLEY.

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND INTERPRETATION OF DRAMA. By J. W. Kaiser. N. V. Swets & Zeitlinger, Amsterdam. 1929. Pp. 79.

The author of this pamphlet deplores the fact that the present-day study of literature aims only at the development of one's faculty to enjoy literary works emotionally and artistically and fails to comprehend its object, which would add to the psychological understanding of those who created the drama and studied human nature in general. Students remain strangers to the real significance of the tragedies or comedies they admire and to the souls of those who created these works. They see only a superficial picture of a phase of life and fail to penetrate into the deeper nature and structure of a literary work as a document of human utterance. In the creation of the drama, the author works out

his own life pattern. The sense of inferiority and the struggle to overcome this inferiority and build up a superior individual or superman is the force which impels to literary creation. Of the multi-personalities in the drama, each represents some separate striving in the author himself which is only partially sublimated. To quote from Kaiser, "Drama is a product of the psyche which unconsciously projects its arrangement toward a certain problem into an apparently multi-personal demonstration of life."

The author gives an interpretation of his created work along the lines of his individual attitude toward life, portraying himself born with a feeling of inferiority and the desire to prevail. In the drama he reveals how the exigencies of real life are experienced as threatening both his individual style of life and the superiority he hopes to gain by it.

There runs through each drama a "rising line"; this connects the initial mood with the conclusion. It is this line along which the dramatist attains his object, that is to say, self-confidence, recognition, dominance, excellence. The initial mood of the first act is one of sadness or depression, general uncertainty, diffidence, and ominous expectation, realized as inferiority. It is in this act that we find a display of the author's attitude toward life and of the problems of reality. This act, or "exposition," as it is called, reveals the special reason for the author's "torturing-feeling" of inferiority, discloses the nature of the inferiority and the desire to overcome the situation and to attain recognition and superiority. He cites examples of this in the opening lines of Maeterlinck's "Pelléas and Mélisande" and Shakespeare's "Merchant of Venice."

The second act brings out the conflict. One is led here to believe that the chief character or hero is approaching failure (giving proof of his inferiority), but this seeming failure is used to enhance the value of the hero's ultimate triumph. The third act is commonly called the "crisis." In this the opposing elements of the will and desire of the dramatist or of his hero are overcome and the fortunes of the hero reach a critical point. The fourth act, or "falling action," contains the development of the preference embodied in the crisis. The fifth act, or conclusion, shows the hero triumphant in a reconciliation between the world and the behavior pattern as personified by the hero. (Kaiser believes that three acts suffice for a drama, rather than five.)

As an example of his plan, he cites Rostand's "Cyrano de Bergerac," who has all the qualities of a superior man, nobleman, officer, poet of great talent, swordsman, orator, humorous, courageous. He is able by his wit to do everything and conquer everybody but his lack of physical beauty undermines his self-confidence, giving him a feeling of inadequacy and inferiority and this overshadows his life; it has forced him to enter upon a restless struggle for superiority and recognition. The sense of inferiority like an insurmountable bar lies between him and happiness, in spite of all his victories. To win the love of woman assumes the

value of a conquest, the last and indispensable victory before he can reach his goal of dominance.

According to Kaiser's interpretation of drama, the hero represents the dramatist himself, as a perfected superman and, as the plot continues, by overcoming all difficulties and obstacles which arise in his life plan and unceasingly gaining strength, he is at last the powerful and successful one who marries and is happy ever after, or who dies (one form of interpretation of success). He has the sympathy and admiration of the readers or the spectators, which brings the satisfaction for which he is striving unconsciously.

Thus, in *Cyrano*, the hero does not want Roxane as his wife. He has met woman as a friend and that satisfies his scheme of life. He only wants to make sure that he can win her love, which he does, and then he continues his quest of military glory after she has taken the veil. Fatally wounded, he confesses his love for her.

Kaiser thus analyzes this drama of Rostand's in the following summary: "A vision of desperate ambition. A glorification of the denial of the Reality of Life for the sake of Apparent Victory. An unconscious training for fictitious superiority. The momentary portrait of a poet's attitude towards life. Nevertheless a sublime form of human utterance, deserving reverence."

An example of the feelings of imperfection and sadness is illustrated in Shakespeare's comedy, "The Merchant of Venice." In the first verse, Antonio's state of mind shows this depressed mood. In this mood Shakespeare identifies himself as Antonio who is the dramatist's ideal self, his would-be self, which has been found imperfect.

"In sooth, I know not why I am sad:
It wearies me; you say it wearies you;
But how I caught it, found it, or came by it,
What stuff 'tis made of, whereof it is born,
I am to learn;
And such a want-wit sadness makes of me
That I have much ado to know myself."

The above lines serve to express Antonio's presentiment of coming evil and they prepare the audience for the things that are to happen. The words express the conscious and unconscious expression.

Antonio is represented as an ideal—a generous, tenderhearted man, brought into difficulties by his kindness to his friends. He delivers unfortunates from the power of cruel usury; he protects the weak and helps the poor. By his kind and noble attributes he has attained great recognition. Bassanio becomes what is called the "conditional creation"—a new ideal self, a "should-be" self of Antonio. The creation of this new self is an equivalent to a sacrifice of the old one (Antonio). Hence, the "should-be" self is substituted for the old one and the

original self-ideal drops out. Thus, we have here a combination in Antonio; with his good qualities he assumes superiority over all because of these qualities. Colleagues in his social set have nothing to do with him, hence his air of superiority towards friends who are his inferior. His superiority is the fruit of exclusiveness. He does not need woman or anyone as companion. He entertains a kind of friendship, a generous sympathy, for those who are his inferiors although he could hate them, which he does unconsciously.

While Antonio has no desire for woman, Bassanio has, and he asks Antonio to loan him money so that he can win a woman. Antonio is willing to do this for in aiding Bassanio to gain ideal woman, he is reaching towards the realization of her being. He himself does not possess what is indispensable to a man, what he is expected to have, and so he aids another man to get it.

The author having created a new ideal, he must then promote the interests of the new ideal. Shakespeare, under the influence of the identification of himself with Antonio, represents Shylock as a specimen of all that is wrong and evil. The religious intolerance for Jews was recognized by Shakespeare in the Elizabethan age. The rival is pictured as unfavorably as possible. The two faiths are particularly fitted for the dramatist's purpose. Shylock ruled by Jehovah, the jealous and revengeful tyrant; Antonio, a follower of the merciful sin-forgiving Savior.

Not knowing or understanding Shakespeare's unconscious meaning, the audience express their secret sympathies. The majority detest Shylock and lovingly follow Antonio's tribulations. "They fail to see that Shylock is in the first place the antagonist of Antonio because Antonio wants to dominate all that lives in Venice in order to prove his superiority. They fail to see that of two characters Shylock is the more natural one and they are willingly led to the conclusion, at which the author unconsciously aimed."

Woman at first appears as a dangerous partner, but is tolerated because she does not demand the sacrifice of the friend and because she herself can be a friend. Antonio fears that he will fall short of superiority if he includes woman. A new possibility is found, the husband sacrifices his wife for his friend and yet succeeds in giving her what is due her. Their dissatisfaction, sadness, disharmony, and struggle come to an end. Antonio and Bassanio are no longer realized as opposed one to another, as they merge into the ideal self.

Kaiser believes the correspondence between the psychic tendencies disclosed in this play and the historical data concerning Shakespeare is evident. He concludes with the following, "A series of interpretations of Shakespeare's drama along lines of the theory given here will go far to dispose of the arbitrariness in literary criticism."

MARY O'MALLEY.

SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE MENTALLY DEFICIENT. By Stanley Powell Davies, Ph.D., with Foreword by Frankwood E. Williams, M.D. Published by Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York. Pp. 380+Bibliography and Index.

The first edition of this work was published in 1923. This, the second edition, is considerably enlarged, has much new material distributed throughout, and is illustrated. The reviewer is very glad to see an excellent picture of the late Dr. Fernald, whose name will always be associated with the early efforts at understanding and helping the feeble-minded in this country. Particular attention should be called to the additions to the chapter on the Changing Concepts of Heredity, to the sanity of the discussion of the question of Sterilization, and to the new chapters on Defective Delinquents and on the Newer Aspects of Behavior. The very excellent historical matter naturally remains much the same, but with the change in the other portions of the book, specifically those mentioned, Dr. Davies' book still maintains its place as the most important text on the subject of the feeble-minded which we have in this country.

WHITE.

BECAUSE I STUTTER. By Wendell Johnson. D. Appleton and Company, New York. 1930. Pp. 127. Price \$1.50.

This interesting little book is the story of a stutterer written by one of them. The author is a young man who, after the usual experiences with methods, aids and devices guaranteed to cure his affliction, including "stuttering schools," found his way into Dr. Lee Travis's speech clinic at the University of Iowa, where, to quote his own words, he has "succeeded for all practical purposes in gaining an understanding of himself and his situation as a speech defective." Incidentally he is recovering from this stuttering.

How did this understanding come about? In the Iowa Speech Clinic laboratories research in speech pathology has been carried on for several years. Dr. Travis's theory is "that stuttering is a definite neuromuscular derangement of the functional type in which there is a general reduction in cortical activity due to transient and mutually inhibitive activities of the associative areas of the right and the left cerebral hemispheres. In the stutterer, instead of nervous energy flowing into one center of greatest facility in transmission, it flows into two centers of equal facility in transmission, which function in reaction patterns of opposite orientation and configuration to produce in the peripheral speech organs simultaneous or alternate opposition in muscular movement. The symptoms of stuttering are mainly signs of the rivalry between the two sides of the brain." The neurological basis of stuttering then, is a lack of a sufficiently dominant center in one or the other of the two cerebral hemispheres. Instruments have been developed which measure—or discover—the subject's native neural dominance; and by this means Mr. Johnson found, that though he had always been right-handed he should have been

left-handed; and training was instituted to make him so. Along with this went a "thorough-going psychoanalytic investigation" which he states unearthed nothing of importance to the causation of the stuttering. It did however clear up the morbid attitudes which he had developed toward himself as a stutterer and toward the world in general.

Brief though it is, Mr. Johnson's story is an interesting human document. It is the story of a hypersensitive child with good intelligence growing up in the restrictive and prosaic atmosphere of the middle-west prairies. He had an esthetic bent, and early became a day-dreamer. However he was not unduly introverted, and developed considerable athletic powers, as well as building up a reputation in his small community as a jolly good fellow. All his activities however, from a very early age, he regards as distinctly compensations for his stuttering. His whole personality grew out of it and was conditioned by it; he was never just a boy or a young man; always, even when silent and solitary, he was a *stutterer*. This too in spite of the fact that he had a very happy and normal childhood, and that his associates paid little attention to his handicap. This is no chronicle of thwarted childish wishes and emotional traumata, but the story of a healthy happy youngster who for some unknown reason—no one knew even that he was natively left-handed—began to stutter at the age of five, and by ten was no longer Wendell Johnson, boy, but Wendell Johnson, Stutterer. He traces for us step by step how his personality trends developed in response to the restrictions laid upon him by his handicap. From an eager, active, happy child we see him turning into a shut-in and self-centered adolescent, growing bitter and rebellious, and breaking into active revolt as an atheist and radical in his nineteenth year. How much further in the way of personality disintegration this might have gone had he not found help in time no one can say.

Though not intended as such the book is a treatise on the mental hygiene of the handicapped in whatever way, and as such should be read by every parent or teacher who has to deal with them.

WINIFRED V. RICHMOND.

PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY. Volume I. The Problems of Psychology and Perception. By Leonard T. Troland. D. Van Nostrand Company. 1929. Pp. 429.

This book is the first of the four volumes promised by the author on the principles of psychophysiology. It embraces the parts dealing with the definition of psychology, with psychophysiological methods of investigation and with the whole field of perception. That the author is friendly toward the Freudian type of psychology is made clear in his review of general psychological knowledge where he states "By thus laying stress upon the problem of motivation, the psychoanalysts have given psychology a tremendous impetus in a direction along which it must travel progressively if it is to be of maximum human utility. The Freudian emphasis

upon sex, fear and other primitive motives has opened the eyes of psychologists to the importance of instincts, for an understanding of mental life."

Gestalt psychology, behaviorism, and the psychology of consciousness are all discussed at some length. Concerning behaviorism he states that "Behaviorists frequently contend that physiology deals only with the functions of individual organs in the body thus leaving for consideration of psychology the manner of their interaction and coördinated functioning, in the adaptations which are made by the organism to its environment. However, the general conception of physiology, as it has developed historically, certainly does not justify this distinction," and concludes that "there is nothing new in the behavioristic movement except the contention that the movement in question is psychological." Consciousness is defined in terms of experience, "as a cross section of the latter taken in time, at any instant," and introspective psychology is a systematic description of immediate experience in its own terms—it is the science of the constitution and processes of immediate experience, a science of elements, structures, and changes: Psychophysiology is a science of special relations and of the laws which correlate the data of introspective psychology with those of physiology, which is a physical science. The primary problem of psychology is that of the description of experience, and experience may be analyzed in three different ways—i.e., by parts, by aspects and by phases. He regards the problem of the localization of consciousness as being cosmological rather than as psychophysiological in nature, and factors which have a localization in the brain are determinants of consciousness—"Consciousness itself, has no 'seat' anywhere in the physical world" since temporal cross-sections of immediate experience cannot possibly be located in the physical brain.

Throughout the book the author demonstrates his ability to express complex scientific and philosophic matters in a clear, easily read language construction. He has herein accumulated, discussed and attempted to correlate the important past contributions in this field, has redefined many concepts and has reorganized into more specific problems several of the more unsettled phases of physiological psychology. The chapters dealing with response, sensation and perception are particularly excellent for the student in psychology. When finished, the complete set of four volumes will include the important aspects of the field of psychophysiology and thus should serve as an excellent text for the university student, and as a useful reference book for the instructor. The bibliography comprises 330 references.

LEWIS.

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